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FOREWORD 
 This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a roundtable on Impact 
Evaluation of Merger Decisions held by the Competition Committee in June 2011. 
 
 It is published under the responsibility of the Secretary General of the OECD to bring 
information on this topic to the attention of a wider audience. 
 
 This compilation is one of a series of publications entitled "Competition Policy Roundtables". 
 
PRÉFACE 
 Ce document rassemble la documentation dans la langue d'origine dans laquelle elle a été 
soumise, relative à une table ronde la table-ronde sur l'évaluation de l'impact des décisions relatives aux 
fusions qui s'est tenue en juin 2011 dans le cadre du Comité de la concurrence. 
 
 Il est publié sous la responsabilité du Secrétaire général de l'OCDE, afin de porter à la 
connaissance d'un large public les éléments d'information qui ont été réunis à cette occasion. 
 
 Cette compilation fait partie de la série intitulée "Les tables rondes sur la politique de la 
concurrence". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visit our Internet Site -- Consultez notre site Internet 
 
http://www.oecd.org/competition 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
By the Secretariat 
Considering the discussion at the roundtable as well as the delegates’ and panellists’ written 
submissions, several key points emerge: 
(1) Ex post evaluations of merger decisions can help to assess whether the conclusions in a specific 
merger decision were correct in light of the available evidence at the time of the decision, and 
whether a decision was consistent with the jurisdiction’s policy goals.  They are an important 
tool that can help competition authorities to improve the quality of future decisions.  
 Experts and delegates agreed during this roundtable that ex post evaluations are an important 
instrument for assessing previous merger review decisions, as well as for improving the quality 
of future decisions.  Merger review necessarily involves making predictions about future market 
developments.  Ex post evaluations provide an opportunity to check whether these predictions 
were sound, given the information available at the time, if the assumptions on which these 
predictions were made were sensible, and if the tools and models used to make the predictions 
were appropriate.   
 Ex post evaluations can also focus on specific aspects of previous merger decisions.  In many 
merger decisions, the outcome may depend on a single, key argument such as the likely entry of a 
new competitor or the existence of sizeable merger-specific efficiencies.  Ex post evaluations can 
focus on these specific aspects of merger review decisions to inform the competition authority 
about what data to collect and how to evaluate evidence in future merger cases where the 
outcome depends on similar claims.  Several competition authorities have also used ex post 
reviews to examine the effectiveness of remedies in maintaining competition. 
(2) A number of quantitative methods can be used for ex post evaluations of merger decisions, such 
as structural models, difference-in-difference approaches, and event studies, as well as surveys.  
Which method can be most usefully applied will depend on a range of factors, including data 
availability, resources, and expertise, and therefore there is no single, perfect method for all ex 
post evaluations.  Using a combination of methods typically will produce the most reliable 
results, and experts suggest that surveys should always be included in an evaluation exercise. 
 The principal three quantitative methods to conduct ex post evaluations are structural models, 
difference-in-difference approaches, and event studies.  Each method has both advantages and 
limitations. These need to be taken into account when planning an ex post evaluation exercise and 
when determining what method(s) to apply.  If the available data and the skills and expertise of 
the team in charge of the work do not match the requirements of the method chosen for an ex post 
review, the results of the evaluation exercise may be unreliable. 
 Structural models make it possible to examine how the market would have developed absent the 
merger.  In principle, they can also be used to evaluate merger prohibition decisions.  Although 
structural models may be considered the "state of the art" evaluation method that can produce the 
most reliable results, they also have limitations.  They rely on standard oligopoly models and 
DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 14 
cannot be used if competition in the market does not follow one of those models. In addition, 
they cannot capture any structural change in the market. Their biggest limitations, however, are 
their extensive data requirement and the sophisticated econometrics skills they demand.  
 The difference-in-difference approach relies on a comparison of the market in which a merger 
has taken place with development in a “control market,” which must be very similar to the 
market where the merger takes place, but sufficiently removed so it is not affected by the merger.  
This method is less data intensive, but nevertheless still requires a significant amount of data and 
econometric expertise. Most critically it depends on the ability to identify an appropriate “control 
market” for the results to be meaningful.   
 Event studies analyse stock market reactions after a merger has been announced, both with 
respect to the merging parties and their competitors.  They have the advantage of requiring a 
limited amount of data, which is easily available and less resource intensive. However, this 
method has its limitations, too.  For example, the parties involved in the merger and their 
competitors must be publicly listed firms and, if they are multi-product firms, the market affected 
by the merger should be the main market in which they are active.  Moreover, it was argued that 
event studies are not a reliable evaluation method because they rely on the assumption that stock 
markets efficiently and swiftly process all available information and incorporate it in stock prices, 
an assumption that has long been dismissed in the financial economics literature.  Other 
roundtable participants thought, to the contrary, that event studies can in the right circumstances 
provide useful information about past merger decisions. They have been used by several 
competition authorities as an evaluation tool.   
 Surveys of market participants are not a quantitative method, but they can support quantitative 
methods because surveys make it possible to gather data when data are otherwise unavailable.  
Further, they can be used to complement the results of other assessment exercises.  Surveys may 
appear simple to conduct, but the questions require careful preparation to provide reliable 
information. Sampling design is also very important for their success.   
(3) Previous merger decisions can sometimes also be evaluated with less resource-intensive 
approaches.  For example, where several mergers occur in the same industry over time, later 
merger reviews can be used to assess the correctness of predictions in previous decisions; sector 
surveys can be used to focus on mergers in specific industries; or at the time the authority adopts 
a decision another specific merger can already be identified as a candidate for later review, 
which facilitates data gathering.  What is important is that a competition authority is committed 
to a systematic and regular effort to review previous decisions to assess whether they were 
correct and used effective analytical tools. 
 The delegates acknowledged that not all competition authorities will have the necessary resources 
and/or number of merger decisions to apply some of the more complex and resource-intensive 
evaluation methods.  But the speakers emphasised that a wide spectrum of approaches to ex post 
evaluations exists and that not every competition authority has to use the most elaborate, 
expensive methods.  Nevertheless, competition authorities should commit to systematically 
reviewing previous decisions, even with the more basic approaches, and avoid simply assuming 
that their previous interventions were successes.  
 Approaches to ex post reviews that even smaller authorities can usefully apply include, for 
example, reviewing a merger to examine the accuracy of earlier merger review decisions in the 
same industry; using limited and targeted, "mini review" exercises in key sectors in which the 
competition authority expects a larger number of mergers; and using a "seed planting" strategy 
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where another merger is already identified for future review at the time of the decision, the key 
issues that drove the decision are clearly identified when closing the file, and data gathering 
begins as the transaction is consummated.  It has also been argued that qualitative methods are 
less resource intensive, but can still provide useful information concerning the accuracy of 
previous decisions. 
(4) It is important to plan review exercises carefully to ensure that their results are reliable and to 
maximise their usefulness. This requires a clearly identified goal of the assessment, careful 
selection of the decisions that will be reviewed, identification of available data, and the choice of 
a method that is appropriate to the decision selected and the data available, and for which the 
competition authority, or its outside experts, have the skills necessary to ensure reliable results. 
 Experts and delegates from competition authorities that have undertaken ex post evaluations 
concurred that careful planning is essential to maximise the benefits of ex post evaluation 
exercises.  Among the first elements to consider are the goal and scope of the review exercise.  
The design of a review should ensure that it determines not only whether those past decisions 
were correct in light of the jurisdiction's policy goals and the available evidence, but also whether 
the analysis leading to the decision was accurate and complete. 
 Another point of agreement was that the decision(s) to be reviewed must be selected carefully.  
Close-call decisions are good candidates for ex post evaluations.  These could include, for 
example, decisions in cases where there was uncertainty and perhaps even disagreement within a 
competition authority about how to evaluate the evidence correctly, and/or public criticism after 
the decision. The likely availability of data should also influence the selection of decisions for ex 
post evaluation.  In addition, sufficient time should have passed since the decision was reached to 
ensure that the effects of a merger can be observed, but not so much time that it would be 
difficult to disentangle those effects from other market developments.   
 Another important element is the selection of the review team.  Doing an ex post review in house 
can require significant resources, but at the same time may facilitate access to data because files 
may be confidential or parties may be unwilling to reveal data to consultants.  However, since 
ensuring impartiality is important, if an authority decides to perform an ex post evaluation in 
house, it should be conducted by staff not involved in the original decision.   
(5) Ex post merger reviews can also be used to estimate the benefits of merger enforcement in 
general and to demonstrate that the costs of a merger review regime are justified in light of the 
benefits it produces.  Simplified methods that rely on a limited number of parameters can be used 
to estimate consumer benefits from the overall merger control activities of a competition 
authority.  
 Ex post evaluations can also be used to estimate the overall benefits of merger enforcement.  For 
this purpose, competition authorities can use simpler methodologies that allow them to estimate 
the impact of a larger number of decisions.   
 However, the approaches normally used to quantify the benefits of merger regimes (hence of a 
large number of action/no-action decisions) also have their limitations. They do not involve 
detailed examination of specific merger decisions, but they perform simple calculations to 
determine the likely benefits deriving from a large number of merger decisions. Further, they 
assume that the decisions adopted by the competition authority have all been correct.  More 
importantly, the benefits are likely not to include an estimation of the deterrence effect of merger 
control regime because of the difficulty inherent in such an exercise. 
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 Some delegates also made the point that only multiple detailed ex-post assessments may permit 
more general inferences about the effectiveness of merger enforcement with regard to certain 
types of mergers. 
(6) Given the growing recognition of the importance of conducting ex post assessments, the 
challenges when conducting ex post evaluations of merger decisions, and the experience with 
review exercises that an increasing number of authorities have had, there appears to be a case 
for a more systematic effort to gather existing experiences and techniques in a single document 
with a view toward creating a toolbox with know-how, references, and examples for competition 
authorities seeking to conduct an effective ex post evaluation of merger decisions.  
 Participants agreed on the potential benefits of a toolkit for ex post evaluations of merger 
decisions. Such a toolkit should not propose a one-size-fits-all approach, but should include 
approaches that are appropriate and realistic for competition authorities with various levels of 
resources and expertise. There was also agreement that it would not be appropriate to seek to 
collect a set of best practices, given that the experience in this area is still relatively limited and 
that there are significant differences among competition authorities in terms of resources, skills 
and expertise. 
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SYNTHÈSE 
 
Par le Secrétariat 
Plusieurs points essentiels ressortent des débats de la table ronde, des contributions écrites des 
délégués et des experts à la table ronde : 
(1) Les évaluations ex-post des décisions relatives aux fusions peuvent aider à évaluer si les 
conclusions auxquelles une autorité de la concurrence a abouti pour rendre une décision relative 
à une opération de fusion donnée étaient correctes à la lumière des éléments dont elle disposait au 
moment où elle a pris la décision en question ou encore si une décision donnée était conforme aux 
objectifs d’action publique visés par son pays. Elles constituent un outil important qui peut aider 
les autorités de la concurrence à améliorer la qualité de leurs futures décisions.  
 Lors de la table ronde, experts et délégués sont tombés d’accord sur le fait que les évaluations ex-
post sont un instrument important pour évaluer les décisions relevant du contrôle des fusions que 
les autorités de la concurrence ont prises dans le passé ainsi que pour améliorer la qualité de leurs 
futures décisions. Le contrôle des fusions suppose nécessairement que l’autorité de la 
concurrence se livre à des prédictions sur les évolutions futures du marché. Les évaluations ex-
post offrent aux autorités de la concurrence l’occasion si les prédictions qu’elles ont faites étaient 
justes, étant donnée les informations dont elles disposaient au moment où elles ont rendu leur 
décision, les postulats sur lesquels reposaient ces prédictions et les outils et modèles utilisés pour 
aboutir à ces prédictions.  
 Les évaluations ex-post peuvent également être axées sur certains aspects précis des décisions 
relatives aux fusions rendues dans le passé. En ce qui concerne nombre de décisions, le refus ou 
l’agrément de l’autorité peut dépendre d’un unique argument irréfutable comme l’arrivée 
probable d’un nouveau concurrent sur le marché ou l’existence d’importants gains d’efficacité 
induits par la fusion proprement dite. Si elles sont axées sur ces aspects précis, les évaluations 
peuvent également indiquer aux autorités de la concurrence quelles données recueillir et de quelle 
manière évaluer les éléments dont elles disposent lorsqu’elles procèderont au contrôle de futures 
opérations de fusion dont l’agrément ou le refus dépendra d’arguments analogues. Plusieurs 
autorités de la concurrence ont en outre utilisé les examens ex-post pour confirmer que les mesures 
correctives demandées ont permis de préserver la concurrence aussi efficacement que prévu. 
(2) Un certain nombre de méthodes quantitatives – modèles structurels, approche des doubles 
différences et études d’événement – ainsi que des enquêtes d’opinion peuvent être utilisées pour 
réaliser des évaluations ex-post. Le choix de la méthode qui s’avèrera la plus utile dépend d’une 
série de facteurs, comme la disponibilité des données et les ressources et compétences dont 
l’autorité est dotée. Il n’existe donc pas de méthode unique et idéale applicable à toutes les 
évaluations ex-post. Combiner les méthodes disponibles est un moyen d’obtenir généralement les 
résultats les plus fiables et les experts suggèrent aux autorités d’inclure systématiquement une 
enquête d’opinion dans les exercices d’évaluation. 
 Les modèles structurels, l’approche des doubles différences et les études d’événement sont les 
principales méthodes quantitatives applicables pour réaliser des évaluations ex-post. Chacune 
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présente à la fois des avantages et des inconvénients, qui doivent être pris en compte lors de 
l’organisation d’un tel exercice et pour déterminer quelle(s) méthode(s) appliquer. Si les données 
disponibles, les qualifications et les compétences de l’équipe qui en est chargée ne correspondent 
pas aux exigences de la méthode retenue, cela peut compromettre la fiabilité des résultats de 
l’évaluation effectuée. 
 Les modèles structurels permettent d’analyser comment le marché aurait évolué en l’absence de 
fusion. En principe, ils peuvent donc également être utilisés pour évaluer les décisions de refus 
d’agrément. Même si les modèles structurels peuvent être considérés comme une méthode de 
pointe qui permet d’obtenir les résultats les plus fiables, ils ont aussi des limites. Ils reposent en 
effet sur des modèles d’oligopole standard et ne peuvent être appliqués à un marché n’obéissant 
pas à l’un d’entre eux. Ils ne peuvent pas non plus rendre compte des évolutions structurelles 
survenant sur le marché concerné. Quoi qu’il en soit, leur principale limite tient à l’ampleur des 
données nécessaires et aux compétences économétriques complexes qu’ils requièrent. 
 La méthode des doubles différences repose sur une comparaison du marché sur lequel la fusion a 
eu lieu avec l’évolution survenue sur un « marché de référence » qui doit être très similaire à 
celui sur lequel l’opération s’est déroulée, mais en être aussi suffisamment éloigné pour ne pas en 
ressentir l’impact. Cette méthode nécessite moins de données. Néanmoins, une quantité 
importante de données et de compétences économétriques sont tout de même nécessaires pour la 
mettre en œuvre. Cette méthode dépend par-dessus tout de la capacité à identifier un « marché de 
référence » pour que les résultats de l’évaluation soient valables. 
 Les études d’événement analysent les réactions du marché boursier – tant vis-à-vis des parties à 
la fusion que de leurs concurrents – après l’annonce d’une opération de fusion. Elles ont pour 
avantage de ne nécessiter qu’une quantité limitée de données facilement accessibles, ce qui exige 
de mobiliser moins de ressources. Toutefois, cette méthode présente elle aussi des limites. Ainsi, 
les parties à la fusion et leurs concurrents doivent être des entreprises cotées et, s’il s’agit 
d’entreprises produisant plusieurs produits, le marché concerné par la fusion doit être leur marché 
principal. En outre, les intervenants ont fait valoir que les études d’événement ne sont pas une 
méthode d’évaluation fiable car elles reposent sur le postulat que les marchés boursiers étant 
efficients traitent rapidement toutes les informations dont ils disposent et les répercutent sur le 
cours des actions ; or ce postulat a depuis longtemps été démenti par les ouvrages d’économie 
financière publiés. Selon d’autres participants à la table ronde, ces études peuvent, au contraire, si 
les circonstances s’y prêtent, fournir des informations utiles sur les décisions relatives aux fusions 
prises dans le passé. Plusieurs autorités de la concurrence les utilisent comme outil d’évaluation. 
 Les enquêtes effectuées auprès des acteurs du marché ne sont pas une méthode quantitative mais 
elles peuvent appuyer les méthodes quantitatives car elles permettent de recueillir des données 
que les autorités ne pourraient se procurer par un autre moyen. Elles peuvent en outre compléter 
les résultats qu’ont donnés d’autres types d’évaluations. Ces enquêtes peuvent en outre paraître 
simples à réaliser. En fait, les questions à poser doivent être préparées avec grand soin si l’on 
veut en tirer des informations fiables. La composition de l’échantillon est également très 
importante pour que ces enquêtes portent pleinement leurs fruits. 
(3) Les décisions relatives aux fusions rendues dans le passé peuvent parfois être évaluées à l’aide 
d’approche mobilisant moins de ressources. Ainsi, lorsque plusieurs fusions ont eu lieu au fil des 
ans dans un même secteur d’activité, les autorités peuvent utiliser les procédures ultérieures de 
contrôle des fusions pour confirmer le bien-fondé des prédictions auxquelles elles se sont livrées 
pour rendre leurs décisions passées ; elles peuvent aussi utiliser les enquêtes réalisées auprès 
des acteurs de tel ou tel secteur d’activité pour centrer leurs évaluations sur les opérations de 
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fusion qui ont lieu dans le secteur en question ou bien encore, au moment où elles rendent une 
décision, elles peuvent déjà identifier quelle autre opération de fusion bien précise donnera lieu 
à un examen ultérieur, ce qui simplifie le recueil des données. Il importe surtout que les autorités 
de la concurrence se livrent à un effort systématique et régulier d’examen des décisions qu’elles 
ont prises dans le passé pour évaluer si ces décisions se sont avérées correctes et peuvent servir 
d’outils d’analyse efficaces. 
 Un délégué reconnaît que les autorités de la concurrence ne disposent pas de toutes des 
ressources nécessaires et/ou n’ont pas toutes rendues un nombre suffisant de décisions relatives à 
des opérations de fusion pour mettre en œuvre certaines des méthodes d’évaluation les plus 
complexes ou qui mobilisent beaucoup de ressources. Les intervenants ont toutefois souligné 
qu’il existe un large éventail d’approches applicables pour mener à bien des évaluations ex-post 
et que les autorités de la concurrence ne sont pas toutes tenues de faire appel aux méthodes les 
plus complexes et les plus onéreuses. Elles doivent néanmoins s’engager à réexaminer 
systématiquement les décisions qu’elles ont rendues, fût-ce à l’aide d’approches plus sommaires, 
et se garder de supposer simplement que leurs interventions passées ont été fructueuses. 
 Il existe plusieurs méthodes que même les petites autorités de la concurrence peuvent utilement 
mettre en œuvre. Par exemple, elles peuvent procéder au contrôle d’une opération de fusion dans 
un secteur donné en vue d’évaluer la justesse des décisions qu’elles ont prises dans le passé 
concernant d’autres opérations dans ce même secteur. L’autorité de la concurrence peut aussi 
recourir à des « mini-évaluations » limitées et ciblant des secteurs d’activité importants au sein 
desquels elle s’attend à un grand nombre de fusions. Elle peut en outre appliquer la stratégie 
consistant à « semer des graines » qui consiste à considérer, au moment où elle rend une décision, 
que celle-ci fera l’objet d’une évaluation future. Au moment de la clôture du dossier, elle doit 
alors mettre clairement en évidence les principales raisons ayant motivé cette décision et 
commencer à recueillir, dès que l’opération de fusion est réalisée, les données qui seront 
nécessaires à cette future évaluation. Certains intervenants ont en outre soutenu que les méthodes 
qualitatives, tout en mobilisant moins de ressources, peuvent quand même fournir des 
informations utiles quant à la justesse des décisions rendues dans le passé. 
(4) Il importe d’organiser avec soin les examens ex-post pour assurer que leurs résultats sont fiables 
et pour en maximiser l’utilité. Cela requiert de définir précisément l’objectif de l’exercice, de 
choisir avec soin les décisions qui feront l’objet de l’évaluation, de s’assurer que les données 
disponibles ont été identifiées et de choisir une méthode d’évaluation adaptée à la décision 
retenue ainsi qu’aux données disponibles pour laquelle l’autorité de la concurrence, ou les 
experts extérieurs qui procèderont à l’évaluation, sont dotés des compétences requises afin de ne 
pas compromettre la fiabilité des résultats. 
 Les experts et les délégués des autorités de la concurrence qui ont effectué des évaluations ex-
post sont tombés d’accord sur le fait qu’une organisation minutieuse est indispensable pour 
maximiser les avantages de tels exercices. L’objectif et l’ampleur de l’évaluation comptent au 
nombre des premiers éléments à prendre en compte. La conception même de l’évaluation doit 
assurer que cet exercice permettra bien à l’autorité de déterminer si les décisions qu’elle a 
rendues dans le passé étaient les bonnes, à la lumière des objectifs visés par les pouvoirs publics 
de son pays et des éléments dont elle disposait à l’époque, mais également si l’analyse qui l’a 
conduite à prendre la décision en question était juste et complète. 
 Nul n’a contesté non plus qu’il convient de choisir avec soin la ou les décisions à évaluer. Les 
décisions rendues alors que les avis étaient très partagés peuvent ainsi être particulièrement 
intéressantes à examiner. Le choix peut aussi porter, par exemple, sur les décisions prises alors 
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qu’au sein de l’autorité de la concurrence, les personnes qui s’en sont chargées n’étaient pas sûres 
de savoir comment évaluer correctement les éléments dont elles disposaient, voire ont pu être en 
désaccord à ce sujet, et/ou sur les décisions qui se sont heurtées à de vives critiques de l’opinion 
publique. La disponibilité probable des données doit également entrer en ligne de compte pour 
choisir les décisions qui donneront lieu à une évaluation ex-post. En outre, un délai suffisant doit 
s’être écoulé depuis le moment où la décision a été prise pour que l’on puisse assurément en 
observer les effets, mais il ne doit pas être trop long non plus, car il serait alors difficile de 
distinguer les effets en question d’autres évolutions survenues sur le marché concerné. 
 Le choix de l’équipe chargée de l’évaluation est également important. La réalisation d’examens 
ex-post en interne peut exiger d’importantes ressources mais faciliter dans le même temps l’accès 
aux données nécessaires quand les dossiers sont confidentiels ou que les parties ne sont pas 
disposées à les communiquer à des consultants extérieurs. Quoi qu’il en soit, dans un souci 
d’impartialité, si une autorité décide de procéder à une évaluation ex-post en interne, cette 
évaluation devra alors être réalisée par des collaborateurs qui n’auront joué aucun rôle dans la 
décision rendue à l’origine. 
(5) Les examens ex-post peuvent également servir à évaluer les avantages engendrés par les activités 
d’application de la loi en général et à démontrer que les coûts d’un régime de contrôle des 
fusions sont justifiés compte tenu des avantages qui en découlent. Les méthodes simplifiées 
reposant sur un nombre limité de paramètres peuvent servir à estimer les avantages pour les 
consommateurs en les isolant des autres activités générales de contrôle de fusions exercées par 
une autorité de la concurrence. 
 Les évaluations ex-post peuvent également servir à évaluer les avantages généraux engendrés par 
les activités d’application de la loi. Dans cette optique, les autorités de la concurrence peuvent 
recourir à des méthodes plus simples, qui leur permettent d’estimer l’impact d’un plus grand 
nombre de décisions. 
 Cela étant, les approches normalement utilisées pour quantifier les avantages des régimes de 
contrôle des fusions ont également leurs limites (d'où un grand nombre de décisions d'action/non-
action). Elles ne comportent pas un examen détaillé des décisions de fusion spécifiques, mais 
effectuent des calculs simples pour déterminer les avantages probables découlant d'un grand 
nombre de décisions relatives aux fusions. En outre, elles reposent sur le postulat que les 
décisions rendues par les autorités de la concurrence sont toutes correctes. Plus important encore, 
les avantages en question n’incluront probablement pas une estimation du pouvoir de dissuasion 
du régime de contrôle des fusions en raison de la difficulté inhérente à un tel exercice. 
 Certains délégués ont également fait valoir que seules les évaluations ex-post de détails  multiples 
peuvent permettre à des conclusions plus générales sur l'efficacité de l'application de la fusion à 
l'égard de certains types de fusions. 
(6) Étant donné que l’importance des évaluations ex-post est de plus en plus admise, compte tenu des 
difficultés liées à la réalisation de ces examens et du fait qu’un nombre croissant d’autorités de 
la concurrence se sont déjà livrées à cet exercice, il convient, semble-t-il, d'envisager de 
s’employer plus systématiquement à compiler, dans un document unique, ces expériences et les 
techniques utilisées afin d’élaborer un manuel recensant les savoir-faire, indiquant des références 
et donnant des exemples aux autorités de la concurrence désireuses de procéder à des évaluations 
ex-post efficaces des décisions qu’elles ont rendues relatives à des opérations de fusion. 
 Les participants sont tombés d’accord sur les avantages que pourrait procurer un manuel consacré 
aux évaluations ex-post des décisions relatives aux fusions. Ce manuel ne saurait imposer une 
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approche unique, applicable à tous les cas de figure, mais devrait notamment proposer des 
approches qui soient applicables de matière réaliste par les autorités de la concurrence, que 
celles-ci soient dotées de ressources et de compétences plus ou moins importantes. Ils se sont en 
outre accordés à dire qu’il ne serait pas adapté de compiler un ensemble de meilleures pratiques 
puisque l’expérience des autorités dans ce domaines est encore relativement limitée et que l’écart 
entre les différentes autorités de la concurrence sur le plan des ressources, des qualifications et 
des compétences dont chacune dispose est important. 
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BELGIUM*
1. Methodologies  
 
 What methodologies can be used to evaluate the impact of merger review by competition 
authorities, i.e. to assess whether the decision(s) taken by the competition authorities in a merger 
case or a series of mergers was consistent with consumer welfare goals and was superior to 
alternative decisions the competition authority could have taken? 
The Belgian Competition Authority wants to highlight that the methodology used to assess decisions 
taken by the competition authorities in a merger case may depend on the relevant counterfactual. For 
instance, the methodology used may depend on whether the benchmark against which the impact of the 
decision is evaluated is  
• the absence of merger review – the merger would have been cleared without review;  
• another decision by the competition authority – e.g., what would have happened if the 
competition authority had required more or less stringent remedies. 
In its annual report, the Belgian Competition Authority uses (since 2008) an extremely simple 
methodology to quantify the useful effect of its actions. In doing so, we have until now focussed on 
restrictive practices and use the same methodology as the European Commission (see box 1 below). In 
essence, the useful effect of our activity would not have been very different if we had included merger 
review, because the useful effect (in the Commission’s methodology) derives from remedies or 
prohibitions, and Belgian Competition Authority has not prohibited any merger and has imposed remedies 
in one occasion since 2008.1
                                                     
*  Submitted by the Competition Authority- Directorate General, Belgium.  
 
1  Decision 2010-c/c-08: Mobistar/KPN Belgium Business (25/03/2010). 
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Box 1: Simple methodology to evaluate the effects of merger activity 
To evaluate the useful effect of its activity, the Belgian Competition Authority uses the methodology developed 
by the European Commission. For what concerns concentrations, the methodology focuses on decisions where 
remedies are imposed on the undertakings concerned and decisions that prohibit the merger in progress2
The thresholds for merger notification raised significantly in 2006. The objective the Belgian legislator was to 
reduce resources dedicated to merger review and increase resources available for restrictive practices. Since then, the 
Belgian Competition Authority reviews a limited number of mergers per year and has only imposed remedies in two 
decisions, where behavioural remedies were imposed on telecom operators, 
..  
3  one of which also included structural 
remedies (the sale of the fiber network). 4
Following the European Commission we consider that the concentration would have created or strengthened a 
dominant position—in the absence of remedies—that would have had the effect of increasing prices on the relevant 
market by 10%. Therefore, the useful effect is 10% of the relevant market. 
    
The Belgian Competition Authority only seeks to evaluate the effect of its merger review activity 
against an absence of merger review and has not yet tried to evaluate whether alternative decisions would 
have led to a superior consumer welfare outcome. We, nevertheless, believe that the latter exercise would 
be extremely relevant and would very much welcome additional work along these lines.  
Such empirical investigations are likely to help drawing the attention of policy makers, competition 
authorities and practitioners on the most relevant characteristics of mergers that are most likely to affect 
consumer welfare. In addition to the useful suggested bibliography provided in the suggested issues and 
questions, we found the following article useful, as it sets out a methodology to generate evidence to guide 
merger enforcement: 
• Ashenfelter, O. C., D. Hosken and M. Weinberg (2009), ‘Generating Evidence to Guide Merger 
Enforcement,’ CEPS WP 183. 
Finally, the Belgian Competition Authority believes that more work is necessary on a related issue: 
assessing the tools used by economists to predict post-merger effects. Indeed, competition authorities rely 
increasingly on merger simulation techniques in assessing the effects of mergers, but surprisingly few 
studies have evaluated the predictive effect of such techniques. Exceptions are for instance: 
• Hosken, D. (2011), ‘Ex-post merger review: what is it and why do we need it?’ Oxera Agenda, 
March 2011. 
• Peters, C. (2006), ‘Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the US 
Airline Industry,’ Journal of Law and Economics, 49: 627-49. 
• Weinberg, M. and D. Hosken (2008), ‘Using Mergers to Test a Model of Oligopoly,’ WP Federal 
Trade Commission. 
• Weinberg, M. (2010), ‘More Evidence on the Performance of Merger Simulations,’ forthcoming 
in American Economic Review, P&P. 
                                                     
2  See eg, Commission (2010), ‘DG Competition Management Plan 2010,’ 12 May 2010. 
3  Decision 2010-c/c-08: Mobistar/KPN Belgium Business (25/03/2010) and 2008-c/c-59 : Belgacom/Scarlet 
(07/11/2008). 
4  Decision 2008-c/c-59 : Belgacom/Scarlet (07/11/2008). 
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 What are the advantages/disadvantages of various methodologies, in particular in terms of the 
data they require and the trade-off between practicality/feasibility and accuracy/credibility of 
results? Are certain methodologies more suitable for certain types of ex post reviews than for 
others? For example, are there particularly data-intensive methodologies that might be more 
suitable for studies of a very limited number of merger review decisions, and other 
methodologies that are more useful for studies of a larger number of merger decisions?  
As developed in point 1., the Belgian Competition Authority believes that a (overly?) simplistic 
methodology can be used to quantify the useful effect of merger review. Such a methodology is not 
rigorous, but is extremely easy to apply. It enables the authority to explain how resources are used. 
The Belgian Competition Authority has no specific experience to share concerning more sophisticated 
methodologies (but would welcome more work on these issues). The studies cited above can be of interest. 
 If the direct impact of merger decision on consumer welfare is difficult to assess, are there useful 
proxies that can be used instead?  
No specific experience to share, but the studies cited above can be of interest. 
 What methodologies have you used in previous studies? Did they produce meaningful results?  
No experience to share. 
2. Results and lessons learned  
As developed in point 1. and 2., the Belgian Competition Authority uses a very simple methodology 
to quantify the useful effect of its merger review activity. Such a methodology is not rigorous, but enables 
the authority to explain how resources are used. 
The Belgian Competition Authority would welcome empirical studies that evaluate whether 
alternative decisions would have increased consumer welfare. Such studies are expected to help policy 
makers and competition authorities to focus resources on the most relevant mergers, and reach better 
decisions. Moreover, the Belgian Competition Authority would studies assessing the tools used by 
economists to predict post-merger effects. 
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CANADA 
1. Introduction 
Merger review is inherently a forward-looking predictive exercise. This is especially true in Canada 
where the Competition Act (the “Act”) prohibits the Commissioner of Competition from challenging a 
merger under the merger provisions of the Act more than one year after it has been substantially 
completed.1
While merger review is often about looking forward, much can be gained from considering past 
actions. When resources permit, ex-post studies of merger decisions support agencies in comparing their 
predictions with the tangible events that occurred in the market(s) of concern, and in certain cases, provide 
means to evaluate and improve performance. For example, a review of past enforcement decisions may 
cast a new light on past decisions and the veracity of key information.  With this new insight, the agency 
may alter its information-gathering procedures to ensure that critical information is collected and tested. In 
other cases, the agency’s predictions may have been inaccurate because of a misinterpretation of the 
available information. In such circumstances, an ex-post review provides a mechanism to identify and learn 
from past mistakes. Finally, ex-post studies allow the competition agency to assess what analytical 
approaches are working well, thereby confirming the basis for the agency’s predictions and remedy design. 
 This increases the importance of ensuring, ex-ante, that appropriate information is gathered 
and interpreted correctly, so that mergers that will likely lessen or prevent competition substantially are 
properly identified and that appropriate remedial action is taken.  Further, in cases where it is decided that 
enforcement action is warranted, agencies must ensure that the remedies sought will be effective in 
achieving their intended purpose. 
This submission outlines two recent ex-post studies.  The Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) 
commissioned a third party to conduct the first study, and the second study was conducted internally by the 
Bureau’s Mergers Branch. The first study evaluated the accuracy of the Bureau’s predictions of likely 
competitive effects in a small number of “borderline” cases that had raised material competition concerns, 
but where the Bureau ultimately decided that the merger did not merit a challenge before the Competition 
Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) or warrant the seeking of remedies by the Bureau. The second study examined 
the effectiveness of merger remedies sought by the Bureau in previous cases. The results of these studies, 
and other informal evaluations of past decisions, have been of significant value to the Bureau in developing 
policies and procedures with respect to the analysis of mergers and the design and implementation of 
merger remedies. 
2. Ex-Post merger review study 
In 2006-2007, at the request of the Bureau, CRA International (“CRA”), an economic and financial 
consulting firm, conducted an ex-post merger review study2
                                                     
1 Prior to amendments made to the Act on March 12, 2009, the Commissioner of Competition could 
challenge a merger within three years of it being substantially completed.  
 to consider whether the Bureau applied 
2  Mark Neumann & Margaret Sanderson, CRA International, “Ex Post Merger Review: An Evaluation of 
Three Competition Bureau Merger Assessments”, August 1, 2007. Bureau announcement and report 
available online at: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02468.html.  
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appropriate analytical approaches and took reasonable decisions in three separate merger reviews.3
2.1 Selecting the cases to study 
  
Specifically, CRA considered whether any of the markets examined in those reviews were substantially 
less competitive than they were pre-merger. 
The objective of the study was to consider mergers that had raised material competition concerns, but 
where the Bureau ultimately decided that the merger did not merit a challenge before the Tribunal or 
warrant seeking a remedy from the parties. The Bureau worked with CRA to determine which cases to 
study. In particular, the following considerations were taken into account: 
• Sufficient evidence had been gathered at the time of the review to formulate reasonably detailed 
predictions about likely competitive effects.  
• Sufficient time had passed that the market(s) in question would have adjusted to the merger. 
• The market was not in a considerable state of flux at the time of (or after) the merger such that it 
would be difficult to determine the response of the market to the merger. 
• The participants would likely be willing to be interviewed and provide useful information.  
• Useful public data about market conditions before and after the merger was available. 
2.2 Understanding the predicted outcomes 
The study involved understanding, as precisely as possible, the nature and the basis of the Bureau’s 
predictions in each of the respective reviews and any overriding conditions (e.g., barriers to entry, 
countervailing power, etc.) that were of predominant importance in the ultimate decision to either not 
challenge the merger, or seek remedies.  To this end, CRA was provided with the Bureau’s analysis, as 
well as supporting evidence from the relevant case files.  
2.3 Understanding the actual outcomes 
To determine the competitiveness of ex-post market conditions, CRA undertook analyses that, in 
many ways, paralleled the Bureau’s original investigations. For example, CRA conducted interviews with 
market participants, determined the set of products that buyers would consider to be sufficiently close 
substitutes to be part of the same relevant market, measured market shares and concentration, considered 
barriers to entry, and the other factors influencing competition. CRA also considered post-merger changes 
including those affecting buyer behaviour and any supply responses by rivals or entrants, and price or 
service levels.  
2.4 Findings 
CRA found that, in general, the Bureau’s analyses accurately assessed market conditions, and 
reasonably predicted outcomes accounting for the information that was available at the time of the 
Bureau’s reviews. In addition, the report identified several areas where the Bureau could make incremental 
improvements to its merger analysis.  
                                                     
3  Three merger reviews were selected as part of the study: the 2000 acquisition by Corus Media of the assets 
of WIC Broadcasting; the 2003 merger of a number of coal companies based in western Canada, 
collectively referred to at the time as the Fording Group; and a 1998 joint venture between 506062 New 
Brunswick Ltd. (Carmeuse) and Lafarge S.A., both suppliers of building materials.  
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For example, CRA concluded that the Bureau may have given too much weight to the size of 
customers in its assessment of countervailing power in one of the cases examined. CRA observed that “size 
is only a proxy for the strength of a negotiating position and not per se the basis for a strong negotiating 
position. The next best alternative available to the seller and buyer are more important.”4
CRA also recommended that the Bureau “[r]ecognize that in markets with differentiated products and 
the ability to reposition products that the dynamics can be complex and a straightforward application of 
market shares may miss some key aspects of the merger that need to be considered.”
 As a result, CRA 
recommended that the Bureau give more critical consideration to claims of countervailing power in future 
cases. 
5
The Bureau recently considered these recommendations in its review of the Merger Enforcement 
Guidelines (“MEGs”).
 
6
2.5 Lesson Learned: Disentangling the impact of the merger on competition  
 Among other things, the revised MEGs will provide more detailed information on 
how the Bureau assesses the unilateral effects of a merger in markets with differentiated products, and will 
clarify that the size of a buyer is not the only, or a necessarily compelling, relevant factor when considering 
whether a buyer has countervailing power.  
The competition issues are complex for most mergers of interest to agencies. Thus, where predicted 
outcomes differ from actual outcomes, finding the root deficiencies in the original analysis requires careful 
study. However, this challenge is exacerbated when changes unrelated to the merger, that were unforeseen 
in the original analysis, occur post-merger.  
For example, in the Fording coal case, CRA noted that meteoric growth in Asian markets that was 
unrelated to the merger drove international coal prices up to very high levels resulting in the opening of 
many new coal mines in western Canada and, thus, increasing competition to Fording. As a result of these 
developments and, in particular, entry of new market participants, CRA noted that it was difficult to 
disentangle the merger’s potential impact on pricing from other events.7
Similarly, in the context of the Corus-WIC transaction, CRA noted that even very well-informed 
customers can find it difficult to identify the effects of a merger in a market where many other factors are 
changing unless that effect is large.
 
8 In such situations, interviews with customers may need to be 
supplemented with empirical studies that control for changes to other factors.9
                                                     
4  Supra note 2 at p. 47. 
 
5  Supra note 2 at p. 48. 
6  “Bureau Announces Plans to Revise the Merger Enforcement Guidelines”, February 25, 2011, available 
online at: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03350.html. This decision followed 
roundtable consultations conducted across Canada, as well as consultations with foreign agencies, and a 
focused internal review. An important aspect of the consultation process was evaluating, at least 
informally, how well the Bureau’s analytical framework had worked in reaching appropriate merger 
decisions in past cases. 
7  Supra note 2 at p. 24. 
8  Supra note 2 at p. 49. 
9  In appropriate cases, a ‘difference-in-differences’ methodology may be employed where the effects of a 
merger are identified through comparison to changes observed in “control” markets.  
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While the Bureau made efforts to avoid encountering these problems when selecting cases for the 
study, the importance of the changes that had occurred in these markets was not apparent until they were 
reviewed in detail as part of the study.  
3. The merger remedies study 
The Bureau recently completed an extensive merger remedies study that considered prior enforcement 
decisions occurring between 1986-2005. The main objective of the study was to determine the 
effectiveness of the design and implementation of merger remedies obtained by the Bureau. A concise 
public report summarizing the findings of the study is expected to be published on the Bureau’s website in 
the second quarter of 2011. Presented below is a summary of the methodology used in the study.  
The Bureau’s study, in its inspiration and design, built on the experience and results of merger remedy 
studies conducted in other jurisdictions, in particular the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s “Study of the 
Commission’s Divestiture Process”,10 the European Commission Directorate-General for Competition’s 
“Merger Remedies Study”11 and the U.K. Competition Commission’s “Understanding Past Merger 
Remedies: Report on Case Study Research”.12
3.1 Selecting the cases to study 
  
Between 1986 and 2005, the Bureau intervened in 50 merger cases and obtained 76 remedies. 
Because of difficulties contacting interviewees with sufficient knowledge of remedies obtained before 
1995, the Bureau limited the study to 41 individual remedies obtained in 24 merger cases between 1995 
and 2005.  
3.2 Methodology 
In order to obtain input from a complete range of market participants, the Bureau developed 
questionnaires for three sets of constituents: (1) the merged entity; (2) customers; and (3) purchasers of 
divested assets or other beneficiaries of a remedy. Where possible, staff also interviewed representatives of 
third party market participants (e.g., suppliers and industry associations).  
To encourage participation in the study, the Bureau provided certain confidentiality assurances to 
participants13 and agreed that information provided by participants as part of the study would be used only 
for the purposes of the study. Although the Bureau encouraged participation in the study by all key parties, 
the process was voluntary, and a number of parties declined to participate.14
                                                     
10  U.S. Federal Trade Commission (Washington: 1999): http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/08/divestreport.shtm 
 
11  European Commission Directorate General of Competition (Brussels: 2005): 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf 
12  U.K. Competition Commission (January 2007): http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/understanding_past_merger_remedies.pdf 
13  Consistent with the Bureau’s obligations under the Act, confidential information provided by interview 
participants is protected under section 29 of the Act and under section 24 of the Access to Information Act. 
14  A total of 135 interviews were conducted consisting of 20 merged entities, 28 purchasers or beneficiaries, 
60 customers, and 27 third parties. 
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Consistent with the Bureau’s Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada (“Remedies 
Bulletin”),15
1. structural remedies; 
 the study classified each remedy into one of the following four categories:  
2. quasi-structural remedies: 
3. combination remedies; and 
4. stand-alone behavioural remedies.  
To determine whether a remedy was effective, the study  
i) critically evaluated the design and implementation of the remedy;  
ii) examined various factors, including whether the divested business was still operating or actively 
competing in the relevant market(s); and  
iii) asked interviewees to compare current competitive conditions against two counterfactual 
scenarios: (a) a scenario in which the merger had been cleared by the Bureau without any 
remedy; and (b) a scenario in which the merger had been blocked in its entirety.  
The Bureau compiled its observations respecting the effectiveness of a remedy, based on the 
information provided in interviews. Following the interviews, the Bureau evaluated its findings on: (1) the 
effectiveness of the remedies in each case based on the input received; and (2) key observations from the 
case that might inform the Bureau’s approach to remedies in future cases.  
As noted above, the Bureau has not yet published the main findings of the study. However the results 
of the study will be of significant value as the Bureau develops its policies and procedures with respect to 
the design and implementation of remedies. The Bureau intends to use the study’s results, and experience, 
to update its Remedies Bulletin and consent agreement template. The Bureau has already begun 
incorporating the study’s findings into its approach to merger remedies and will continue to do so in the 
future.  
4. Conclusions 
The Bureau has conducted studies evaluating the impact of its decisions in cases where enforcement 
action was taken, and when the Bureau refused such action. Conducting studies is consistent with the 
Bureau’s priority to enhance performance management and transparency, and each piece of work has 
contributed importantly to the development of the Bureau’s enforcement policy. The Bureau will continue 
to explore opportunities for ex-post evaluations where appropriate, and when resources permit. 
                                                     
15“ Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada”, September 22, 2006, available online at: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02170.html 
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CHILE 
1. Introduction 
Evaluation of how competition authorities’ decisions impact on welfare is a relatively new issue for 
competition authorities in Chile. The topic is neither in the agenda of relevant stakeholders nor of think 
tanks on competition policy and law in the country.  
The FNE1
With this in mind, two years ago, the Research Division at the FNE participated in a draft project with 
the support of the IDRC
 is a relatively small competition agency, with budgetary restrictions which have to be 
solved by strict prioritization. However, it understands that evaluating competition authorities’ 
interventions is an increasingly important task, particularly so in a society claiming for the legitimacy of 
their governmental bodies.  
2
The purpose of this contribution is to share with the rest of the delegations the experience of choosing 
a methodology and designing the aforementioned research. Unfortunately, due to FNE’s priorities we have 
not been able to implement and conduct the study so far, so what follows is just limited to methodological 
and design aspects of the project.   
 aiming to develop a case-study model in order to identify whether competition 
authorities’ interventions represent an effective contribution to the total welfare and whether society's gains 
from these interventions are greater than their costs.   
2. Choosing an industry to consider for the study: Methodological aspects 
2.1 The industry 
For the draft project, in the design of which the FNE participated, the Supermarket Industry and 
Competition Authorities’ intervention therein was selected as a case study. The chosen industry seemed 
relevant considering the industry’s evolution towards concentration and consolidation in the last years, the 
availability of information –in part, precisely because of these interventions– and the potential impacts on 
consumers and on industry suppliers as relevant stakeholders3
One concern these interventions had in mind was the consolidation of purchasing power that had 
translated into abusive relations against supermarkets’ suppliers, in particular, small and medium-sized 
ones, which were part of the supply chain.  Given the competition risks associated with these actions and 
their potential negative consequences on consumers' and relevant suppliers' welfare, in 2006 the FNE 
.  
                                                     
1   FNE stands for Fiscalía Nacional Económica, the Chilean Competition Agency. 
2   IDRC stands for International Development Research Center. 
3  In fact, several additional changes took place in the industry in the following years including the 
consolidation of a third actor by means of acquisitions of regional chains, the entry of a fourth actor into 
relevant segments, and a major change in the ownership and control of the principal actor due to an 
acquisition by Wal-Mart. Furthermore, a merger between the larger actors in the retail industry and 
supermarkets had been blocked by the TDLC (TDLC, Decision N° 24, January 31st, 2008). 
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initiated a legal action against the industry‘s leading actors who had initiated a serial acquisitions of 
regional supermarket chains. Shortly after initiation, the case was settled with one of the defendants. A 
settlement with the other one took place much later, after hearings before the Supreme Court. The 
settlement set up a self-regulation structure (mainly general and fair contractual terms for small and 
medium sized suppliers) for each of the defendant companies. The self-regulation framework aimed at 
preventing purchasing power abuses4
2.2 Competition authorities’ intervention to be evaluated 
.  
The concrete interventions of competition authorities had led to the following outcomes: (i) Further 
acquisitions by the defendants should be submitted to notification and review before competition 
authorities. The hypothesis was that this scheme would turn further acquisitions more costly and hence 
would reduced incentives for further acquisitions. (ii)  A contractual frame with general terms for 
exchanges between small and medium-sized suppliers and big retailers should be put in place. The 
hypothesis here was that such a frame would introduce fairness in the exchanges between big retailers and 
their small and medium-sized suppliers, which expose the latter to less risks of abuse. 
2.3 Methodological aspects 
Once those outcomes were identified (reduced incentives for further acquisitions and fairness in 
exchanges between parties), the challenge was to construct reliable indicators using data already available 
or data not difficult to access.  
At the time of the draft, there was not enough data for evaluating the impact on retail prices 
downstream. This was a significant downside of the project. Industry members have claimed reduction in 
retail prices in time. However, an interesting hypothesis to test would have been whether these retail prices 
were actual efficiency gains or there were just a small proportion of surpluses taken from suppliers 
transferred to consumers, and hence an increase in supermarket’s margin.  
Thus, quantitative as well as qualitative instruments would be required in order to test the hypotheses. 
Some of the indicators considered were: the number of new acquisitions in the following months by the 
same defendants; the number of acquisitions by other actors, not subject to these regulations5
3. Design considerations 
; satisfaction 
tests and interviews to relevant stakeholders such as small and medium-sized suppliers as well as 
consumers –if the project extended downstream. 
Developing an evaluation process is a very time and resource-consuming endeavor. Such an initiative 
cannot be undertaken by agencies if budgetary constraints or other reasons produce uncertainty about 
completion.   
Once the decision is taken, the composition of the research team should be carefully defined. The 
work could be performed in whole or in part externally. However, we believe that involving agency 
members in the exercise of evaluating agency’s interventions can be much richer as a learning process. In 
                                                     
4  Settlement between the FNE and D&S, approved by the TDLC on December 15th, 2006. TDLC,  Ruling 
N° 65, May 8th, 2008.  Settlement between the FNE and Cencosud, approved by the Supreme Court on July 
24th, 2008.  
5  At the time of the draft, the successful entry of a third actor was already known. Whether this entry was or 
not facilitated by the regulatory burden faced by the incumbents is something not easy to define but it was 
an actual outcome in the industry at the time of drafting the project. 
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this sense, it seems that a team composed by members of the agency as well as by external consultants 
could represent an appropriate equilibrium, as long as external consultants are appropriately selected. 
Indeed, one of the first issues that may arise from this exercise is the weakness of data management 
within agencies. It is not infrequent that data obtained during investigation cases are known and managed 
only by case-handlers members of the investigation teams. The lack of a centralized system for data 
management will be perceived at the beginning of the evaluation process, particularly when a baseline 
should be defined.   
Thus, a priority task -once the decision to develop evaluation activities has been made- is to build 
baselines for relevant investigated industries that have been translated into competition authorities’ 
interventions. In order to build these baselines, a centralized administration of data can be a helpful 
institutional arrangement within agencies. 
4. Final remarks: Lessons learned 
The decision of evaluating competition authorities’ intervention implies the selection of appropriate 
cases. This selection process rests on the data available, which in turn depends on institutional 
arrangements for knowledge management within agencies. Thus, these considerations should be taken into 
account and actions should be considered long before the evaluation project design and conduction of the 
process are initiated. 
Evaluation activities, particularly in small agencies facing budgetary constraints are submitted to an 
internal competition for resources in the prioritization game. Resources to evaluation activities should be 
committed for the entire project in order to avoid a project failure due to the lack of resources. 
An appropriate selection of the members of the team for the evaluation process is crucial. We believe 
that a team composed by members of the agency and external consultants able to perform quantitative and 
qualitative analysis is the appropriate body for performing the task. 
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ESTONIA 
The Estonian Competition Authority has not yet carried out any formal ex-post impact evaluation 
studies of merger decisions.  In a way, the Competition Authority would be in a somewhat better position 
to undertake such studies than outsiders, as the Competition Authority has all the information that was 
necessary for making such a decision, knows about the criteria for making decisions etc.  But the main 
reason we have not yet formally evaluated the impact of any decision is the lack of resources (both human 
and financial), which is probably the case for many small authorities. 
But the fact that we do not carry out formal studies, does not necessarily mean that we are not 
interested what impact our decisions to intervene or not to intervene might have had on the market. 
One way to find out about the impact of a previous decision is during the proceedings of the next 
merger in the same market.  In such a case, we generally receive a lot of information regarding how the 
competitive situation in the market has changed after the previous merger and when sending out inquiries, 
there is also a possibility to ask data from the market participants.   
A couple of years ago there were two concentrations in the market for distribution polyurethane (PU) 
foam market.   The time between the two cases was more than a year.  Both the concentrations affected the 
market for distribution of block foam used in furniture and bedding industry.  In a way, that was a perfect 
case where we had the possibility to analyze the impact of the first decision, which was to grant permission 
to concentrate.  During the proceeding of the second case, more information was gathered about how the 
market worked and what had happened after the previous concentration.  And the Competition Authority 
again came to the conclusion that the market for distribution of PU foam characterized a typical product 
market in a small country, i.e. high share of imported goods and companies located abroad selling PU foam 
directly to furniture producers located in Estonia, which meant that acquisition and possible closing down 
of the only Estonian producer would not to a significant extent restrict effective competition in the market. 
There have also been several concentrations in dairy and meat production industry, which have also 
given the Competition Authority the possibility to learn about the impact of previous decisions to grant 
permission to concentrate. 
There is also a merger decision in the history of the Competition Authority, which in a way had a 
significant impact in the pharmaceuticals´ sector.   The mentioned decision was made in 2003 regarding 
the acquisition of sole control by the largest wholesaler of pharmaceuticals of a company operating a 
pharmacy chain (Decision of June 5, 2003, No 16-KO AS Magnum Medical / OÜ Parimex Invest).  The 
concentration broadened the range of activities of the dominant wholesaler also to the retail sector. 
The reality is that the Competition Authority can only make decisions based on the legal acts in force. 
At that time, the criteria for prohibiting a concentration was creating or strengthening of a dominant 
position and there were no objective reasons for prohibition.    
The criteria for prohibiting a concentration have been changed, instead of dominance test there is now 
SIEC test also in the Estonian Competition Act.   
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Also a court case was related to the mentioned concentration - the decision to grant permission to 
concentrate was challenged by a small competitor in the retail market, Akos Apteek OÜ (Akos).  Akos 
claimed that the concentration placed its pharmacies into a disadvantaged position compared to the 
pharmacies acquired by Magnum Medical AS, as the latter could apply discriminating trading conditions to 
Akos´ pharmacies.   But probably more important than the content of the court ruling this time was the fact 
the court recognized the right of appeal of merger clearance decisions by third parties. 
Five years later, in 2008, the first concentration was prohibited in the history of Estonian Competition 
Authority.  The case concerned the acquisition by a pharmacy chain Terve Pere Apteek OÜ (that belongs 
to the largest wholesaler of pharmaceuticals in Estonia – AS Magnum Medical) of a small pharmacy 
(Decision of May 8, 2008, No 3.1-8/08-020KO Terve Pere Apteek OÜ / OÜ Saku Apteek). 
The concentration was prohibited due to the anticompetitive tendency, although the target´s market 
share on the market for retail sale of pharmaceuticals was below 1%.  The tendency was that vertically 
integrated groups (one group owns both wholesale level and pharmacies) were little by little acquiring 
control of pharmacies.  The result of such transactions was strengthening of market power horizontally in 
the market for pharmacies´ services and vertically on the wholesale level, as pharmacies belonging to the 
group could not choose their suppliers anymore. 
So, the aim of the decision to prohibit the concentration was to stop the tendency leading to restriction 
of competition and in a way, the tendency was started with the decision the Competition Authority made in 
2003.  As the pharmaceuticals´ sector have become quite concentrated in Estonia and during the years we 
have had several concentrations in that sector, we have also had the possibility to see the gradual change in 
the market structure, as a result of the decisions made by the Competition Authority. 
It should also be mentioned, that as in 2008 the Competition Authority was merged with two sector 
regulators (the Energy Market Inspectorate and some departments of the Communications Board) that are 
now also under the roof of the Competition Authority, we are now in a better position to analyze markets 
in the energy, telecommunications and postal sector already during the proceedings of a concentration and 
also get feedback on the impact of the decisions ex-post from the Regulatory Divisions. 
To conclude it can be said that informal methods of reviewing the effect of merger decisions are 
occasional and cannot be considered as a systematic gathering of information, depending mainly on the 
fact whether there are more concentrations in a specific sector. Formal ex-post impact evaluation studies of 
merger decisions would definitely be of greater value, but if information “comes to us” or it is easy to 
obtain, it would useful to also informally analyze the impact of the decisions in at least some economic 
sectors.  
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GREECE 
1. Introduction 
During the last few years, the importance of a thorough and coherent ex-post merger review by 
competition agencies and courts has been increasing. Although it is widely acknowledged by economists 
and government officials that addressing the competition concerns, which stem from consummated 
mergers, is a costly and time-consuming process, and that remedies (e.g. either structural or behavioural), 
when adopted, are often imperfect at best, sophisticated quantitative techniques are now available for 
competition agencies, attorneys and courts to help them assess the impact of a merger and the efficacy of 
related enforcement decisions, thus leading to improved decision making.  
To evaluate the impact of merger review, that is, to assess whether the enforcement action was 
consistent with the consumer welfare goal and whether it was the best available option, competition 
authorities employ various techniques. This report aims at shedding light on the role of such evaluation 
studies employed in the context of merger decisions, and, to this aim, it focuses on the main relevant 
quantitative techniques (merger simulation models, event studies, structural models, etc.) used in merger 
review in the US and the European Union (EU). 
2. Types of evaluation methods  
Quantitative merger analysis broadly falls under two main categories, namely ex-post and ex-ante 
merger analysis. In an ex-ante quantitative analysis, economists evaluate in advance possible anti-
competitive effects of a proposed merger, consisting either in the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position in a relevant market and/or in the substantial lessening of competition by unilateral or coordinated 
conduct. On the other hand, the ex-post quantitative investigation of merger decisions usually serves two 
fundamental goals:1
The main techniques used for the purposes of merger review involve: a) structural models and 
simulations, b) event studies, c) difference-in-differences models (D-in-D) and d) evaluation methods. 
Such techniques are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, it would often be preferable to use a 
combination thereof in order to mitigate the risk of evaluation errors. The majority of these techniques seek 
to assess the price effects of a merger in the relevant market(s) concerned. However, it is important to note 
that prices are not the only competitive variable which may be affected by a merger. The competitive 
effects of a merger may well extend to product improvements, new product introduction, advertising and 
promotion, research and development, etc.  
 a) to establish whether competition authorities have reached the right enforcement 
decision, namely whether the market structure arising from the decision is more suitable to pursue the 
economic goal of the EU Merger Regulation than the market structure which could have arisen from 
alternative decisions available to the competent authorities, and b) to assess whether the analysis adopted 
by the competent authorities to reach the decision was correct (absence of Type I or II errors).  
The following sections shall focus on the elaboration of the four aforementioned techniques. 
                                                     
1  Apart from quantitative techniques, there are descriptive studies (often qualitative) used in order to 
investigate if the conclusions or assumptions made as part of the merger review were correct. Analysis of 
such methods is though far beyond the scope of this report.  
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2.1 Merger simulation models (MSM)  
MSM, which are based on the theory of industrial organisation, are used to predict the effect of a 
proposed merger on prices and product quantities through the application of modern econometric 
techniques (such as “almost ideal demand system” (AIDS), log-linear model, multi level demand analysis, 
etc.), thus, allowing researchers to assess whether a merger may lead to a substantial lessening of 
competition in one or more relevant markets. In order to predict the post-merger price evolution, 
simulation models use pre-merger market data (e.g. prices, product quantities, cost evolution, etc.) to make 
different assumptions with regard to the post-merger conduct and interaction of the merging firms and their 
rivals.  
MSM have been generally employed by antitrust authorities and merging entities as well as by courts 
to assess the pro- or anti- competitive effects of mergers under scrutiny.2 Analysis based on merger 
simulation models is appealing to competition agencies throughout the world for various reasons. More 
specifically, the development of sophisticated econometric techniques used in the context of economic 
analysis, during the last decade has allowed researchers to apply even more complex simulation models 
based on real market data. Furthermore, simulation-based techniques are quite flexible and able to integrate 
the traditional focus on factors such as market definition, efficiencies, and potential competition. 
Moreover, merger simulation models can evaluate the impact of a divestiture, which constitutes a 
significant structural remedy. Finally, simulation models allow the simplest counterfactuals to be 
considered.3
The use of MSM in markets of diversified products involves a dynamic four-stage process. In stage 
one, consumer demand is estimated through econometric methods applied to data on actual transactions, if 
such data is available. The most commonly used econometric models include AIDS, the linear model, the 
log-linear model, the probability models, such as logit or probit, and the multi-level demand estimation. 
Depending on the specifications of the demand equation, own- and cross- price elasticities are estimated. In 
this respect, it should be noted that, according to economic theory, possession of large shares by the 
merging entities or the existence of relatively high cross-price elasticities between their products tend to 
result in large (unilateral) price effects. On the other hand, small shares, low cross-price elasticities, and/or 
large efficiencies tend to produce small or even negative (unilateral) price effects.
  
4
In stage two, the model is calibrated (i.e. through price selection for the model parameters) in order to 
check if its results are in alignment with the statistical data of the relevant market under scrutiny. The 
calibrated parameters are set in a way that estimated elasticities can yield the prices and market shares 
actually observed in the pre-merger market. In order to ensure the validity of MSM, the estimated own-
price demand elasticities must have a negative sign, while the cross-price elasticities can be either positive 
(substitutes) or negative (complements).  
  
In stage three, supply is estimated through the application of an oligopoly model which best describes 
the conditions of competition between the rivals. The most common oligopoly model used in this context is 
                                                     
2  See, generally, O. Budzinski and I. Ruhmer, “Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey”, 6 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 277 (2009), p. 278; J. Baker and D. Rubinfeld, “Empirical 
Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique”, 6 American Law and Economics Review 386 
(1999), p. 388.  
3  A situation in which the merger is blocked or in which the merger is unconditionally cleared. See LEAR, 
Ex-post Review of Merger Control Decisions, A Study for the European Commission, December 2006, 
para. 2.23. 
4  O. Ashenfelter, D. Hosken and M. Weinberg, “Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 14798, March 2009. 
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the so called “Bertrand” model. The classic Bertrand model assumes that firms compete purely on price, 
while ignoring non-price competition. Each firm decides independently the prices to be charged for its 
products. Both firms stand ready to deliver any quantity of the product. Therefore, in the Bertrand 
Oligopoly, even with only two firms, there is a competitive equilibrium price, whereas in other equivalent 
models, such as the so-called “Cournot” Oligopoly, increases in output lead to gradually lower prices, and 
firms get to have extra-competitive profits. The Bertrand model can be extended to include product or 
location differentiation, however, in such cases, the main conclusion – i.e. that price is driven down to 
marginal cost – is no longer valid.  
Finally in stage four, the new (post-merger) equilibrium can be simulated using the model calibrated 
with pre-merger empirical data, but adjusting market shares to the post-merger situation. 
In view of the aforementioned, it is obvious that the MSM methodology has high data requirements, a 
fact which constitutes one of the method’s major drawbacks. The data usually required to perform MSM 
includes: a) prices and quantities, b) input factor prices, c) demand and consumers characteristics (i.e. 
income, education, age, sex, employment, etc.) and d) data on the main observable product characteristics 
(i.e. brand recognition, customer loyalty, etc.). 
2.2  Event studies (ES) 
ES rank among the most successful tools of econometrics in competition policy analysis. They 
evaluate the welfare implications of private and public actions5
One approach to ES investigates the effect of the announcement of mergers and the suspension of 
derogation from concentrations (Article 7 of Regulation 139/2004) on shareholder value both in the target 
firm and in the bidder. The main result of this approach is that the announcement of the event increases the 
value of the acquired firm and decreases (or at least does not affect) the value of the acquiring firm, thus, 
offering the shareholders of target firms gains, whereas the shareholders of the bidding firms “do not 
gain”.
 through the assessment of the reactions of 
stock markets to an event (i.e. merger announcement, phase II decision or derogation from suspension of 
concentration, decisions of antitrust enforcement agencies). 
6
Another ES approach evaluates the competitive effects of merger announcements on the merging 
entities and their competitors in the relevant product market in which the merger occurs, by analysing the 
price of the merging and non merging firms’ shares around the announcement date of the event.
  
7
ES rely on two assumptions, i.e., that financial markets are efficient and that the agents’ expectations 
are rational, therefore, a firm’s stock price should always represent the discounted value of its flow of 
profits, and when an event is announced, which is expected to affect a firm’s profits, the stock price should 
adapt to reflect this expectation. Any change in the stock prices of the firms operating in the affected 
 
                                                     
5  F. Wenston, S. Kwang and S. Juan, Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 93-106. 
6  E. Maynes and J. Ramsey, “Conducting Event Studies with Thinly Traded Stocks”, 17 Journal of Banking 
and Finance 147 (1993); P. Fotis, M. Polemis and N. Zevgolis, “Robust Event Studies for Derogation from 
Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995-2008”, 11 Journal of Industry Competition 
and Trade 67 (2011), p. 72; P. Fotis, M. Polemis and N. Zevgolis, “Stock Price Performance as an 
Argument for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations: Reality or Myth?”, 30 European 
Competition Law Review 219 (2009).  
7  See, inter alia, L. Beverley, “Stock Market Event Studies and Competition Commission Inquiries”, Centre 
for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-16. 
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markets, relative to the value which would have been observed had the event not occurred, is referred to as 
“abnormal results”.  
There are several methods to estimate abnormal results, i.e. the trade-to-trade method, the “single” 
method, or the so-called “lumped” or “uniform” method, the first one being the most commonly-used 
approach. 
More specifically, the trade-to-trade approach8
“uses all available information about total stock and market returns over time and no bias is 
introduced by attempting to estimate unobserved daily stock returns as occurs with the lumped or 
uniform techniques. However, since trade to trade returns ignore information about daily market 
returns over non-trading periods, it is not clear that it is theoretically superior to the lumped 
method”. 
  
For instance, let’s assume that daily continuously compound stock return for firm j is calculated as 
follows: 
( ) ( )1,,, lnln −−= tjtjtj PPR  (1) 
By assuming one day stationarity in the return generating process, the multi-period return for firm j
ending on date t  is: 
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where tn  is the length of the interval of non trading dates (the period of trading dates between the 
trade in period t and the previously successful traded date) ending on date t  and utjP −,
ˆ
is the unobserved 
stock price of firm j for date ut − ( 1.......1 −= tnu ). Therefore, the trade- to-trade return equals the sum 
of tn  unobserved one day returns. Following equation (1) the adjusted trade-to-trade return is as follows: 
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In all cases, in such situations, analysts should decide whether to use daily, weekly or monthly returns 
so as to reliably conduct event studies.9
                                                     
8  E. Maynes and J. Rumsey, “Conducting Event Studies with Thinly Traded Stocks”, 17 Journal of Banking 
and Finance 145 (1993); J. Barthodly, D. Olson and P. Peare, “Conducting Event Studies on a Small Stock 
Exchange”, 13 European Journal of Finance 227 (2007). 
 
9  P. Fotis, M. Polemis and N. Zevgolis, “Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of 
Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995-2008”, 11 Journal of Industry Competition and Trade 67 
(2011), p. 74. 
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Conclusively, even though ES are well developed, and the data required to apply this methodology is 
quite limited and easy to acquire, there is some concern regarding its effectiveness for small stock 
exchanges with thinly traded stocks (infrequent trading or lumped returns phenomenon).10
2.3  Difference in Differences models (D-in-D)  
 Moreover, not 
all affected agents are firms and that not all firms’ stock is traded on the market, therefore such data shall 
not always be available. This constitutes the main limitation of this methodology. 
The D-in-D methodology is a non-experimental technique which measures the effect of a treatment at 
a given period in time. D-in-D constitutes the most common technique of evaluating merger price effects.  
More specifically, the price effect of the merger is isolated through the comparison of price 
fluctuations in the market affected by the merger as against prices in a competing market (“control” 
product or geographic area), in which price is affected by economic factors other than the merger. Thus, 
pre- and post-merger changes in price in the “control” product or area provide an indication of the effect of 
such other economic factors. Price changes in the “control” product or area are subtracted from price 
changes in the affected product or area, and one can, thus, assess the merger impact.  
The D-in-D method is useful, so long as the following three conditions be satisfied: 
• the “control “product or area must be unaffected by the merger,  
• economic factors, other than the merger, must have a similar impact on both the “control” and 
affected products or areas, and 
• any factors affecting price, which are unique to the affected or control products or areas, cannot 
be correlated with the merger. 
One of the main advantages of this method is that competition authorities and courts do not have to 
estimate the cost and demand factors which affect the pricing mechanism. In other words, the researcher 
assumes that changes in those factors equally and identically affect the merger market and the comparison 
market. However, the key difficulty in these studies is to identify a suitable proxy variable (i.e. a 
comparison market) for the merger market. While this approach has been frequently used by competition 
authorities, the number of court cases remains relatively small.11
The great appeal of the D-in-D estimation derives from its simplicity as well as its potential to 
circumvent many of the endogeneity problems which typically arise when making comparisons between 
heterogeneous individuals.
  
12
                                                     
10  The infrequent trading phenomenon appears when some stocks do not trade daily in the stock exchange. In 
such a case, the estimated variance and co-variance of the stock performance will positively correlate with 
their trade frequency.  
 However, there are some serious drawbacks involved, mainly consisting in 
the fact that the D-in-D estimation uses many years of data and focuses on serially correlated outcomes, 
but it ignores that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent, leading to serious over-estimation of t-
11  D-in-D analysis has been used in the USA in order to analyse the effect of airline alliances 
(Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska) on airline fares. The main result of this study was the 
decrease of the average fares by 5-7% due to the existence of the alliances. See D. Rubinfeld, 
“Econometric Issues in Antitrust Analysis”, 166 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 62 
(2010). 
12  M. Bertrand, E. Duflo and S. Mullainathan, “How Much Should we Trust Differences-in-differences 
Estimates?”, M.I.T. Working Paper 01-34, p. 2. 
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statistics and significance levels,13
2.4  Evaluation methods  
 and that the selection of “control” variables entered in the regression 
model can matter. To be more specific, the inclusion of more covariates (such as controls) in the regression 
can improve the accuracy of the model if movements of the control variables are correlated with the 
treatment group. Finally, D-in-D models may be subject to certain biases (mean reversion bias, etc.). 
The evaluation methods, which encompass various estimation techniques, consist in the comparison 
between the behaviour of two groups of agents: the control group and the experimental group. The basic 
principle is that, on condition that all other factors are equal, the policy effect, namely the effect of the 
competition authority’s decision, consists in the difference in performance between the two groups.14
The data requirements of this set of methods can be summarised as follows: a) data on the merging 
firms and their competitors (i.e. market shares, pricing policy, discounts, etc.), b) data on one outcome 
variable (i.e. prices, profits, R&D expenditure); c) data on the exogenous covariates (i.e. demand and cost 
shifters, such as income, population density and input prices) and d) data on other exogenous variables.  
 This 
methodology evaluates merger effects on several competitive variables, and not just price effects.  
Even though the academic literature on the use of evaluation methods in merger control is quite 
limited, the logic of this instrument is extensively used (ex ante) by antitrust authorities, since it appears to 
be quite simple to use, at least in its most basic form.15
3  The Greek experience 
 
3.1  Relevant cases and methodology employed 
As already analysed under section 2.2 above, the evaluation of merger decisions through event studies 
may, inter alia, be performed either by an ex ante estimation of the announcement effects of mergers on the 
merging and rival entities or by an ex post evaluation of the balance sheet profit effects of mergers on the 
merging and rival entities for a certain period of time, post-merger.16
In the two cases summarised further below, i.e. the PPC-Halyvourgiki joint venture and the Delta-
Chipita merger, the HCC Directorate General conducted ex post merger evaluation studies through the 
application of event study analysis on the basis of publicly available data (i.e. stock prices, general market 
index), in order to investigate the impact of the respective HCC decisions (and the effectiveness of the 
behavioural remedies imposed by the HCC in the first case). 
 The latter methodology has been 
employed by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) on several occasions.  
More specifically, the analysis conducted in these two cases evaluated the statistical (market) model 
)/( ,, ττ ττ XRERAR jj −=  (4) 
                                                     
13  Ibid, p. 3.  
14  LEAR, Ex-post Review of Merger Control Decisions, A Study for the European Commission, December 
2006, para. 2.26. 
15  Ibid, para. 2.28. 
16  T. Duso, K. Gugler and B. Yurtoglu, “Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? A 
Comparison of Stock Data and Accounting Data”, GESY Discussion Paper No. 163, September 2006. 
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where τAR  is the Abnormal Return, ,jR is the actual return of firm j on day τ and )/( , τXRE j  is 
the expected or conditional return given event on day τ under normal conditions.   
The assumptions of efficient market hypothesis and rational expectations imply that the market model 
forecasts that firm j’s stock return at time τ (normal return) is proportional to a market return. That is, 
E(Rjτ/Rm,τ)= α + βRmτ +εjτ (5) 
where Rmτ: the return on the market index for day τ in the event window. 
The estimated values of the model’s parameters17
τjR
^
 were set to predict what firm j’s stock return would 
have been, had the merger not been announced ( ). Therefore, 
ττττ εβα jmmj RRRE ++=
^^
,
^
)/(  (6) 
Subtracting the predicted return of firm j on day τ from equation (4), we get the Abnormal 
Return/Residual around the merger announcement day τ ( τjAR ).  
The factual background of the cases concerned was as follows:  
3.1.1  The PPC-Halyvourgiki joint venture 
On 16.2.2009, companies PPC S.A. and Halyvourgiki S.A. notified the formation of a joint venture to 
the HCC, pursuant to Article 4b of the Competition Act. The joint venture would undertake the 
construction and operation of two power plants with a total capacity of 880MW, within the facilities of 
Halyvourgiki S.A. Halyvourgiki S.A. would own 51% of the joint venture share capital, whereas PPC 
would own the remaining 49%. The formation of the joint venture was announced on 12 February 2009, 
and a Phase-II referral took place on 12 March 2009. On 29.5.2009, the HCC cleared the notified 
concentration imposing certain remedies intended to ensure an effective level of competition in the 
relevant market of production of electricity.  
The following conclusions were drawn in the context of the event study analysis conducted by the 
HCC Directorate General:  
• the stock price of PPC indicated a significant positive abnormal return of approx. 0.34% prior to 
the announcement date of the formation of the joint venture. Moreover, PPC shares experienced a 
cumulative abnormal positive return of 0.98% around the announcement date,  
• it took the stock market two days to fully absorb the impact of the announcement, with the 
merging entities’ stock prices increasing by around 0.26% on the announcement date, whereas a 
further increase of 0.38% was noted on the following day,  
• the rival entities’ stock prices (Terna and Mytilinaios) experienced negative abnormal results at a 
rate of -5.26% on the day following the announcement date.  
                                                     
17  The Greek parameters α & β of equation (5). 
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As the above analysis suggests, the fact that the share prices of the merging entities’ competitors 
illustrated negative significant abnormal returns indicates that investors expected the merger to be 
profitable for the merging companies, and not for the rivals, and, thus, it was unlikely that such merger 
would induce adverse effects on competition in the post-merger oligopolistic relevant market (production 
of electricity).  
It is worth mentioning that, according to economic theory, insignificant or negative abnormal returns 
for the merging entities’ rivals around the announcement date suffice to conclude that the market expects 
the merger to be cost-reducing, and not price-increasing. A decrease in the market value of the merging 
entities’ rivals, as in the case of the PPC-Halyvourgiki joint venture, strongly suggests that concentration in 
the relevant market is unaffected, since it may be due to a relevant decrease in the ability of firms to 
coordinate production and pricing decisions, which in turn generates a positive impact on competition in 
the relevant market. Such positive impact might be due to the absence of horizontal and vertical effects 
(conglomerate merger).  
3.1.2.  The Delta-Chipita merger 
On 17.4.2006, Delta Holdings S.A. (Delta) and Chipita International S.A. (Chipita), both active in 
several segments of the food sector, notified their merger to the HCC. Upon fulfilment of the conditions 
provided for in the share purchase agreement, Delta would fully absorb Chipita’s subsidiaries (i.e. Goody’s 
S.A., General Foods S.A. and Delta Foods S.A.) and acquire full control of Chipita. Following completion 
of the merger, the acquiring company would change its name to Vivartia S.A. On 17.5.2006, the HCC 
initiated a Phase-II investigation on the basis that the transaction could raise serious competition concerns 
in certain affected relevant markets. Based on the evidence gathered during investigation, the HCC 
concluded that the notified transaction could not potentially impede effective competition through the 
creation or a strengthening of a dominant position in the relevant markets concerned. The concentration 
was cleared by the HCC on 10.7.2006.  
In this context, the event study analysis conducted by the HCC Directorate General evidenced that the 
HCC did not commit a Type II error. In other words, the HCC allowed a merger, which the stock market 
considered pro-competitive (i.e. a merger which did not reduce consumer surplus).  
Again, as in the case of the PPC-Halyvourgiki joint venture analysed above, in this conglomerate 
merger case, a statistically significant negative cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in the market 
value of the merging entities’ competitors on the day after the announcement of the merger evidenced that 
competition in the relevant market remained unaffected.  
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HUNGARY 
The present contribution of the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, GVH) 
is based on the questions posed, but follows a slightly different structure. We first discuss our general 
views on the subject, highlight some of the challenges we see in applying ex post evaluations in the case of 
a smaller country / competition authority and then our limited experience with ex post evaluations. 
1. The goals of impact evaluations 
In our view, the answers to the practical questions depend a lot on the main goals the competition 
authority expects to achieve by conducting impact evaluation studies. Below, we present two possible 
goals. Naturally, one can choose to pursue both at the same time as they are not contradictory to each 
other, but there may be some trade-offs that need to be considered in implementation. 
The first objective may be called "internal", that is, providing information for the agency itself. 
Conducting impact evaluation studies may provide useful feedback that can help the agency improve the 
quality of its work in future cases. This may be especially true in industries with high merger activity (for 
example, telecommunications or retail), where direct lessons can be drawn from analysing the impact of 
previous mergers. In the case of a primarily internal focus for impact evaluation, cases can be chosen based 
on how "interesting" or "useful" the results are expected to be. 
The second objective may be called "external", that is, providing information on, or justifying, the 
agency's work for third parties. If an agency routinely conducts impact evaluation studies, these may help 
to improve the agency's reputation, justify its importance, or have direct effects on its budget. There are 
two possible approaches to case selection in this case: either the agency could attempt to measure the 
overall positive impact of merger control on consumer welfare by analysing all cases, or it could focus on 
certain more important or more "problematic" cases, in order to establish whether the agency's assessment 
was "correct". 
2. Impact evaluation methods 
The choice of methods depends, to some extent, on the number of cases where an impact evaluation 
study is carried out. When all cases are investigated, it is probably the best to employ simulation methods 
to a degree (as in the practice of the OFT). This speeds the process and facilitates comparing cases to each 
other, but still requires a dedicated staff with this main responsibility. However, simulation requires many 
assumptions and simplifications, leading to possibly less robust results. Because of this statistical property, 
we think that a sufficiently large number of cases are required to derive reliable estimates. In our view, 
these arguments favor larger jurisdictions with more cases and resources to successfully implement the 
general impact evaluation of merger control. 
When only selected cases are investigated, a more detailed approach can be implemented, ideally 
using quantitative ex-post studies. In our view, the conceptual framework should be based on correct 
factual-counterfactual comparisons, by controlling for other market characteristics and developments. If 
possible, this would mean a quantitative approach in a difference-in-differences (DID) spirit; even if 
explicit econometric estimations could not be carried out. Whenever possible, it is preferred to complement 
the analysis with qualitative data, for example by using customer questionnaires. 
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In our view, one should be very careful when using financial market data to evaluate the impact of a 
competition authority's merger decision. First, there are many theoretical and measurement concerns, as 
event studies measure the impact of merger decisions on consumer welfare in an indirect and imperfect 
way. Second, many merging or rival firms' shares are not quoted, especially in transactions that are 
investigated in smaller jurisdictions.1
3. Case selection for impact evaluation 
  
If not all cases are investigated, the question of the approach to case selection arises. In our view, 
especially when first commencing the use of impact evaluation studies or if resource allocation is an 
important consideration, it may make sense to conduct them in cases where ample data is available on the 
industry. These may be, for example, industries where list prices are employed (like telecommunications or 
FMCG). Also, in "problematic" mergers, the Competition Authority is likely to have access to more data than 
usual during the merger investigation − although acquiring the data may be harder for the post-merger period. 
Perhaps the most trivial approach to case selection is to investigate mergers where the agency has 
identified competition concerns. It is not trivial, however, to identify "problematic" mergers. It is possible 
to employ certain screening methods: for example, conducting impact evaluation studies based on whether 
a merger was Phase II, or whether there were remedies. A further advantage of remedies is that they are 
often employed in cases where possible counterfactual situations have been defined in more detail, thus 
facilitating a DID approach. Impact evaluation might be simpler in the case of structural remedies, as 
opposed to behavioral, especially if the divestiture concerns only some of the affected markets. 
However, selecting the cases based on simple statistical criteria can lead to bias in identifying 
"important" cases − it is quite possible that in a complex merger, detailed analysis was performed already 
during pre-notification or Phase I, and the merger was finally cleared. It is also worth considering that 
analyzing more complex cases also leads to a higher margin of error in the results of impact evaluation.  It 
therefore may make sense to also investigate some "simpler" cases − but selecting them will then be 
somewhat subjective. 
4. The GVH's experience with impact evaluation in mergers 
The GVH has not yet conducted a full-scale impact evaluation study in a merger case where it made 
the decision itself. As we discussed above, impact evaluation studies may be less effective and relatively 
more costly to carry out (in terms of agency resources). The number of mergers investigated per year is 
relatively low (34 in 2009 and 37 in 2010, of which only 2 and 1 were remedied). This means that the 
possible sample size of mergers where impact evaluation could be conducted is also relatively small, 
implying that general conclusions about the agency's effectiveness would be hard to draw reliably.   
The GVH has commissioned, in a handful of cases, surveys pertaining to how well-known a given 
case is to the general public. In such studies, respondents are also sometimes asked about their thoughts on 
the impact of a given decision. One such study was conducted in relation to a merger on the market for 
tabloid newspapers.2
                                                     
1  The merger might also impact only a relatively small division of a large international company, in which 
case no significant stock market reaction can be expected, even if it may have had a significant effect on 
the affected markets. 
 The survey contained questions relating to consumers' perceptions of the likely 
effects the merger would have had, first on the content of the two papers, second on their respective prices, 
2  Ringier/Hid Radio (Vj-155/2008). The GVH had issued a Statement of Objections in the case, and no 
suitable remedies could be found. The parties finally withdrew the merger before the GVH could take a 
formal decision. 
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and also, whether the acquired paper would have been shut down. While many consumers could not 
answer the questions, the majority of those who gave answers believed that the papers would have become 
more similar to each other, that their prices would have increased, and many also believed that the acquired 
paper would, eventually, have been pulled from the market. Such a survey is of course no substitute for an 
impact evaluation study. 
A detailed impact evaluation concerning two mergers in the Hungarian retail gasoline markets was 
conducted in 2007. The basic motivation to start with this evaluation was another transaction in this market 
in 2009,3 and the GVH wanted to thoroughly check the effects of previous mergers on Hungarian retail 
prices. Note however, that the two mergers in 2007 were part of larger transactions involving multiple 
countries and so were investigated by the European Commission.4 The study ran fully fledged difference-
in differences estimations and developed a methodology to separate the effects of the two mergers that 
happened almost simultaneously.5 The study used a detailed, publicly available database containing daily 
retail gasoline prices (for 24 monthly, during 2007-2008) for each gas station.6
                                                     
3  Shell/Tesco (Vj-17/2009), approved unconditionally in Phase II. 
 The study found that both 
mergers had a statistically significant but minimal effect on prices (all price effects were smaller than 1%), 
and these results were robust to various specifications. 
4  The acquisition of Esso stations by Agip in case Eni/Exxon Mobil (COMP.M.4723), and the acquisition of 
Jet stations by Lukoil in transaction in case Lukoil/Conocophilips (COMP.M.4532), both cases cleared 
unconditionally in Phase I. 
5  A publicly available paper written on the subject is Csorba-Koltay-Farkas (2011), "Separating the ex post 
effects of mergers: an analysis of structural changes on the Hungarian retail gasoline market" 
6  www.holtankoljak.hu ("Where Should I Refuel?" in Hungarian), a website run by a private company to 
help consumers to compare gasoline prices at various stations. 
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JAPAN 
1. Introduction 
The Japan Fair Trade commission (hereinafter, “the JFTC”) employs two approaches related to the 
impact evaluation of merger decisions. One is the evaluations conducted by the staff in charge of merger 
reviews (Mergers and Acquisitions Division, hereinafter referred to as “M&A Division”) and the other one 
is conducted by the Competition Policy Research Center (hereinafter, “CPRC”)1
The M&A Division evaluated past cases from the viewpoint of further elaborating the merger reviews 
and published a report. In this evaluation, analyses of publicly available data and interviews with the 
parties concerned were employed as the evaluation method. 
 in which external experts 
participate. 
Outside experts played central roles in conducting the analyses in the evaluation by the CPRC, with a 
view to actively introducing economic analyses to the enforcement of the AMA and the planning/designing 
of competition policies. The purpose of the analyses was to focus mainly on the aspect of “efficiency” 
achieved by mergers. The analyses were attempted on the extent of achievements of efficiencies resulting 
from mergers and on the changes in market performance after mergers through actually applying economic 
methods by referring to the methodologies conventionally employed by economists and the competition 
authorities in the U.S.  
In the following, we will introduce “Ex-post evaluation of the merger review” (Japan Fair Trade 
Commission, 22 June 2007 )2
2. Ex-post evaluation of the merger review 
, which summarizes the analyses by the M&A Division, and “Empirical 
Studies of the Effects of Mergers and the Implications for Competition Policy” conducted by the CPRC. 
In this report, analyses were made mainly from two viewpoints. 
One is the “ex-post evaluation of import pressures.” In this analysis, import data was analyzed across 
items with regard to cases in which import pressures were evaluated as a factor to promote competition. In 
addition, detailed data analysis and interviews about the degree of import pressures after the mergers were 
conducted with regard to a past case in which potential import pressures were positively evaluated. 
Another is the “ex-post evaluation of remedies” in which the licensing of patent rights as a remedy in 
a past case was reviewed. More detailed data analyses and interviews were conducted about the status of 
the implementation of a remedy after mergers and its effects, etc. 
                                                     
1  The Competition Research Center, established in June 2003, has the objective to reinforce theoretical and 
empirical foundations for enforcing the AMA and related laws as well as planning, proposing, and 
evaluating competition policies. Its activities are developed with a view to build functional and sustainable 
cooperative platforms through joint studies among outside researchers, practitioners, and staff of the JFTC. 
2  Available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/07.june/070622-tenpu.pdf (Japanese version only). 
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2.1  Ex-Post evaluation of import pressures 
In this analysis, assessment of import pressures during the merger review was evaluated ex-post. 
More specifically, with regard to past cases in which import pressures had been recognized as having 
high possibility of working after the mergers, evaluations were made on whether import pressures were 
actually realized by analyzing the trends of import ratio across products and conducting detailed 
examination of a case in which the existence of import pressures was evaluated as a factor to be 
considered.  
2.1.1 Analyses on the trends of import ratios across items 
First, the analysis focused on the trends of import ratios across products with regard to 20 cases/26 
products for which data can be easily gathered from public information, etc., extracted from cases in which 
import pressures were evaluated as having high possibility of working after the mergers (27 cases/49 
products). The sample was selected from major merger cases in each year (hereinafter referred to as “major 
published cases”) which were published by the JFTC over a decade from 1994 until 2003 (119 cases/280 
products). 
As a result, imports were realized for 7 products after mergers and a certain amount of imports was 
observed for 8 products. For these products, it was considered that a certain degree of import pressures had 
functioned after mergers except for cases in which import products cannot be substituted for domestic 
products due to their low quality. 
On the other hand, the ratio of imports after mergers remained at low levels for 11 products. It is   
necessary to determine the existence of import pressures after analyzing the reasons why the ratio of 
imports remained so low in each case. 
2.1.2  Analysis on a case in which import pressures were evaluated positively 
In response to the results of the above 2.1.1, detailed analysis was conducted for a chemical product 
called “phenol” in a merger case between Mitsui Petrochemical Industries and Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals3 in 
which import pressures remained at a low level despite the positive evaluation on import pressures at the 
time of the merger review4
The above analysis focused, in terms of the ease of substitution between domestic and import 
products, on points such as degree of institutional barriers, degree of import-related transportation costs 
and existence of problems in distribution, degree of substitutability between imported products and 
domestic products, potential for supply from overseas, and correlation between domestic and overseas 
prices. 
. 
As a result, with regard to “phenol”, the ratio of imports was low at the time of the merger review and 
remained at a low level except for imports of certain goods. 
However, it was evaluated that there were potential import pressures from overseas because  certain 
conditions are satisfied such as little differences in product brands, grades and qualities between domestic 
and overseas goods, low switching costs resulting from repeated use, etc., and existence of many 
relatively-large-scale users observing overseas markets through their overseas operations. 
                                                     
3  Available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/ma/jirei2/9nendo.pdf (page3-5)(Japanese version only). 
4  Interviews were conducted during January and February 2006.  
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2.1.3  Conclusion 
As a result of the analyses in the above 2.1.1, in terms of the cases where import pressures were 
positively evaluated in merger reviews, it was suggested that they are in fact a mixture of two types of cases, 
that is, cases where import pressures are regarded to actually work and those where import pressures are not. 
Therefore, in future merger reviews, it is important to evaluate import pressures deliberately through 
data analyses and detailed interviews, especially in cases where the ratio of imports is low. 
2.2  Ex-post evaluations of remedies 
These analyses reviewed the contents and effects of remedies. 
More specifically, the analyses categorized/sorted out the characteristics and the effects of remedies 
by type and evaluated a past case by gathering documents/data as well as interviewing parties’ competitors 
and users. 
2.2.1 Categorization and analysis of past remedies 
Contents of remedies were analyzed with regard to the published cases during the decade from 1996 
to 2005. 
As a result, competitive problems were pointed out or some kinds of remedies were proposed in 
advance by the parties for approximately 40% of the cases, while approximately 25% of the total was 
approved on condition that remedies are implemented. 
Therefore, in light of the results of the past merger reviews, it was shown that (1) competitive 
concerns were solved by some kinds of remedies in many cases and (2) secure implementation of remedies 
were important for maintaining competitive markets. 
2.2.2  Analysis of a case in which remedies were implemented 
In this analysis, “Acquisition of shares of Sanyo Electric Vending Machine CO., LTD. by Fuji 
Electric CO., LTD.5
It evaluated “the decision on substantial restraint of competition” and “the design for remedies” 
through gathering documents/data and conducting interviews from parties, competitors and users
” was reviewed as a case where the licensing of patent rights as one of the remedies 
was taken. 
6
• Evaluation regarding the decision on substantial restraint of competition 
. 
In the field of vending machines sales, shares of the parties had declined after the merger. Factors 
such as the continuation of users’ policies to purchase from a plurality of sellers and various 
attempts concerning purchasing methods such as bidding/joint purchase were identified as the 
background of the decline. 
As a result, the overall sales prices of the product declined and it was considered unlikely that the 
merger substantially restrained the competition. Therefore, it was considered that the view on the 
impact on sales competition by the merger was reasonable. 
                                                     
5  Available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/ma/jirei2/H13jirei9.html (Japanese version only). 
6  Interviews were conducted during November and December 2005. 
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• Evaluation regarding the necessity of remedies 
Because there had been no application by competitors for the licensing of patents at the time of 
the analysis, it was possible to view the remedy as being unnecessary. 
However, another view was considered possible that convenience for users and consumers is 
achieved as a result of ensuring entry pressures through securing the disclosure of patents by the 
party because of the existence of indispensable patents for new entry. 
2.2.3  Implications from the evaluation 
The results of the evaluation suggest the following points to be remembered for future cases in which 
remedies will be necessary. Firstly, it is important to consider whether remedies are sufficient to solve 
competitive concerns resulting from mergers. In addition, when a remedy such as the licensing of patent 
rights is implemented, there is a possibility that such a remedy does not function properly if extremely high 
license fees are required in applying for the license. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the conditions on 
disclosing technologies to other companies, such as the fee and the period, as well as to revise such 
conditions in response to changes of market conditions, etc. 
Moreover, it was pointed out that, when remedies are implemented after mergers, it is necessary to 
publicize the remedies and research in advance of potential candidates applying for licenses.  
3. Empirical studies of the effect of mergers and the implications for competition policy 
This study was conducted by a team consisting of several researchers (including outside experts) of 
the CPRC, which is a research institute belonging to the JFTC, and made public at an international 
symposium regarding competition policies convened on March 4, 2011. 
During the period of this study, a merger between the two biggest companies in the iron steel industry 
in Japan (the business integration of Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal) was announced on February 3, 
2011. 
According to the press release, both parties concerned aimed at the following: “Improvement of the 
profitability”, “High evaluation from shareholders and capital markets”, “Competitiveness in technology, 
quality, and cost”, “Better response to the needs of customers”. 
To analyze the achievements of such aims in past mergers, this study conducted empirical studies on 
the effects of mergers on (1) profitability, (2) stock prices, (3) R&D, and (4) selling prices. 
However, these analyses had the following limitations. 
First, although the study was based on public information except for the price study, the number of 
samples was limited because many actual merger cases concern non-public firms for which financial 
reports and share price data were unavailable. Second, because of short post-merger periods, there is a 
possibility that it is insufficient for the mergers to exert their effects. Finally, because the motives and types 
of mergers are diverse and quite a few seem to have been made to rescue failing companies for example, 
there is a possibility that the mergers do not have enough impacts. 
For these reasons, it should be noted that the conclusions of this study cannot necessarily be 
determinative. 
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3.1  Empirical results 
3.1.1  Evaluation on the effects of mergers on profitability 
In this section, direct influence of mergers on corporate performances (profitability) was evaluated. 
Analyses were made on six mergers among first regional banks and second regional banks consummated 
between the period of 2000 and 2006. 
The change in corporate performances was analyzed by employing the propensity score matching 
method in which control firms, that is, firms that have similar characteristics to the merged firms except for 
experiencing mergers, were selected to compare financial indicators of merged firms to those of control 
firms. The method was used because a simple comparison of pre- and post-merger changes in financial 
indicators between merged firms and non-merged firms may not capture the effects of mergers alone. 
The results of the analyses revealed that although statistically-significant differences were not found, 
there were many cases in which their ROEs deteriorated after mergers. They suggest that mergers rarely 
contribute to increases in profitability. 
3.1.2   Evaluation of effects on stock prices 
In this analysis, the extent of influences of a merger on stock prices was analyzed by employing an 
event study method. 
By applying the stock market model, the rates of returns on respective stocks were estimated as linear 
functions of the rate of return on the market portfolio by controlling the effects of the price changes of 
overall market portfolio. Abnormal rate of returns (AR) were calculated as the difference of the actual rate 
of return from the expected rate of return obtained by the above procedures and then cumulative abnormal 
rate of returns (CAR) were worked out. As the object of analyses, 15 cases in which the parties were listed 
on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and available for analysis were selected out of the merger 
cases after 2000. 
The result of the analyses revealed that there were many cases in which stock prices rose on the day of 
the merger announcement but eventually became negative after several days. Therefore, the cumulative 
influences were not significantly different from 0 in the majority of cases. 
Theoretically, a merger is expected to raise the efficiency of the merging firm and thereby its long-run 
profitability so that the merger announcement should raise its stock price and result in a positive CAR. 
However, such effects were not found in these cases. 
3.1.3  Evaluation of effects on R&D expenditures 
To analyze the impact of mergers on innovation, R&D expenditures and the number of published 
patent applications were studied. 
As the objects of the analysis, 39 major cases were selected from merger cases in the manufacturing 
industry in Japan after 2000. 
The result of the analyses revealed that although both the R&D intensity and the number of published 
patent applications decreased in many cases, increases in R&D intensity were found in some cases, 
especially in R&D-intensive industries. 
However, a detailed survey, such as a review on specific cases, should be necessary because R&D 
intensity and the number of published patent applications alone were not sufficient as indices for such studies.  
DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 68 
3.1.4   Evaluation of effects on prices 
In this study, price effects of mergers were examined by analyzing how retail prices of goods in the 
market changed before and after the mergers. 
As the data for the analyses, scanner data was used for 3 selected items such as household flavor 
seasoning, sugar, and instant noodles. 
Although the number of items subject to the survey was limited to three, average market prices 
(including products by companies other than the parties) increased to a greater or lesser extent (0.16% in 
household flavor seasoning, 5.28% in sugar) in two of them and the average product prices of the parties 
increased further in all three. 
In addition, in product differentiated industries, there were some cases in which the parties used both 
price increases and price cuts depending on the brand to further differentiate itself among the brands sold 
by the parties concerned. 
It was suggested that it is necessary to examine not only the effects on the average price but also the 
effects on the product composition and positioning that a merger may cause, which means the necessity of 
considering the possibility that some of the consumers may benefit whereas others may be hurt from the 
mergers. 
3.2  Conclusion 
These empirical studies suggested that the priority for competition agencies should be to watch the 
impacts on prices, that is, the impacts on the users (consumers) in merger reviews. On the other hand, the 
parties need to show detailed plans together with the scope of their implementations concerning the 
improvements of efficiencies and ‘long-term competitiveness.’ 
Moreover, it was pointed out that more economic and quantitative evaluations should be exploited 
based on econometric analyses because merger reviews in Japan have tended to be based on qualitative 
evaluations based on interviews, etc.  
4.  Final conclusion 
As presented above, there are two types of impact evaluations of merger decisions in Japan, that is, 
the ones conducted by the JFTC and the ones conducted by outside experts. 
Both of them were voluntarily conducted to refine merger analyses7
Therefore, accumulation of ex-post evaluation cases and studies regarding evaluation methods are 
expected in the future. 
. Although certain suggestions 
were obtained from them with regard to the merger review, some limitations concerning the analyses, such 
as the number of cases, data, the periods for evaluations, etc., were pointed out. 
                                                     
7  Note that policies are evaluated in Japan according to the “Government Policy Evaluations Act” (Act No. 83 
of 2001, and hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) so that swift (within 30 days with regard to the first reviews 
and within 90 days with regard to the second reviews) and appropriate reviews on mergers (acquisition of 
shares, mergers, divisions, joint transfers of shares, acquisitions of businesses, etc.) are conducted in order to 
maintain and promote fair and free competition by preventing certain mergers that may be substantially to 
restrain competition in a particular field of trade. In addition thereto, evaluation of achievements is 
implemented with regard to transparency in merger reviews by publishing major merger cases, etc. 
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KOREA 
1. Introduction 
In merger regulation, imposition of effective remedies as well as the reasonable definition of the 
relevant markets and correct assessment of anticompetitive effects is important aspects for preventing 
potential anticompetitive effect of a merger. The effectiveness of remedies can be improved by reviewing 
the impact of remedies imposed in the past enforcement cases. Therefore, the starting point for imposing 
proper merger remedies is empirical analysis of effects on the merging parities and impact on the relevant 
markets by the remedies issued in previous cases.  
The following will discuss the KFTC’s experience of conducting comprehensive analysis on the 
impact of its previous merger decisions. 
2.  Korea’s impact evaluation study of merger enforcement  
2.1  Overview  
The KFTC does not regularly evaluate the impact of merger decisions. However, in 2006 it conducted 
an evaluation on impact of remedies imposed in previous merger cases handled since Korea’s competition 
law, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), was enacted. The goal of this evaluation, 
carried out by an independent researcher, was to ensure consistency and effectiveness in merger remedies 
and compliance of such remedies by merging parties. 
2.2 What were evaluated?  
The 2006 evaluation was conducted on merger cases handled from the time of the enactment of the 
MRFTA in 1980 to the 1st half of 2006 that resulted in decisions to impose remedies. Among the total 31 
such cases identified, however, 2 early cases handled in 1982 was excluded from the evaluation since there 
was a difficulty in acquiring relevant data as the cases took place long time ago.  
Out of the 29 cases reviewed in the impact evaluation, 21 were about horizontal merger, 7 were 
vertical merger and 1 conglomerate. 
2.3 How were they evaluated? 
For the impact evaluation, the report first summarized case overview including the state of relevant 
markets, anticompetitive effect of the proposed transactions, and remedies imposed in each case, and 
proceeded to analyze effect and significance of the remedies.  
The most important task in the process was obtaining relevant data on changes in market environment 
and in profitability of the merging firms after the remedies were imposed and other information necessary 
to assess how the imposed remedies affected competition in the markets.  
As the evaluation report was to be publicized, the independent researcher’s collection of data was 
limited to publically available documents such as market state analyses provided by, for instance, financial 
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authorities, or business reports produced by merging firms. To facilitate the process, however, the KFTC 
provided researchers carrying out the evaluation with part of the documents submitted by merging firms 
for monitoring of compliance with the imposed remedies.  
2.4 What were the results? 
2.4.1 Overall result  
The impact evaluation study concluded that the KFTC’s overall enforcement performance in merger 
cases was quite positive considering its relatively short history in merger enforcement. It pointed out, 
however, that the merger enforcement focused on structural remedies in the early days changed the course 
after the Asian financial crisis, preferring behavioral remedies in many cases for years. The study said this 
change in enforcement approach to prefer behavioral remedies was hard to consider appropriate given the 
common practice in imposing remedies in merger cases.  
The study also emphasized that behavioral remedies could have characteristics of direct regulation 
and urged great caution on this. Of course, this does not mean that structural remedies should be always 
chosen over behavioral ones even when behavioral measures are needed. However, it went on to say that 
the fact that remedies issued in the course of merger regulation, the most fundamental area of antitrust 
enforcement aimed for the free market, could have the effect of direct regulation deserves close attention 
by competition authorities. 
2.4.2 Empirical analysis of merger cases: Muhak-Daesun merger (Jan. 28, 2003) 1
2.4.2.1 Case overview  
 
In 2002 Muhak Co., the main soju (Korea’s traditional liquor) producer in Busan city, additionally 
acquired 33.77 % stakes in Daesun Distilling Co., the biggest soju producer in Gyeongnam province, to 
own 41% of Daesun, raising competitive concerns in the soju markets of Busan and Gyeongnam. Those 
two regional soju markets- Busan and Gyeongnam markets- had highly concentrated structure with the 
markets dominated by the two merging parties. The combined market share of the merging parties was 
92.5% in Busan and 97.2% in Gyoengnam.  
2.4.2.2 Merger remedies  
The KFTC practically blocked the Muhak-Daesun merger deal by ordering Muhak to sell its entire 
stakes in Daesun to the third party within one year.  
2.4.2.3 Impact assessment of remedies  
The KFTC analyzed changes in the relevant market share during the period of 2001-2004, and found 
that the level of market competition had been maintained or increased modestly. 2
                                                     
1  KFTC Resolution 2003-No. 027 (Jan. 28, 2003) 
 
2  Changes in Market Share in Busan and Gyeongnam  
Busan (2001→2004) Gyeongnam (2001→2004) 
Daesun 84.4 → 86.0 Muhak 84.4 → 80.0 
Muhak 7.1 → 7.4 Daesun 12.9 → 15.8 
Jinro 7.2 → 5.4 Jinro 2.7 → 4.1 
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Regarding this, the study concluded that the state of the market after the imposition of the remedies 
showed there was no problem in the KFTC’s decision. This conclusion is based on the fact that the 
KFTC’s decision aimed to prevent already meager elements of competition from being totally lost from the 
merger rather than introducing or strengthening effective competition in the market.  
2.4.3 Empirical analysis of merger cases: Hyundai Motor- Kia Motors (Apr. 7, 1999) 3
2.4.3.1 Case overview  
 
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis when Korea strived to handle the problem of insolvent 
companies, Hyundai Motor Co. acquired new stocks in Kia Motors Corp. amounting to 51% of the 
company. At that time, Korea’s auto market was dominated by Hyundai, Kia and Daewoo Motor under the 
strong oligopoly structure, and new entry to the market was not seen as feasible. Regarding the merger 
deal, the KFTC carried out a review by defining the relevant market as passenger car, truck and bus 
markets and found that the transaction would substantially lessen competition in each relevant market. 
Nevertheless, the KFTC determined that the competitive harm could be repressed, being outweighed by its 
beneficial effects such as rationalization of the industry and strengthened competitiveness in the global 
market given that the rival Daewoo accounted for 36.8% and 25.8% of the passenger car and bus markets 
respectively with strong export performance.  
2.4.3.2 Merger remedies 
Regarding the merger transaction, the KFTC imposed behavioral remedies restricting price increases, 
instead of structural remedies such as divestiture of the truck division. Under the price increase restriction, 
defendants had to keep the prices increase rate of trucks they manufactured and sold in the domestic 
market lower than the foreign-currency-denominated price increase rate of their exported vehicles of the 
same standard for 3 years. 
2.4.3.3 Impact assessment of remedies  
The study analyzed the remedies imposed in this case in two aspects; a problem caused by imposition 
of behavioral remedies instead of structural ones and the post-merger market changes.  
First, regarding the price restriction, the study raised a problem of its effectiveness in that it was not 
easy for a competition authority to monitor the implementation of that remedy due to various factors to 
consider including terms of trade. Also, the evaluation study found that the three-year price increase 
restriction was not enough to remedy the harm from the eliminated competition given that prices of 
compact vehicles rose by 27.3% and turnover of Hyundai soared in the short period of time.  
Regarding the post-merger market change, it said the auto makers’ share of the domestic market did 
not show significant change, even though the merged firm’s market share somewhat increased right after 
the transaction.  
2.5 Use of impact assessment study 
The impact evaluation study conducted by outside researchers was the first of this kind aimed to 
comprehensively assess the effect of remedies imposed in the previous merger cases handled after the 
MRFTA was enacted.  
                                                     
3  KFTC Resolution 99-No. 43 (Apr. 7, 1999)  
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This evaluation study is particularly noteworthy in that it set up the basic framework of imposing 
merger remedies by identifying principles and things to be improved in crafting and imposing merger 
remedies. In fact, in December 27, 2006 the KFTC established the “Guidance on Imposing Merger 
Remedies” specifying the types of remedies and criteria for imposing such remedies based on the study.  
3.  Conclusion 
Evaluating the impact of merger remedies ex post is not an easy task. But without empirical analysis 
of the impact of remedies, a competition authority cannot identify problems nor explore ways to address 
such problems. Improvement of the merger enforcement is possible only after the close analysis of actual 
effect of remedies imposed in the previous cases.  
In this regard, a competition authority’s voluntary effort to periodically review impact of merger 
remedies is essential. It needs to be noted, however, that a successful impact evaluation requires careful 
consideration regarding, such as, on what grounds impact of merger remedies will be judged and who will 
conduct the evaluation and how to design the evaluation methodology.  
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NETHERLANDS 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) sets out one of the methods it uses to 
measure the impact of its merger decisions. This paper also presents the method the NMa uses to determine 
to what extent its decisions influence the decisions of companies to i) proceed with certain merger plans 
and notify them to the NMa; ii) modify such merger plans before notifying; or iii) to abandon the merger 
plans.   
Recently, there has been an increased interest in the evaluation of competition authorities’ activities. 
As a result, an increasing number of competition authorities are beginning to measure the effects of their 
enforcement actions in their jurisdiction. The reason they carry out such impact studies may vary. Some 
possible reasons for carrying out such assessments include i) the added benefit of using results in their 
advocacy efforts; ii) in order to learn lessons from past experiences by understanding what the impact of 
certain enforcement activities are, and iii) utilizing this information to improve enforcement activities. 
 Different types of techniques may be used to shed light on the impact of competition authorities’ 
decisions.1 The different methods range from i) using score cards to compare different authorities2 and ii) 
using threshold values to calculate the effects3; to iii) carrying out econometric ex-post studies.4 Generally, 
authors agree that ex-post studies are the most credible way to assess the competitive effects of completed 
mergers.5 Although well-resourced ex-post evaluations and other impact assessment methods have a 
variety of highly practical uses, a general concern remains, that such evaluations will not be able to 
measure deterrence or anticipation6
                                                     
1  Buccirossi, P., L. Ciari, T. Duso, S-O. Fridolfsson, G. Spagnolo and C. Vitale (2008), A short overview of 
a methodology for the  ex-post review of merger control decisions, De economist, 156 (4): 453-475. 
Davies, S. (2010), A review of the OFT’s impact estimation methods, OFT 1164, London: OFT. 
 accurately. This is an important weakness since, arguably, deterrence 
or anticipation is the most important effect of competition law enforcement. For instance, Neven and 
Zenger stated that: “The impact that enforcement decisions have on other potential cases is not observed 
either. As long as decisions are sound, neglecting their deterrent effect might, however, significantly 
underestimate their effectiveness. Indeed, one could argue that a competition policy implemented solely or 
2  Bergman, M.A. (2008), Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Or measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of 
competition, De economist, 156 (4): 387-409. 
3  Kemp, R.G.M., M. Mulder en J. Van Sinderen (2010), Outcome of NMa activities: a description of the 
calculation method, NMa Working Papers, no 1., Den Haag: NMa. OFT (2010), A guide to OFT’s impact 
estimation methods, OFT 1250, London: OFT. 
4  Kemp, R.G.M and A. Severijnen (2010), Price effects of Dutch hospital mergers: An ex-post assessment of 
hip surgery, NMa Working Papers, no 2., Den Haag: NMa. International Journal of the Economics and 
Business (2011), Special issue: Hospital mergers and antitrust policy, 18 (1). 
5  Weinberg, M. (2008), The price effects of horizontal mergers, Journal of competition law and economics, 
4(2), 433-447. 
6  Deterrence is more related to anti-trust, anticipation more to merger control. 
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very largely through deterrence would be most effective.”7 Neven and Zenger have further stated that: 
“Neglecting the deterrence effect of enforcement may significantly bias the evaluation of consumer benefits 
downwards. Estimates of the deterrence effect are rare and crude. Nonetheless, there are indications that 
it is substantial in size.”8
This paper will therefore first present the results and experiences of ex-post studies performed in the 
Netherlands and then expand upon the idea that when one measures the impact of competition authorities’ 
decisions, it is also important that one considers some indications of the effect of this deterrence, 
particularly in terms of anticipation. The NMa believes that when determining outcome vis-à-vis merger 
policy effects, in essence, calculating the number of actual interventions in merger cases may result in a 
study which simply considers the ‘tip of the iceberg.’ By only considering the impact of the actual 
interventions, additional effects of competition enforcement (for example companies not notifying their 
merger plans as a response to previous merger decisions) are not fully taken into account.
 
9
2. Ex-post research in the Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands, ex-post studies on the impact of merger regulations have to date been done on an 
ad-hoc basis. Two ex-post studies have been carried out since the NMa’s inception in 1998. The first study 
was done by an external research company, NEI, as part of the evaluation of the Dutch Competition Act in 
2002. The sponsor of this study was the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The second study was done by 
NMa staff in 2009. These studies both focus on supervision. Both studies will be discussed in short, 
followed by an examination of the practical issues of the NMa’s ex-post study. 
2.1 NEI-study10
The NEI-study was part of an evaluation of the Dutch Competition Act. In the study, ten competition 
cases were studied, of which five were merger cases. Of these five merger cases, one was prohibited, while 
the other four were cleared. Of the four which were cleared, three were authorized conditional upon 
remedies.  
 
The NEI-study is qualitative in nature, as interviews were used as the main method to collect data and 
evidence. Indicators of competition were studied and evaluated by considering what the structure of the 
relevant markets is following the merger, and what the structure of the markets would have been had the 
NMa not intervened at all (i.e.  the current situation compared with a counterfactual). Of the five mergers 
which were studied, NEI concluded that the merger which was approved (without remedies) did not 
influence the level of competition in the market (i.e. the decision to approve was a good one). The 
assessment of two of the mergers which were approved - conditional upon remedies - concluded that the 
remedies proved to be unnecessary. The assessment of the final merger case, cleared conditional to 
remedies, showed that these remedies had in fact ensured that competition had remained stable in the 
market post merger – and that without the remedies, the level of competition would have dropped. This is 
also true for the prohibited merger where it was concluded that without the prohibition, the level of 
competition would have decreased in that market. 
                                                     
7  Neven, D. and H. Zenger (2008 ), Ex-post evaluation of enforcement: A principal-agent perspective, De 
economist, 156 (4): 478. 
8  Neven, D. and H. Zenger (2008 ), Ex-post evaluation of enforcement: A principal-agent perspective, De 
economist, 156 (4): 482. 
9  Davies, S, and A. Majumdar (2002), The development of targets for consumer savings arising from 
competition policy, Economic discussion paper 4, report prepared for OFT. 
10  NEI (2002), Eindrapport evaluatie mededingingswet, Rotterdam: NEI.  
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2.2 NMa-study11
In this study, the price effects of two hospital mergers were assessed (the assessment was based on 
one treatment - namely hip surgery) (hereafter NMa Study). Both mergers were finalized at approximately 
the same time in 2005. One merger decision had not been controversial at all, while the other merger 
decision had led to a lot of debate and criticism from scholars and politicians, who generally put a lot of 
emphasis on the relevant geographical market. The results for the first merger showed the price effects (a 
small decrease in price) to be insignificant. The econometric results for the second merger showed that 
there was a significant price increase for hip surgery of 3.5% to 5% as a result of the merger.  
 
As the NMa Study is more recent, we will discuss some relevant practical issues of performing the 
quantitative ex-post study in more detail. 
2.2.1 Methodology 
In the NMa Study, the “Differences-in-Differences” method was used.12 This type of quantitative 
study is often used for ex-post studies and more in particular to evaluate the effects of hospital mergers.13 
When sufficient data is available, this is an especially good methodology to use, particularly as it controls 
for sector-wide developments. Such a study allows one to isolate the price effect of the merger. In this 
study, sufficient data was available, as it had already been collected by the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
(NZa) for their regulation activities. In order to complete the study, the NMa selected only one treatment, 
hip surgery, as it has a large share in the total revenues of the competitive segment. This competitive 
segment is in 2005 approximately 20% of the total hospital care revenue.  Given time constraints and 
potential answering biases, the NMa did not combine the quantitative study with interviews with market 
parties and other stakeholders.14
2.2.2. Design 
 
Two merger cases were selected for scrutiny for the NMa Study. Because the NMa had two mergers 
in the same sector and in the same year, they were integrated in one analysis. For the first case, the decision 
was relatively straightforward (Phase I decision); after the merger enough effective competition remained, 
therefore, the merger was no problem. For the second case, it was more of a ‘close call’ (Phase II decision) 
with some evidence pointing to a clearance and other evidence pointing to a prohibition. Assessing the 
evidence was especially difficult as competition was still in its early development stage in this sector. 
Some of the parameters considered in the NMa assessment of the hospital case included: i) are patients 
willing to travel and how far; ii) will differences in quality between hospitals become transparent; iii) will 
patients use this information in their choice of hospital; iv) will insurance companies try to direct their 
insured to visit contracted hospitals; and v) will insurance companies use selective contracting. Naturally, 
different assumptions or expectations could result in opposing conclusions.  
                                                     
11  Kemp, R.G.M., and A. Severijnen (2010), Price effects of Dutch hospital mergers: An ex-post assessment 
of hip surgery, NMa Working Papers, No. 2, The Hague: NMa. 
12  Woolridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press; Bertrand, M., E Duflo and S. Mullainanathan (2004), How much should we trust differences-
in-differences estimates?, Quarterly Journal of Economics), 119(1), pp. 249-275. 
13  See for instance International Journal of the Economics and Business (2011), Special issue: Hospital 
mergers and antitrust policy, 18 (1). 
14  There is an increased risk of socially desirable answers if NMa-staff do the interviews. An option could 
have been to outsource this qualitative research to a research company. 
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2.2.3 Conducting the NMa Study 
The NMa Study was performed by staff of the Office of the Chief Economist of the NMa. The case-
handlers who had assessed these cases were not involved in the actual research of the study, although they 
were consulted in order to understand some of the finer details of the cases. As data were provided by the 
NZa, NMa case-handlers were also not involved in the data preparation. The NZa was also not involved in 
the actual research. As a result the study was carried out without any prejudice or bias. 
Besides the NZa data, some publicly available data was also included (number of beds, proxies for 
quality, etc). No extra information was required from the merging parties or other industry participants. 
Industry participants were also not informed that the ex-post study was being conducted.   
2.2.4 Results and lessons learnt 
The main objective of the study was to determine the price effect of the merger and how that related 
to the size of the geographical market. If there had been a price increase, this would be an indication that 
the geographical market had been defined too broadly, i.e. the hospital is not effectively constraint by the 
other hospitals. The objective of the study was not to evaluate whether the decision was correct or not. Had 
this been the objective, a different type of evaluation would have been necessary.  
The study showed that in one merger, the prices of hip surgery of the two merging parties had 
increased by 3.5% and 5% respectively post-merger. This could be an indication that the geographical 
market had been too broadly defined in the decision. The study showed that in the other merger, no 
significant price effects for hip surgery were found, which could indicate that the merger did not have an 
anti-competitive effect. 
After an internal check for confidentiality, the results were anonymously presented at an academic 
seminar. After internal deliberation, it was decided that - as it is important to undertake these types of 
studies - one also ought to present the results externally. Furthermore, the results were also discussed 
internally and extra attention was paid to the definition of the geographical market for future cases. As a 
result of the analysis of the results of this study, a project was set up within the NMa to evaluate new 
methods for geographical market delineation. This was done in order to determine whether and how the 
study’s findings could be used to improve the assessment of future healthcare mergers.  
Furthermore, it was also decided that market research which studies the switching intentions of 
patients (stated preferences) should be evaluated with more care. Both of these considerations should 
improve the assessment of future hospital merger cases. 
Six months after the initial presentation a newspaper article appeared - based on the results of the 
NMa Study – stating that hospital mergers result in higher prices. The article led to a significant amount of 
debate in Parliament. In the view of the NMa, the article had exaggerated and misinterpreted the results, 
particularly as it was a study of only one treatment, whereas hospitals perform thousands of different 
treatments. When the NMa had completed the NMa Study, it felt that because its study was simply based 
on one treatment, it needed to keep the results in context in order not  to give too much attention to a study 
on one segment of a much larger market. Despite this, the hospitals involved were not amused when the 
newspaper article appeared, as they felt they had to ‘defend’ themselves. A lesson learnt from the debate 
that followed the newspaper article is that communication of the results of these types of research should 
be done more proactively, explicitly framing the context and informing the merging parties and other 
stakeholders involved beforehand as well as explaining more carefully why such studies are worthwhile 
and important to perform.  
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2.3 Conclusion ex post studies 
The NMa believes it is important to perform ex-post studies. They can help to improve the internal 
decision making and contribute to how evidence can be interpreted. Furthermore, the NMa believes that it 
is important to publish these results and discuss the results with external parties. This will result in better 
analyses and show the public that the NMa wishes to learn continually and to improve its decision making.  
3. Deterrence and anticipation of competition law enforcement 
Besides these ex-post studies, it is also important to study the ‘opposite’, i.e. how do the decisions of 
the NMa influence the behaviour of companies so that they refrain from (potential) anti-competitive 
mergers. As stated before, this is perhaps one of the most important, and yet least understood, aspects of 
competition control. Below we will therefore present a study on the deterrence and anticipation effect of 
competition law enforcement.  
3.1 Literature 
As mentioned earlier, when determining outcome of competition enforcement, it is also important to 
consider anticipation/deterrence effects. Several authors have studied the deterrence effect of competition 
enforcement. 15
The deterrence effect on merger control may result in two effects: a frequency-based effect (merger 
plans being forsaken) and a composition-based effect (merger plans being shaped differently).
  Whereas most literature focuses on collusion and anti-cartel policies, the anticipation 
effect of merger control is less researched.  
16 Stigler 
found that in the US a stricter merger policy reduced the number of horizontal mergers relative to the 
number of conglomerate and vertical mergers, i.e. a composition-based effect.17 Eckbo argued that merger 
plans which may have anticompetitive effects are deterred by a more aggressive antitrust policy, however, 
he is concerned that mergers that are not anti-competitive are also deterred.18 In a later study, Eckbo could 
not directly identify whether a change in policy would impact future merger plans of companies.19 In 2005, 
the NMa commissioned a study on the anticipation effect of the NMa’s merger control activities.20
                                                     
15  Seldeslachts, J., Clougherty, J. and Barros, P. (2009), Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The 
Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, Journal of Law and Economics, 52 (August): 607-634. 
Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G. and Vitale, C. (2009b). Deterrence in Competition Law. 
Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY). Discussion Paper No. 285. 
 
Interviews with 16 competition lawyers learned that companies are aware of the NMa’s competition 
enforcement and that companies do in fact aim to minimise the probability of intervention by the NMa. As 
such, merger proposals are often modified or even abandoned when there is a high probability that the 
NMa will not authorise the merger proposal. Furthermore it was calculated that approximately 12% of the 
16  Aaronson, R. (1992) Do companies take any notice of competition policy?, Consumer Policy Review, 2(3): 
140-145. Cited in: Seldeslachts, J., Clougherty, J. and Barros, P. (2009), Settle for Now but Block for 
Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, Journal of Law and Economics, 52 (August): 
607-634. 
17  Stigler, G.J. (1966). The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws. Journal of Law and Economics, 9 
(October): 225-58. 
18  Eckbo, B.E. (1989), The role of stock market studies in formulating antitrust policy towards horizontal 
mergers: Comment, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 28: 22-38. 
19  Eckbo, B.E. (1992), Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence, Journal of Finance,  47 (July): 1005-1029. 
20  Twynstra Gudde (2005), Research into the Anticipation of Merger Control, a report prepared for the 
Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), available at www.nmanet.nl. 
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initiatives are amended and that 6% of the initiatives are abandoned. This implies that for every 100 
notifications, there are approximately six plans abandoned and 12 modified. In 2007, the OFT 
commissioned a study of the deterrence effect in the UK, which concluded that, based on the answers of 
the lawyers, for each merger in which the OFT intervened, five merger proposals were modified or 
abandoned without intervention by the OFT. Based however, on the answers of the companies, the 
deterrence effect is more than double: for each merger in which OFT intervened twelve merger proposals 
were modified or abandoned without intervention by the OFT.21
To better understand the impact of the anticipatory effect of merger control in the Netherlands, the 
NMa recently commissioned SEO Economic Research
 
22 to investigate the magnitude of this effect. In this 
contribution, we will limit the presentation to the results of this study as they relate to mergers. 23
3.2 The SEO Economic Research study
 
24
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The NMa enforces the Dutch Competition Act (Mededingingswet). This enforcement involves, 
amongst other tasks, monitoring mergers and acquisitions. The aim of competition enforcement is to 
influence the behaviour of businesses in such a way as to prevent mergers and acquisitions that restrict 
competition. This aim is partially achieved where businesses themselves modify their behaviour without 
direct intervention by the competition authority. Therefore, when determining the effect of enforcement 
activities in the area of merger control, the effect is measured not only by the extent to which the NMa acts 
on anti-competitive mergers, but indeed also by the extent to which companies modify or abandon their 
plans in advance of intervention.25
In order to understand the magnitude of the anticipation effect, questionnaires were used. The use of 
questionnaires, however, has limitations. For example, there is no certainty concerning the reliability of the 
information provided by the respondents. Managers, for example, may be reluctant to indicate that the 
anticipatory effect is low in order to avoid stricter enforcement action in the future (strategic bias). 
Managers may also be reluctant to provide information about anti-competitive activities. As the term cartel 
has a strong negative connotation, the answers may be distorted by a desire for respectability. This 
potential distortion on anti-competitive behaviour will be lower where the answers are provided by an 
adviser (such as a competition economist or lawyer).
  
26
                                                     
21  OFT (2007), 'The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the OFT – discussion document', OFT 
963, London: OFT. 
 This strategic answering bias may also be lowered 
by asking for facts (numbers of merger plans, adjustments of plans, etc.). 
22  Van der Noll, R., B. Baarsma, N. Rosenboom and J. Weda (2011), Anticipating cartel and merger control, 
SEO-rapport nr. 2010-076, Amsterdam: SEO, available at www.nmanet.nl. 
23  The study also investigate the impact of anti-cartel control, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
24  This section is based on Van der Noll et al(2011). 
25  For instance, in the UK companies are not obliged to notify their merger plans, therefore deterrence of anti-
competitive merge plans is even more relevant in the UK. 
26  Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G. and Vitale, C. (2009b). Deterrence in Competition Law. 
Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY). Discussion Paper No. 285. 
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3.2.2 The anticipation process 
To start with, the NMa is, for the most part, aware only of mergers that are notified and is in many 
cases unaware of those that are not notified. Although the NMa is sometimes made aware of merger plans 
that are announced via media or by pre-notification contacts, there might be even more plans that are 
unknown to the NMa.  
The anticipatory response of companies to mergers and merger control can be seen as follows; A 
merger may follow different paths (see Figure 1). The starting point is the preparation of a merger plan. 
This plan may or may not be anti-competitive. In many cases this is not entirely clear to the company 
concerned. After the plan has been examined in more detail it becomes clear whether it is attractive for the 
company or not. Once a merger has been concluded it is expected to provide a benefit, excluding the costs 
and uncertainties of competition enforcement. If there was no merger control, the plans with a benefit > 0 
would result in a merger. An impractical or unattractive plan has a negative benefit (≤ 0). If the benefit is 
positive, it is likely that a company will wish to proceed with the merger plan, and that they will therefore 
notify these intentions to the relevant competition authority/authorities. 
Figure 1:  Merger plans and anticipation 
                   
Based on: Van der Noll, et al. (2011)27
Phase 4 of the above diagram represents the decision to proceed with the merger through to 
notification. If the merger is notified, the NMa will determine whether a licence is required. The expected 
payoff is the ‘Likelihood of clearance x Benefit – Notification costs’. A company will notify its plan only 
if the ‘Likelihood of clearance x Benefit – Notification costs’ > 0. To estimate the likelihood of clearance, 
it is important to gauge how the NMa is likely to assess the merger. Previous decisions may be important 
in that respect.  
 
There are two mechanisms of anticipation effects: a) anticipation because anti-competitive merger 
plans are not notified and b) anticipation because anti-competitive merger plans are modified and then 
                                                     
27  Van der Noll, R., B. Baarsma, N. Rosenboom and J. Weda (2011), Anticipating cartel and merger control, 
SEO-rapport nr. 2010-076, Amsterdam: SEO, available at www.nmanet.nl. 
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notified. ‘Business chilling’ or over-anticipation occurs when plans for mergers that do not restrict 
competition are abandoned or modified in anticipation of enforcement action.  
In SEO’s survey of companies and lawyers, this framework is used to collect the information on the 
anticipation effect. 
3.2.3 Results 
Results of the survey of companies show that the participating companies considered a total of 354 
mergers in the last five years (see Figure 2). 37% of them resulted in a notification; of these 37%, 2% were 
modified before notification in order to forestall potential objections on the part of the NMa; 5% of the 
mergers did not result in a notification and were abandoned on competition grounds. In terms of notified 
mergers, for each 100 notified mergers, there are 5 mergers modified before notification and 13 plans were 
abandoned.  
Figure 2: Results magnitude of anticipation effect 
 
Based on: Van der Noll, et al. (2011)28
The results of the SEO survey of lawyers showed that 64% of the proposals they had advised on, 
resulted in a notification, of which 5% were modified prior to notification in order to maximise the 
likelihood of gaining clearance. 4% of the merger proposals were abandoned because of the expected 
outcome of the assessment by the NMa (see also Figure 2).  
  
Besides an estimate for the effect of anticipation, SEO also investigated which factors influence the 
level of anticipation by means of a conjoint analysis. In Table 1 the attributes with their respective levels 
are presented. In the SEO study, respondents had to evaluate and score different hypothetical situations by 
indicating the probability that the company would proceed with the merger plan up to notification. In all 
hypothetical situations, the benefit of the merger is an expected profit increase of 10%. The probability of 
                                                     
28  Van der Noll, R., B. Baarsma, N. Rosenboom and J. Weda (2011), Anticipating cartel and merger control, 
SEO-rapport nr. 2010-076, Amsterdam: SEO, available at www.nmanet.nl. 
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clearance depends on the market share and the possibility to submit remedies (does the company believe it 
has the ability to for instance, divest a division or plant). The other factors are outlined in the table below. 
Table 1: Setup conjoint analysis 
Dimension  Attribute (levels) 
Attractiveness of the merger • 10% profit increase (constant) 
Probability of clearance after 
notification phase 
• Market share of combined company (less than 40%; 40% to 70%) 
• Possibility of submitting remedies during notification phase (yes; no) 
Cost of notification • Cost of notification fee (€ 0; € 15,000; € 30,000) 
• Lead time (2; 6; 12 weeks) 
For the companies examined, all the attributes were considered to be significant. The results showed 
that as regards the market share, a higher market share results in a higher probability to notify the merger, 
i.e. a lower anticipation effect. The possibility to submit remedies during the notification phase results in a 
higher probability to notify a merger. Higher notification fees lead to a lower probability to notify a 
merger, i.e. more anticipation. Finally, longer lead times result in a lower probability to notify a merger. Of 
these attributes, the unavailability of remedies has the greatest effect on the anticipation response, followed 
by an increase in cost from € 15,000 to € 30,000. In third place comes an extension of lead time from 6 to 
12 weeks. 
The lawyers who responded to this study stated that they believed a higher market share would reduce 
the likelihood that the merger plan will be continued. Where the lawyers who responded to this survey 
indicated that they regard market share as indicative of the expected chance of obtaining clearance, 
companies probably just see a higher market share as a higher profit potential. When lawyers prepare an 
advice for companies on a proposed merger, market share has by far the greatest effect of all the other 
factors they consider. In their advice, lawyers do not in general, for instance consider the costs of 
notification or lead time as reasons not to notify or not to merge.  Compared to the current notification fee, 
a lower fee will result in more notifications, i.e. less anticipation. Also the availability of remedies will 
increase the probability of notification.  
3.3  Conclusion SEO Study 
The results of a study on the anticipation effects of merger control confirm the widely accepted 
proposition that merger control has a much larger affect than the direct effects observed. Based on the 
results of the SEO survey, 18% of merger plans are modified or abandoned. And these are the cases that 
really matter, i.e. merger plans that are perceived by companies as potentially anti-competitive. The 
number of abandoned plans (13 per 100 notifications) is especially important. The fact that this number is 
much higher than the number of remedied or blocked mergers shows that anticipation does matter. 
As discussed above, for companies, the availability of potential remedies influences the decision to 
notify. If companies already have potential remedial solutions for foreseen discussions with authorities on 
competition concerns, they are more inclined to notify a merger. The level of probability for merger 
notification can be influenced by the notification fee and the lead time. It is clear from the answers 
provided by the lawyers survey that they still use market shares as an important indication of potential 
competition problems, despite the more economical assessment of mergers. Costs and lead time are less 
important for the lawyers. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper presents the experiences of the Netherlands with ex-post studies on merger decisions. It is 
important to review decisions regularly and study the effects of mergers on the market. The results should 
be used in an internal process to improve the decision making. It is also useful to publish these results 
externally. 
This paper also considers the anticipatory effects of supervision; particularly as such results are also 
relevant when evaluating ex-post effects. As discussed above, the anticipatory effects created as a result of 
previous competition enforcement may in effect lead to a decrease in the number of anti-competitive 
mergers plans even making it to the drawing board. 
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NORWAY 
1. Background 
In 2007, the Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (the 
Ministry hereafter) commissioned Copenhagen Economics (CE) to prepare two reports on impact 
evaluation; the first focused on competition indicators and methods that can be used to report the results of 
the Norwegian Competition Authority (the NCA hereafter), and to assess the effects of competition policy, 
whereas the second report focused on actually assessing the economic effects of the Competition 
Authority’s interventions and enforcement, as well as presenting literature on approaches and experiences 
in this field. 
Following up on the reports, the Ministry Reform asked the NCA in its assignment letter for 2008 
specifically to perform ex post assessments of the impact of at least one decision relating to abuse of 
dominance, one decision relating to illegal price cooperation and one merger case. The same requirement 
has been expressed in subsequent years. 
This contribution will elaborate on the NCA experiences with impact evaluations more generally, and 
impact evaluation of merger decisions more specifically. First, however, the contribution will briefly 
present the content and recommendations on methodology in the first CE report, as well as the legal 
context for impact evaluations related to competition policy enforcement and decisions in the field of 
mergers. 
2. The legal context for impact evaluations 
The current Norwegian Competition Act entered into force on 1 May 2004. The Act is to some extent 
harmonized with EU competition rules. The purpose of the Act is stated in Article 1 as "...to further 
competition and thereby contribute to the efficient utilization of society’s resources."  
The primary enforcement tools of the Norwegian Competition Act of 2004 are sections 10 and 11 
(equivalent to Article 53 and 54 of the EEA agreement and Article 101 and 102 TFEU) and section 16 
concerning merger control (similar to Article 57 in the EEA agreement). 
The criterion for intervening against a concentration is that it “will create or strengthen a significant 
restriction of competition, contrary to the purpose of the Act”. Since the purpose of the act is stated as the 
“efficient utilization of society’s resources”, the NCA shall accordingly apply a total welfare standard for 
its work in the field of mergers. 
3. Methodology  
The first of the two reports commissioned by the Ministry focused on competition indicators and 
methods that can be used to report the results of the Norwegian Competition Authority, and to illustrate the 
effects of competition policy. 
In the mandate for the report, the Ministry asked CE to give a summary of national and international 
experience in using competition indicators and other tools in empirical analyses of the effects of 
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competition policy. CE was also asked review the literature about competition indicators and other tools 
that are suited to analyzing the effects of competition policy, and to assess the positive and negative 
characteristics of the different methods and identify and assess competition indicators and other methods 
that can be used to report the results of the Norwegian Competition Authority, and to illustrate the effects 
of competition policy. 
Since methodologies is one of the suggested issues and questions for consideration in country 
submissions in the roundtable invitation, this contribution will report some of the main CE conclusions 
with regard to methodology.  First a brief clarification on core concepts such as methods, initiatives and 
indicators before presenting the CE recommendations relating to these concepts.  
Methods such as statistical and simulation models are tools that can be used to study and assess the 
effects of specific policy variables or competition policy initiatives. The relevant competition policy 
initiatives are mostly interventions related to the core activities of the competition authorities, i.e. merger 
decisions, intervention against abuse of dominant position or intervention against cartels or other 
agreements reducing competition. However, they can also be other initiatives of the competition 
authorities, for instance sector inquiries and information campaigns. 
The assessment of the effect of the initiative will be done by one or more relevant competition 
indicators that try to measure the degree of competition intensity in an industry. When it comes to 
indicators, the report present and discusses a host of different alternatives within eight categories, i.e. 
measures of concentration (e.g. HHI, N-firm concentration indices), barriers to entry (e.g. establishment 
rates, churn-rates), mobility (e.g. concentration variance coefficient), innovation (e.g. R&D ratio, patent 
ratio), prices (e.g. price changes in a sector), profits (e.g. return on assets), productivity (e.g. change in 
labour productivity) and product quality (consumer complaints). 
CE recommends that the NCA use, as far as possible, price changes as the relevant competition 
indicator to assess both the expected and the actual effects of competition policy initiatives. Apart from 
that, CE did not recommend any other competition indicators for general use, since many competition 
indicators are ambivalent in the sense that it is not unambiguous whether an increase or a decrease in this 
indicator expresses an increase in competition intensity. This can only be determined in the specific case. 
When it comes to economic tools to predict the counterfactual ‘but-for’ situations, CE distinguish 
between five different categories:  
• the ‘before-and-after’ method,  
• benchmark method,  
• cost structure method,  
• statistical method and  
• simulation method. 
The ‘before-and-after’ method tries to compare the market before and after a competition policy 
initiative, the benchmark method compares the market with other comparable markets, but without the 
same competition policy initiative, the ‘cost structure method’ tries to predict how the market would have 
looked without the competition policy initiative based on cost structure, observed costs and profit level, the 
‘statistical method’ tries to predict how the market would have looked without the competition policy 
initiative, based on a statistical relationship between prices and other data that can explain the price setting 
on the market and finally, the ‘simulation method’ implies simulation of the market price without the 
competition policy initiative based on modelling the price setting on the specific market. 
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In addition to these broad methods, qualitative interviews can also be used to assess the effects of a 
specific initiative are assessed by asking clients and competitors for their assessment of the evolution 
before and after a competition policy initiative. CE points out that by conducting interviews, it is fairly 
easy to obtain many answers: however, it is important to bear in mind that these answers are subjective 
since clients and competitors may have an interest in bringing to the fore certain answers.  
When assessing the effects of competition policy initiatives, it is natural to differentiate between two 
groups of cases or initiatives. The first group comprises the core activities of the competition authorities, 
i.e. intervention against anticompetitive mergers, cartels and abuse of dominant position. The other group 
includes all the other decisions and initiatives that come from and are implemented by the Competition 
Authority. These are for instance sector inquiries, information campaigns, and the publication of 
guidelines.  
Relating to the NCA core activity cases, CE recommends using simulation models to predict the 
expected effects (ex ante) of competition policy initiatives on price. Simulation models can be simple or 
more advanced IO models. What is important is to model how the market would have developed if the 
specific initiative had not been carried out, for example if a merger that was prohibited had been instead 
authorised without any conditions. 
It can also be mentioned that CE distinguishes between ex ante and ex post effects. The difference is 
that the former is an assessment made before the competition policy initiative has generated detectable 
effects while the latter takes place after the initiative has, or could have, generated detectable effects. 
CE recommends that the NCA carry out both types of assessments, and presents two reasons why ex 
ante assessments should be carried out. First, highlighting and visualising the expected effects of the 
competition policy initiatives are necessary to argue why the initiatives should be approved and carried 
out. Second, it is an important condition in order to appropriately highlight and visualise the actual effects 
after the concrete initiative has been carried out.  
Furthermore, they present three reasons to carry out ex post assessments. Firstly, it is argued that the 
NCA is politically obliged to highlight and visualise the effects of their work. Secondly, it is increasingly 
important to document how the Norwegian society benefits from the resources used in public 
administration. Thirdly, it is necessary in order to give priority among the uses of public means for 
different purposes. 
The second of the CE reports focused on actually assessing the economic effects of the Competition 
Authority’s interventions and enforcement, i.e. the difference between the overall economic welfare before 
and after an intervention on a market. In the report, a distinction was made between two types of effects: 
direct and indirect effects. The direct effects are the effects on the market on which the specific 
intervention is made. The indirect effects are partly the spill-over effects on other markets than the market 
on which the intervention takes place, and partly the deterrence effect which is due to the NCA’s pure 
existence and not necessarily to the specific interventions.1
English summaries of the reports are available here: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fad/whats-
new/news/2007/Reports-on-improving-the-performance-of-.html?id=498165 
  
                                                     
1  No actual impact assessment of a merger was done in the report, just an indication of how an assessment of 
the Ticketmaster-case in 2005 could have been done. 
DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 86 
4. The framework for NCA‘s work related to impact assessment 
The NCA’s main task is to enforce the competition law. The Ministry provides the framework for the 
NCA’s activities. However, the NCA enforce the competition law independently from the Ministry.2
At the beginning of each year the Ministry states the government’s priorities in the competition field 
in a letter of assignment to the NCA. No instructions can be given regarding the outcome of specific cases. 
However, the Ministry can ask the NCA to give priority to certain areas of the law and focus and assess 
competition concerns related to certain sectors of the economy.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Ministry has since 2008 in its letter of assignment asked the 
NCA to use “price or another suitable indicator to make visible the effects of the competition policy”. 
More specifically, the NCA is asked to evaluate the impact of:  
• at least one decision related to the prohibition regulations in the law, 
• at least one decision related to the merger regulations in the law, and 
• at least one case where the NCA have called attention to restrictive effects on competition of 
public measures. 
It is up to the NCA to choose interventions or initiatives and markets representative of its work and 
activities. Finally, it is stated that the impact of the intervention on consumers must also be illuminated. 
The following work has been done by the NCA to fulfil the Ministry’s impact assessment 
requirement: 
• 2008. A chapter in the NCA publication ‘Competition in Norway’ with a general discussion on 
merger policy and a presentation of i.a. two merger cases where local competition concerns were 
decisive in the decision.  
• 2009. The Gilde – Prior merger and assessment of alleged efficiency gains3
• 2010. Mergers and acquisitions in the retail gasoline market and an econometric analysis showing 
the importance of competition in local markets.  
  
Evidently, these impact assessments are primarily intended to highlight the effects of competition 
policy in a wider societal context. However, the experiences after a merger that has been stopped or 
approved can also provide the Competition Authority with a better technical basis for assessing future 
mergers. This guided the NCA in its choice of case for 2009.  
The NCA presented the cases evaluated in its respective core areas in its annual report for 2009 and 
2010. English-language summaries of the annual reports presented are available at the NCA website. The 
results of the work done in 2008 on impact assessment were published in the NCA publication 
“Competition in Norway”, together with six market studies in February 2009. 
                                                     
2  The Ministry is the appellate body of the NCA’s merger decisions and prohibitions not involving fines. The 
courts are the appellate body of decisions according to the prohibition regulations involving fines. 
3  This impact assessment analysis has not been finalized.  
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5. Challenges experienced 
One of the points of doing impact assessment is to advocate and illustrate the value of competition law 
and the authority’s work to enforce it. Sørgard (2009) point out that “Several jurisdictions have at their own 
initiative quantified the expected effects of their own merger investigations. Some of them have also initiated 
ex post studies of the actual effect of a merger ban or a decision to allow a merger.” 4
The NCA have with great interest followed the work the FTC, DOJ, OFT as well as other jurisdictions 
contribution in this field, with, inter alia, annual reports on estimates of savings for consumers following 
merger bans. 
 
One can argue that estimates of savings for consumers would not really be a relevant measure of 
success for a competition authority basically following a total welfare standard in its merger enforcement 
work. Moreover, the saved welfare loss triangle often can be quite small compared to the saved consumer 
surplus. Thus, the resulting figures might not really be very impressive, compared to the savings for 
consumers, as an indicator of our success. 
The CE report recommended that the NCA use price as a suitable indicator. However, it is not an easy 
task to obtain price data of sufficient quality and disaggregation, which also can be publicized as part of the 
merger impact assessment study.  
The NCA will often obtain price data as part of its merger assessment, but these price data will 
typically be subject to confidentiality and thus, not suitable for publication – which is one of the points of 
doing impact evaluation.  
As part of its efforts to obtain data of good quality and at a satisfactory level of disaggregration to do 
impact assessment, the NCA approached Statistics Norway. There were however, clear limits implied by 
the law on statistics on what data Statistics Norway could supply at the level of disaggregation needed for a 
satisfactory impact evaluation analysis. To obtain high quality data from undertakings is very important to 
the work and creditability of Statistics Norway. Succeeding in this obviously depends on confidentiality and 
trust that the data not will be used in a way that is contrary to the undertakings’ interests.  
One of the major challenges related to impact evaluation in the field of mergers is obviously also the 
methodological, i.e. to predict how the market would have developed if a merger had not been approved), 
or if it had been approved. 
Establishing this hypothetical market situation, which often is called the ‘but-for’ situation in the 
economics literature, is quite demanding in practice, both with respect to the competencies required, the 
tools used, and the data necessary for the chosen indicator.  
Yet another not insignificant challenge is to identify merger cases suitable for impact assessment in a 
relatively small jurisdiction. 
Below is a table summarizing case statistics in the field of mergers in the period 2007 to 2010:  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Notifications of mergers and acquisitions 561 444 294 415 
Interventions against mergers and acquisitions 5 4 1 0 
 
                                                     
4  Sørgard, L. (2009). “Optimal Merger Policy: Enforcement vs. Deterrence”, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, vol. LVII, no. 3. Sørgard is a former chief economist at the NCA. 
DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 88 
Even though one could in principle do ‘but-for’ impact assessment of all the approved mergers, 
typically, however, cases where the authority intervened are chosen. The table shows clearly that the 
potential merger cases available for impact assessment are very limited. In addition, several of these 
merger cases where the NCA intervened were approved with some structural remedies, typically to 
alleviate negative effects on competition in local markets. This adds to the methodological challenges.   
The low number of interventions, even lower number of suitable cases for impact assessment and 
assumed relatively low figures for saved welfare loss in these cases, does, however, not imply that the 
competition law and the NCA’s work in the field of mergers is insubstantial. 
Sørgard continues the quotation above by saying that “However, all commentators seem to agree that 
such studies might detect only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ when it comes to the overall impact of merger 
policy”.  
This perspective is confirmed by a study commissioned by the NCA in 2008. The survey was inspired 
by a similar survey conducted by the Office of Fair Trading in Great Britain. The Norwegian survey 
clearly shows that competition policy does act as a deterrent. According to those surveyed, proposed 
mergers and acquisitions have been cancelled or significantly modified due to the risk that the transaction 
would otherwise have been stopped due to the current competition law. 
Sørgard’s (2009) analysis is based on the notion of a model where the mergers with the clearest 
welfare enhancing benefits typically is cleared without further investigation, and the mergers with the 
largest negative impact on welfare are deterred. 
The following figure can illustrate this:  
 
Some obvious conclusions follow from this. One is noted by Sørgard in his concluding remarks: “to 
have a correct understanding of the overall impact of merger enforcement one should evaluate not only the 
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enforcement effect from those mergers that were investigated (type I and type II errors), but in addition try 
to measure the number of mergers being deterred.”  
Secondly, given that this model is a correct representation of the reality, the mergers subject to further 
investigation and potential intervention are cases where the welfare benefits are in the border area of 
plus/minus zero. Ergo, the cases where the NCA actually intervened or approved with remedies following 
closer analysis, will probably not be very suitable for impact assessment at all, at least not if the purpose of 
the assessment is to advocate the importance of merger decisions through demonstrating big savings for 
consumers. 
Yet another challenge is resource constraints. The NCA employs around 90 people, of which 70 are 
directly working on competition related cases. The NCA has been given extra resources from the Ministry 
to its work to fight collusion in 2008 and 2009, and this work has been given top priority in recent years. In 
2010 the NCA secured evidence in four cases at 19 different locations involving a total of 11 companies. A 
total of 32 formal statements were taken in connection with investigations into six different cases. 
On top of this come very resource-demanding court trials. For instance, the most important case in 
2010 was the trial in appeal court of the Tine case. Tine is Norway’s biggest dairy undertaking. In 
September 2010, the Civil Court of appeal ruled that Tine violated the Competition Act. The administrative 
fine was set by the appeal court to 30 Mill. NOK. This corresponds to 5 mill USD. The appeals trial, as in 
the first instance trial, took 8 weeks and a large number of man-hours for the NCA. 
Of the available NCA resources, 71 per cent were used on illegal conduct, 24 per cent on mergers and 
acquisitions, and 5 per cent on hearings and calling attention to any restrictive effects on competition of 
public measures in 2010.  
Doing impact assessment in a way that withstands the scrutiny of the public and professional eye is 
obviously a task that is very resource demanding, and it must fight to get priority in the daily work of 
handling mergers according to the requirements of the law, and the work to investigate and prosecute 
illegal conduct. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The above section leaves a rather gloomy perspective on the potential for impact assessment in the 
field of mergers. This does not imply that the NCA believes that this work is too resource demanding, 
futile and that it should be discontinued. 
There are obviously clear challenges related to data, methodology, identifying suitable cases and 
indicators, as well as succeeding in giving this work priority in the everyday enforcement work. 
However, to continuously advocate the importance of the work the competition authorities are doing 
through i.a impact assessment provides the very foundation and legitimacy for the competition authorities’ 
work, among the public in general and the politicians and granting authority in particular. Counterfactual 
price is a good indicator in this regard, when suitable cases can be found, which also is in accordance with 
the recommendations of CE and the requirement in the Ministry’s assignment letter that the impact of the 
intervention on consumers must be illuminated.  
In addition, impact assessment is very valuable as a learning tool to improve the quality of future 
decisions in the field of mergers. Thus, the NCA will continue its work on assessing and communicating 
the effects of interventions related to its core areas cartels/dominance, mergers and advocacy. Not only 
because the Ministry continue to require that we do so in its annual letter of assignment, but also because it 
is an important part of our work in the field of advocacy work and to improve the quality of our decisions.
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POLAND 
The impact evaluation of merger decisions is a good example of new trends in the activity of 
competition protection authorities. The essential element of such evaluation is to compare the market 
conditions resulting from the decision issued by the antimonopoly authority with a counterfactual situation 
which might have existed on the market if the antimonopoly authority had issued a different decision or 
had not issued the decision at all. The impact evaluation of merger decisions has a significant external and 
internal dimension. The efficacy assessment of the issued decisions can form a vital element of the actions 
taken by the antimonopoly authority with respect to the public opinion and budget decision-makers in that 
it shows the effects of advocacy actions. The impact evaluation of the issued merger decisions by the 
antimonopoly authority can also have an internal dimension and enhance shaping  the internal decision-
making procedures. However, to carry out studies on the impact evaluation of merger decisions it is 
necessary to develop detailed methodology and define study objectives. Furthermore, such studies could 
meet with the internal resistance inside the organisation. 
So far, the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection has not undertaken any impact 
evaluations strictly devoted to merger decisions. The impact evaluation of the issued decisions was one of 
the components of sector inquiries conducted from time to time. According to the Polish Act on 
competition and consumer protection sector inquiries are conducted under explanatory proceedings. 
Pursuant to Article 48 (1), the Polish antimonopoly authority can initiate on an ex officio basis the 
explanatory proceedings regarding a given branch of economy. The explanatory porceedings may in 
particular aim at the study of the market, including the determination of its structure and degree of 
concentration. Such inquiries have been conducted in relation to sectors subject to dynamic consolidation 
processes and at the same time under control of the Polish antimonopoly authority. The objective of the 
conducted inquiries was to assess market conditions and compare the existing circumstances with the 
analyses included in merger decisions. Two series of sectoral analyses provide a good example of such 
inquiries. In the years 2004-2006 an inquiry of the manufacturing and distribution market of vodka, high-
quality spirits and rectified spirit was held, whereas in the period of 2004-2009 the Polish antimonopoly 
authority carried out an analysis of press publishing houses. The first inquiry was particularly significant as 
the spirits manufacturing and distribution market saw several transactions subject to assessment of the 
Polish antimonopoly authority. In the case of one transaction (case CEDC/Polmos Białystok), the President 
of UOKiK granted a conditional consent, while in the other transaction (CEDC/Polmos Jabłonna) he 
prohibited merger. The conducted sector inquiries were highly significant as on the one hand they provided 
up-to-date market data, and on the other hand they provided an opportunity to compare the analyses of 
market development included in the decisions  with the real market conditions .  
The experiences of the Polish antimonopoly authority show that an impact evaluation of merger 
decisions can be useful when there is a well-developed and relatively rich case law regarding a given 
sector. In such case the antimonopoly authority can analyse merger decisions in the context of a particular 
and specific sector.  Undoubtedly, conditional consents are best suited for such analyses. They provide a 
possibility of a convenient evaluation of the assumptions underlying the decision and subsequent market 
development. However, it cannot be excluded that merger consents should also be subject to evaluation, in 
particular if the sector inquiries provided no clear-cut results when such decisions were issued. The 
analysis of the merger decisions issued based on a public interest test seems to be most questionable. An 
impact evaluation of such decisions would have to be based on different assumptions and results thereof 
could hardly be compared to results of analyses of any other merger decisions. 
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The frequency of impact evaluations of merger decisions should correspond to the current needs of 
the antimonopoly authority, resulting for instance from the increase in consolidation processes or the 
adopted plan. The frequency will also depend on organisational and budget resources of the antimonopoly 
authority. Such analyses are subsidiary in relation to the current and primary operations. There is no 
obligation to carry out such analyses under the Polish law. It seems also that introducing a statutory 
obligation of impact evaluations of the issued merger decisions might prove to be counter-effective.  
The previously mentioned sector inquiries were conducted by employees of the antimonopoly 
authority. However, it is worth considering whether outsourcing impact evaluations of merger decisions to 
a dedicated external company would not be a good solution. Such external verification would specifically 
be more objective and resist the temptation to admit that the authority was right. The obstacle could be 
budgetary aspects and the fact that external companies could only rely on voluntary cooperation of 
undertakings and would not have at their disposal such coercive measures as assigned to the antimonopoly 
authority. So far sector inquiries have been based exclusively on the information collected from 
undertakings, obliged to submit such data if requested by the President of UOKiK. This obligation covered 
all the necessary information regarding the study objective, including the data related to the undertaking’s 
trade secrets and confidential information. The collected information was supplemented by any publicly 
available data. 
The results of sector inquiries were mainly used for antimonopoly proceedings relating to mergers in 
order to verify the validity of the conducted analyses and sources of current market data. The described 
sector inquiries, being analyses based primarily on business secrets of undertakings, were for internal use 
only and could not be published.   
 DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 93 
SWITZERLAND 
1. Preliminary remarks 
The substantive test used in Switzerland is a dominance test. In general, under a dominance test, a 
merger may be prohibited if it results in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position which 
significantly impedes effective competition. According to Art. 10 Para. 2 of the Swiss Cartel Act, a merger 
may however only be prohibited or authorized subject to conditions or obligations if it creates or 
strengthens a dominant position liable to eliminate effective competition. The Supreme Court has therefore 
in the past advanced the view that the creation or strengthening of a dominant position which is likely to 
impede effective competition is not enough to block a merger. Rather, under the Swiss Cartel Act, a 
merger may only be prohibited if it is likely that competition in the concerned markets will be eliminated. 
In other words, in Switzerland a merger may only be blocked if it leads to an extremely high concentration 
in a market (e.g. a merger to monopoly). As a result, it is very difficult for the Swiss Competition 
Commission (ComCo) to prohibit a merger. This is highlighted by the fact that in the whole history of 
Swiss competition law only one merger was effectively blocked so far: in 2010 ComCo blocked a „three to 
two merger“ in the Swiss telecommunication market on the grounds of impending post-merger joint 
dominance (see below).1
Consequently, under the current Swiss merger control regime the risk of a regulation failure in the 
sense of a Type I Error, i.e. the prohibition of a welfare-enhancing merger, is minimal.
 
2
2. Impact evaluation studies 
 Given the legal 
situation, it is much more Type II Errors, i.e. the clearance of welfare-reducing mergers, which are of 
concern for Switzerland. Yet, impact evaluation studies systematically assessing the potential detrimental 
effects of the tolerant Swiss merger control regime on total or consumer welfare are missing so far. In 
particular in connection with the current discussion about a possible revision of the Swiss Cartel Act such 
studies would have proven valuable since one pillar of this revision envisages the amendment of the 
substantive test. By furnishing a sound empirical basis, impact evaluation studies surely could have 
supported the political decision finding process.  
ComCo does not conduct impact evaluation studies on a regular basis and so far has only done on 
very specific occasions. This is primarily due to resource and time constraints. In the following 
Switzerland’s (limited) experience with impact evaluation studies is presented and some “lessons learned” 
addressed. 
2.1 Evaluation of the Swiss Cartel Act in 2009 
With the revision of the Swiss Cartel Act in 2003 ComCo received new competences, in particular the 
power to impose direct sanctions. Art. 59a of the revised Cartel Act obliged ComCo to assess the effects of 
the revision after five years. In the context of this assessment external experts were mandated to furnish 
                                                     
1  France Télécom/Sunrise Communications AG, LPC 2010/3, p. 499-561.  
2  Type I Errors may however be of some relevance in connection with the clearance of a merger subject to 
remedies. 
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case studies on the effects of selected decisions by ComCo.3 In the field of mergers,  Pfizer Inc./Pharmacia 
Corp., a horizontal merger in the pharmaceutical industry that was cleared subject to structural remedies in 
2002, was evaluated.4
The impact evaluation study primarily focused on the effects of ComCo’s decision on actual and 
future product market competition as well as competition in innovation markets. Analytically the following 
tools were applied: interviews, empirical analysis and descriptive statistics. In summary, the study 
concluded that some of the imposed remedies were successful while for others no effect could be 
identified. Overall, no detrimental welfare effects of ComCo’s decision were found and it is acknowledged 
that ComCo was correct in its assessment of the impact of the merger on competition in the Swiss 
pharmaceutical market.  
 
Further, the case study pointed to some important problems with impact evaluation studies:  
• First, the Swiss drug market is subject to price regulation. It was noted that the evaluation of 
merger effects is particularly difficult in markets with a lot of innovation and price regulation at 
the same time.  
• Second, firms in many industry are global players. Consequently, a merger between two firms 
like Pfizer and Pharmacia has an international dimension and is subject to notification in several 
countries. The (national) competitive behavior of the merged entity therefore may be influenced 
by factors which are largely independent of the merger decision of a competition authority. In 
such a constellation it proves extremely difficult to isolate ex post the effects of the decision of a 
competition authority.  
• Third, the advantage of impact evaluation studies conducted by external experts is surely the 
increased credibility, i.e. the avoidance of the self-assessment criticism. However, in order to 
fully evaluate the work of a competition authority in a particular case, detailed data (and 
complementary information) is necessary to allow the use of more sophisticated techniques. For 
external experts, such information is typically difficult to acquire, largely due to data 
confidentiality issues. 
2.2 Review of imposed remedies 
In 1998 ComCo cleared the merger UBS/SBV subject to remedies.5
In 2005 the imposed remedies were reviewed.
 Through this merger UBS 
advanced to the largest Swiss bank and to the worldwide largest custodian at the time. The remedies were 
imposed due to competitive concerns in the market for corporate lending and comprised structural and 
behavioral elements. The most important remedy was however of structural nature and involved the 
divestiture of subsidiary companies and branch offices in certain Swiss regions. The remedy aimed at 
ensuring effective competition in those regions where the merger caused high market concentration by 
facilitating market entry for new players. 
6
                                                     
3  See Hüschelrath K. et. al (2009) Evaluation Kartellgesetz: Fallstudien (Bern: SECO).  
 The report primarily focused on compliance of the 
merged entity with the remedies. The occasion was however also seized to conduct a small impact 
4  See LPC 2003/2, p. 314-366. The imposed remedies basically amounted to the divestiture of certain 
products and IPR’s. 
5  See LPC 1998/2, p. 368-409. 
6  See LPC 2005/2, p. 409-417. 
 DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 95 
evaluation study by analyzing market data and responses to questionnaires. This assessment led to the 
conclusion that the success of the imposed remedies was ambiguous: 
• First, it was not possible to find foreign buyers for the branch offices. Although it was envisaged 
to consign (parts of) the customer base of the branch offices to the new buyers, it was correctly 
anticipated by the potential buyers that this would only work to a very limited extent. Further, the 
location of the divested branch offices seemed in general not attractive enough, i.e. many of those 
branch offices were located in economically slow regions. The intention to introduce new players 
in the regional markets for corporate lending consequently largely failed.  
• Second, it was noted that in certain regions the concentration in the concerned market is still very 
high, i.e. the remedies did not have the expected effect in these regions. In other regions 
competition was intensified which was however mainly due to market dynamics.  
In general, remedies in merger cases often involve a time component and require some sort of 
monitoring. The review of remedies seems a good occasion to not only address compliance issues but as 
well impact evaluation of a merger since parties do not have to be approached specifically. The contact 
with the relevant stakeholders to monitor the remedies may be used to collect valuable data/information for 
impact evaluation studies. 
2.3 Event studies 
As mentioned above, in the history of Swiss competition law only one merger – a „three to two 
merger“ in the Swiss telecommunication market – was blocked so far. This was the merger project between 
Sunrise and Orange in 2010.7
ComCo conducted, after the abolishment of the merger project, an internal event study to validate its 
decision. Although the estimated coefficients were statistically not highly significant, they showed the 
“right” signs: with the announcement of the merger project the share price of Swisscom increased while the 
abolishment of the merger caused a drop of Swisscom’s share price. In other words, the market expected 
that the proposed merger between Sunrise and Orange would be beneficial for Swisscom which seems to 
support ComCo’s concerns of joint dominance. 
 The merger was blocked due to concerns of joint dominance between the 
historical telecom operator Swisscom and the merged entity. 
Thus, event studies may be a relative simple and low-cost instrument to evaluate merger decisions. 
The drawback of such event studies is obviously that the merging firms and/or their competitors must be 
quoted on the stock exchange. Further, if an international firm is involved in a national merger in a small 
country like Switzerland – either as a party to a merger or a competitor –, it is often unlikely that this is 
reflected in the share price respectively that the effects of a proposed merger can be properly isolated. The 
merger cases where an event study can be conducted may therefore be rather limited. 
2.4 Impact evaluation studies as a reaction to complaints 
In 2009 ComCo cleared – after an in-depth investigation – a merger in the media sector between 
Tamedia and Presse Publications SR (PPSR).8
                                                     
7  See footnote 1. 
 Initially the merger raised competitive concern, in particular 
in the market for commuter newspapers. The situation was that Tamedia and PPSR each published a 
commuter newspaper in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The parties planed to withdraw one of 
these commuter newspapers from the market after the merger, arguing that the market in the French-
8  See LPC 2009/3, p. 245-330. 
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speaking part of Switzerland was too small to profitably publish two newspapers. The consequences of the 
withdrawal of one of the commuter newspaper was a quasi-monopoly for the other commuter newspaper in 
the concerned regional market. The merger was eventually cleared by ComCo, applying the failing 
division defense. 
Recently ComCo has received complaints about price increases for advertisement in the remaining 
commuter newspaper in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. This may suggest that unilateral effects 
did occur in the concerned market. It is too early to say whether the complaints are justified and whether 
ComCo will open a proceeding. The case is however illustrative since such post-merger complaints may 
tell a competition authority something about the impact of a merger in a particular market. In cases where a 
proceeding is opened, an impact evaluation study of some sort may suggest itself since the merger is 
potentially causal for a price increase or other possibly anti-competitive behavior. Further, within a formal 
procedure the collection of the necessary data/information to conduct an impact evaluation study should be 
facilitated since firms are subject to a legal duty of disclosure. Whether the firms are in all cases able and 
willing to provide such data/information in the desired quantity and quality is however a different question. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK currently operates a two stage regime for investigating mergers, with the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) carrying out the first phase review (Phase I), and referring to the Competition Commission 
(CC) any mergers giving rise to competition concerns (Phase II)1
Since 2005 there have been two ex-post evaluations of both Phase I and Phase II merger decisions, 
reviewing three Phase I decisions and 15 Phase II merger decisions and including unconditional clearance, 
conditional clearance (involving remedies) and prohibition (in the case of Phase II) decisions. These 
evaluations were both conducted by external consultants (PWC and Deloitte). The reports of these studies 
have been published.
. The OFT has the power to accept 
Undertakings in Lieu of a reference to the CC (UiL) from the merging parties, if these are deemed to 
address potential concerns highlighted in the course of its investigations. 
2
There have been two additional evaluations of Phase II merger decisions only, reviewing three further 
cases in total. These included clearance and prohibition decisions. One of these studies was conducted by 
CC staff and was published,
   
3 while the other was conducted by external consultants (LEAR) and is yet to 
be published. The CC has also conducted reviews of some of the remedies it has put in place4
1. Methodologies 
 following 
merger decisions. These reviews focus on evaluating the experience of choosing, designing, implementing 
and monitoring the remedies, as well as whether the remedy had worked to address the competition 
concerns identified. For this paper we focus on the evaluation reports set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, as 
these studies sought to evaluate the CC’s SLC decision.  
The studies conducted to assess merger decisions used a variety of methodologies, both quantitative 
and qualitative. Qualitative methodologies involved interviews with market participants and customers of 
the merging parties, written questionnaires to merging parties and other market participants, desk research 
into developments in the market and qualitative evidence on post-merger prices (where appropriate).  
These qualitative techniques were used to answer questions such as ‘Were the authorities’ decisions 
sound in light of the information available to them at the time?’; ‘Was the authorities’ reasoning clear, 
consistent and supported by the evidence available to them at the time of their decision?’ and ‘Were the 
predictions about future market developments (such as new entry) borne out in reality?’. The qualitative 
techniques are less well-suited to assessing directly the impact of an authority’s decision (to intervene or 
                                                     
1  Under the Enterprise Act 2002, the OFT has the duty to review merger situations and refer to the CC any 
cases where there is a realistic prospect of a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in UK markets. 
2  http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/evaluation/ex_post_evaluation_of_mergers.pdf and 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/review_merger_decisions.pdf  
3  http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/evaluation_report.pdf 
4  See for example, on its webpage http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/evaluation_reports.htm  
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not intervene) on consumer (or total) welfare, since in order to isolate the effect of the merger (or the 
authority’s decision), quantitative data analysis will generally be necessary.  
One evaluation of Phase II merger decisions5 study involved a quantitative assessment of the 
appropriateness of two of the CC’s merger decisions. For both these mergers the study examined prices to 
assess the impact of the CC’s decisions on consumer welfare. The study used a difference-in-difference 
analysis6
The 2009 Deloitte study also included a merger simulation exercise. However, this used only data 
available at the time of the merger, with the aim of bringing to light any theories of harm
 for both mergers and complemented this with standard before and after regression.  
7
The OFT’s evaluation work of mergers focused on ex ante estimation of the impact of Phase I merger 
decisions. For all mergers in which there was an ‘intervention’ (UiL agreed with OFT or merger 
abandoned on referral to the CC), an economic model is used to simulate how prices, demand, and market 
share might have changed if, in the absence of an intervention, the merger had gone ahead. The OFT uses 
information from the case team and conservative assumptions to estimate consumer savings from its Phase 
I merger decisions
 that might have 
been overlooked or evaluated incorrectly. Hence this exercise was not aimed at assessing whether the 
decision taken by the CC or OFT was consistent with consumer welfare goals. 
8
2. Designing impact evaluation studies 
. 
There is no defined regular interval at which the UK authorities have conducted impact evaluations of 
their merger decisions although since 2005 studies of Phase II merger decisions have been carried out 
relatively regularly (four studies since 2005). Previous evaluation work has assessed the Phase II merger 
decisions in cases dating back as far as 1996.9
                                                     
5  The LEAR evaluation study identified in paragraph 3 and yet to be published 
 This reflects the need for evaluation to be conducted after 
sufficient time has elapsed since the competition authority’s decision, so that there is enough data and 
information following the decision to assess its impact. On the other hand, it might become more difficult 
to isolate the impact of the competition authority’s decision if evaluation work is conducted too long after 
the merger inquiry, as other market developments will complicate the analysis. The time at which 
evaluation work is conducted will therefore be informed by the time that has elapsed since an inquiry, 
balancing these two effects. Resource constraints will also be important in determining the regularity of the 
UK authorities’ future evaluation work. 
6  Difference-in-difference analysis is an econometric technique used to try to isolate and measure the effect 
of a specific event or ‘treatment’ (for example, a merger). This is done by comparing the difference in the 
variable of interest before and after the ‘treatment’ – such as the difference in price – for a set of 
observations exposed to the ‘treatment’ (called the treatment group, for example a set of merging party 
stores in overlap areas) to the difference in that variable for a control group that does not undergo the 
treatment. 
7  A theory of harm refers to a specific mechanism by which a merger may damage competition, for example 
by means of unilateral effects, co-ordinated effects or vertical foreclosure. 
8  Merger simulation is not routinely used in the substantive decision making process or to estimate consumer 
savings from the cases referred to the CC. 
9  The PWC study in 2005 evaluated 10 CC decisions between 1996 and 2002; the CC’s internal study in 
2008 evaluated three CC decisions in 2000/2001; the Deloitte Study in 2009 assessed the CC’s decisions in 
five cases dated between 2004 and 2006. 
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Previous evaluation studies have assessed the impact of merger decisions in a variety of cases. Two 
studies10 looked only at merger inquiries where there had been an unconditional clearance decision. As set 
out in one of these reports, this allowed the evaluation studies to test the authorities’ beliefs that the merger 
would not substantially lessen competition, and to explore whether the market developed in the way 
predicted. In the case of blocked mergers an authority’s decision might be less likely to involve predictions 
about actual future developments (as the decision involves a prediction about the hypothetical effect of a 
merger that is not in fact allowed to proceed), and hence there is likely to be less scope to explore the 
accuracy of such predictions in ex-post evaluations. Two other studies11
 0
 did evaluate some non-clearance 
decisions as set out in paragraphs  and  0, focusing on qualitative questions such as those discussed in 
paragraph 5 above.  
One study12
The CC evaluation studies were designed by CC staff, or by both CC staff and external consultants for 
those studies conducted by consultants. 
 focused on two CC clearance decisions in retail mergers. This sector lends itself well to 
quantitative methods as prices for a large number of products and/ or stores can often be used to create a 
large dataset for analysis (we discuss the data used for this study in paragraph 14 below). The CC also 
conducts reviews of retail mergers relatively frequently and hence it was felt useful to evaluate the 
decisions made in two retail merger inquiries and draw lessons for future retail merger inquiries that the 
CC might receive.  
3. Conducting the impact evaluation study 
As set out in paragraph  0 above, previous evaluation of CC decisions has been conducted by CC staff 
and by third parties. Evaluation studies by third parties have the advantage of greater independence and 
distance from the CC inquiries themselves. For similar reasons, where an evaluation is conducted by CC 
staff, members of staff that did not work on the original merger investigation are probably better placed to 
conduct the evaluation. From a resources perspective, it can be preferable to have evaluations conducted by 
third parties (see paragraph 20 below). 
The authorities do not have any statutory powers to request data or information from merger parties 
for the purposes of evaluation (as it would have for the merger investigation itself). Gathering evidence 
therefore often depends on the willingness of merger parties and other market participants to co-operate. In 
practice willingness to co-operate has varied between parties. One consultant found that relevant parties 
(merger parties and other market participants) for the purposes of its 2009 evaluation generally responded 
positively and were willing to co-operate with requests for interviews or written questionnaire responses. 
Another encountered difficulties in obtaining data for a quantitative evaluation of Phase II decisions.  
The different experiences of these two consultancies might be in part a result of the different types of 
data that were requested – parties have generally appeared less willing to co-operate with requests for 
quantitative data but more willing in relation to qualitative information. The quantitative study had 
originally envisaged evaluating three retail mergers, but due to difficulties in obtaining data on one of these 
mergers, the CC’s decisions in only the other two cases were evaluated. Even with these remaining two 
cases, there were some difficulties obtaining data, due to a lack of commercial data13
                                                     
10  The 2005 PWC report and 2011 LEAR report, referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
 and the unwillingness 
of some of the parties to provide data. In one case this meant that, instead of using local prices as had 
11  The 2008 CC internal evaluation and the 2009 Deloitte report, referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
12  2011 LEAR study, referred to in paragraph 3. 
13  Available from sources such as Nielsen. 
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originally been intended, the study was conducted using national prices.14
The authorities have not encountered any internal opposition from staff or (in the case of the CC) 
members to the evaluation of past merger inquiries. Evaluation of past mergers is recognized in both 
authorities as a useful way of improving decision-making and analysis, and the studies are shared within 
and across the authorities (see also paragraph 19). At the CC an Analysis Group, consisting of CC staff and 
members, is involved in developing evaluation work and the lessons drawn from these studies for future 
inquiries.  As part of OFT’s internal evaluation programme
 Commercial data sources also 
generally collect data only on prices (rather than, for example, aspects of service quality) and given that 
merger parties were often not willing to provide further information, evaluation was conducted only on the 
price dimension of the merger parties’ offerings. 
15
4. Results and lessons learnt 
 the OFT evaluation team routinely engages 
with merger case teams to estimate ex-ante the impact of Phase I merger decisions. 
One study16
As set out in paragraph 5 the other evaluation studies did not directly answer the question of the 
impact of the CC’s decision on consumer welfare, but rather looked to assess whether, for example, the 
CC’s predictions about future market developments were borne out:  
 found no evidence to suggest that prices had gone up following the CC’s decision to 
allow the parties in two merger investigations to merge and hence found no evidence that the CC’s 
clearance decision had adversely affected consumer welfare.  
• The 2009 Deloitte study found that in four cases there was entry into or expansion in the market 
that was not foreseen by the CC. The report also made recommendations about the consistency of 
the OFT’s and CC’s intervention thresholds, and about the clarity of the authorities’ guidelines 
on certain issues.  
• The internal study conducted in 2008 found indications that the CC’s decisions were sound, but 
noted that subsequent market developments were not always able to throw light on the CC’s 
decisions. For example, it was difficult to isolate the impact of the merger on post-merger prices 
in one clearance decision, based only on qualitative evidence. 
• The evaluation conducted by PWC in 2005 found that qualitative evidence suggested that there 
were no long-term competition concerns arising following the CC’s clearance decisions. The 
study found that the CC’s predictions about entry and expansion were generally sound, but that 
                                                     
14  The study had originally intended to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis using prices in overlap 
areas (areas where both merger parties were present prior to the merger) as the treatment group and prices 
in non-overlap areas as the control group. However, due to the difficulties in obtaining appropriate data, a 
difference-in-difference analysis used average national prices of the merger parties as the treatment group 
and the average national prices of the other firms in the market as the control group.  
15  The OFT routinely evaluates its work and has a public commitment to evaluate each year at least one of its 
previous interventions. These evaluations help the OFT to understand whether and how past projects have 
achieved the desired impact and whether the outcomes could be further improved. The OFT relies on 
findings from such evaluations to learn lessons that can be applied to future comparable interventions. The 
OFT publishes annual average estimates of impact of its work in the areas of competition law enforcement, 
merger control, consumer protection enforcement, and market investigations in terms of monetary savings 
(or direct financial benefits) to consumers in its annual report and Positive Impact notes. OFT's Positive 
Impact notes are available on the OFT website: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-
categories/reports/Evaluating/ 
16  2011 LEAR study, referred to in paragraph 3. 
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the CC had found it more difficult to predict the circumstances where buyer power was likely to 
act as a significant competitive constraint.  
The evaluation studies are published on the OFT’s17 and/ or CC’s websites.18
The CC found that the internal study conducted in 2008 took a long time to complete. This was 
largely because of resource issues as CC members of staff were also working on current inquiries. This 
meant that evaluation was often lower priority and gave rise to delays in completion of the study.  
 In addition, the results 
from all of these studies were disseminated to and discussed with OFT/CC staff and CC members. As 
discussed in paragraph 7 the 2009 Deloitte study included a merger simulation exercise – lessons from this 
have fed into the CC and the OFT’s ongoing work to improve quantitative techniques in merger analysis, 
for example in assessing how measures such as diversion ratios and GUPPI can be regularly used as part of 
the broader set of evidence across the CC’s merger review.  
The authorities also conduct evaluation in relation to Market Studies/Market Investigation inquiries. 
However, the evaluation of these inquiries is often focused on a set of issues or remedies that are specific 
to the relevant market and the findings on each inquiry, and which do not easily translate to the evaluation 
of merger inquiries. Lessons on the practicality of evaluation studies (such as resource constraints, who 
should conduct the study, etc) however translate across evaluation of different sorts of inquiry, and the 
authorities aim to ensure these lessons are taken on board in future evaluation studies. 
Overall, the authorities have found that a successful evaluation study will need to be open-minded as 
to the conclusions and maintain a degree of independence from the original inquiry. Such independence 
can be provided by commissioning external consultants but this is not essential and staff within the 
authorities are able to carry out these studies. However, if the work is conducted internally, the relevant 
resources need to be available and the work given sufficient priority to proceed in a timely manner. Where 
possible, quantitative analysis can add an extra dimension to the evaluation, but useful insights can 
certainly be gained from ‘softer’ qualitative evidence. Indeed, it may not be straightforward to obtain the 
data necessary for useful quantitative analysis.  
Ex-post merger evaluation has, as discussed above, provided some useful insights into specific merger 
investigations and insights into the authorities’ predictions about certain market developments. It is more 
difficult to use these evaluation projects to derive general lessons about the usefulness and accuracy of 
merger review. One reason for this is that evaluation of individual inquiries does not allow the 
measurement of deterrence effects of the merger regime as a whole.19
                                                     
17  
 In addition, certain types of inquiry 
might be easier to evaluate (see paragraphs 10 and 11, for example), and this could bias the results of 
evaluation work towards these inquiries, rather than evaluation work being an accurate reflection of the 
value of merger review overall. 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/reports/Evaluating/  
18  The LEAR study is yet to be published, but will be once the draft report is finalised. 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/evaluation_reports.htm  
19  The OFT published a study by Deloitte on the deterrence effects of competition enforcement (including 
mergers) in 2007. http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft962.pdf 
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UNITED STATES 
This paper responds to the Chair’s letter of 24 March 2011, inviting submissions for the Competition 
Committee’s upcoming roundtable on how to evaluate the impact of merger decisions.  The U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
(collectively, “the Agencies”) are pleased to provide our perspective on this issue.  FTC and DOJ staff 
have conducted a number of retrospective analyses of merger decisions and have reviewed merger 
retrospectives conducted by experts/others unaffiliated with the Agencies.  This paper first discusses the 
motivations behind designing retrospective merger studies. The second section delves into the process of 
conducting such studies and focuses on specific methodological choices and considerations.  The paper 
then summarizes the general findings of merger retrospective studies regarding the effectiveness of 
common tools of prospective merger analysis.  The concluding section discusses the value of impact 
evaluation studies from a policy perspective. 
1. Why perform merger retrospectives?  
Merger review can present difficult challenges.  In a relatively short period of time, with limited 
information, antitrust authorities must forecast how a change in market structure will affect competition in 
a market.  To facilitate this process, over time the Agencies developed methodologies to expedite merger 
review, like those described most recently in the U.S. DOJ/FTC’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
How can a competition agency improve its methodologies or, more generally, assess its effectiveness?  For 
example, how does the agency learn if it is being aggressive enough, or too aggressive, in challenging 
mergers?  When a merger proceeds with some conditions attached, how can the agency evaluate whether 
the relief maintained competition effectively?  Evaluating the impact of previous merger enforcement 
decisions, and the accuracy of predictions made in the course of reaching those decisions, helps answer 
these questions and improve future enforcement.  The Agencies have also used a retrospective study as 
evidence in a law enforcement challenge to a consummated merger. 
The first task in conducting an ex-post merger review is to develop a clear objective for the study.  
Because an ex-post merger review is a case study – an examination of how one merger affects a specific 
market at a particular point in time – drawing general conclusions from any single study can be difficult.  
However, for particularly important or controversial merger enforcement decisions, simply determining the 
outcome of that merger (did prices rise or fall? did entry occur?) can justify the resources required to 
conduct such a study.  More broadly, multiple retrospective case studies may permit more general 
inferences about the effectiveness of merger policy with regard to certain types of mergers.  To begin to 
build a basis from which to generalize, competition agencies may consider conducting multiple studies in 
the same (or similar) industries.  For example, in 2002 the FTC studied the price effects of four 
consummated hospital mergers.1
                                                     
1  See Timothy J. Muris, Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century, 
Prepared Remarks Before the Seventh Annual Competition in Health Care Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), available 
at 
  While these studies represented a small fraction of all hospital mergers 
that took place during the time period studied, their findings offer evidence on whether the mergers 
allowed by U.S. competition agencies and courts resulted in increased prices.   
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf, and a special volume of the 
International Journal of the Economics of Business published in February 2011 containing the four 
hospital merger studies. 
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Retrospective merger studies can also analyze the effectiveness of tools used in prospective merger 
enforcement.  For example, Peters (2006) compares the effectiveness of various forecasting methodologies 
in predicting the impact of airline mergers.2  In terms of evaluating policy tools, the 1999 staff report by 
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, “A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process,” was designed to 
analyze the effectiveness of remedies.3
The presence of a competition agency in a jurisdiction raises an important sample selection issue, 
insofar as the only mergers available to study are those that were proposed by the merging parties and 
either (a) not challenged by the agency, or (b) unsuccessfully challenged.  By contrast, the “ex-post 
merger” world is not observed for mergers not proposed (for fear of a costly challenge from a competition 
agency) or for mergers successfully challenged by the competition agency.  Hence, retrospective studies 
can only determine how mergers affect competition in the presence of a competition agency conducting 
prospective merger review.   
  While the report concluded that the FTC’s merger remedies had 
successfully maintained competition in most instances, it also offered recommendations to enhance the 
success of future remedies.   
Evaluating the effectiveness of merger policy, however, requires determining whether the competition 
agency is being too stringent (challenging some mergers that would tend to have procompetitive effects) or 
too lax (refraining from challenging some mergers that have anticompetitive effects).4  When evaluating 
the impact of merger enforcement decisions, most studies focus on two types of “marginal” mergers.5
2. Methodologies for evaluating the impact of mergers 
  First 
are the “close call” mergers – i.e. where the merger faced serious opposition but was not ultimately 
challenged, and proceeded with minimal (if any) conditions attached.  Second, at least in the U.S., are 
mergers that the competition agency challenged but where the agency failed to obtain the requested relief.  
Because both types of mergers plausibly could result in price increases or other anticompetitive outcomes, 
studying these mergers can reveal whether government merger enforcement decisions sufficiently identify 
likely consumer harm. 
Estimating the impact of a merger presents a number of methodological issues.  The most basic, but 
nonetheless challenging, issue is choosing the effect to measure.  Most studies choose to estimate the 
merger’s effect on price.  The non-price effects of a merger – such as product quality, variety, or 
innovation (research and development) – are no less important to consumer welfare, and should play an 
important role in the decision-making of a competition agency.  However, non-price effects present more 
                                                     
2  Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulations: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 
49 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2006). 
3  Federal Trade Commission, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/08/divestreport.shtm. 
4  Akin to Type I and Type II errors, respectively. 
5  This set of mergers is very different than the average merger among the set of all consummated mergers.  
The Agencies clear the overwhelming majority of reportable mergers without a substantial merger 
investigation – in most years since 1991, over 95 percent of mergers did not receive a second request for 
information from the Agencies.  See the Agencies’ ANNUAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE 
HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm.  In addition, a large number of non-reportable mergers do not 
receive substantial investigation. 
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challenging issues of measurement and as such are studied less often.6
Choosing which price to study presents additional complications.  Merging firms often produce a 
number of competing products, and each type of product may be available in a number of different sizes – 
for instance, a soft drink available in single-serving cans as well as multiple-serving bottles.  Another issue 
is whether to measure the wholesale price – which the merging firms may control more directly, and as 
such would be central to market definition in the Agencies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines – or the retail 
price, which may be more easily available and could account more properly for any impact on consumer 
welfare.
  The remainder of this paper focuses 
on price effects, but the analysis can generally be extended to non-price effects as well. 
7
After deciding how to measure price, the next issue is finding a benchmark to which observed post-
merger prices can be compared.
  Yet retail pricing data (obtained from a sample rather than a census of retailers) may be 
incomplete, while wholesale pricing data may not reflect volume discounts.  These and other tradeoffs 
must be carefully evaluated in each instance, and often present problems specific to the merger at hand. 
8
More sophisticated estimates attempt to control for various demand conditions and cost shocks that 
affect price.  One approach is to estimate the relationship between market price and all of the relevant 
supply and demand factors.
  The benchmark aims to estimate what the market price would have been 
“but for” the merger.  Various methodologies can be used to produce such estimates.  However, they 
involve analyses of varying degrees of complexity – and often require nontrivial assumptions about how 
the world would have looked had the merger not been consummated.  Perhaps the simplest estimate of such a 
counterfactual price uses the pre-merger price.  However, the difference in price before and after the merger 
accurately estimates the merger’s impact only if demand and/or cost factors vary little over time.  While such 
an assumption can be difficult to justify, it may be the best available option in cases where data is limited. 
9
(1)  
  For example, before determining the price impact of a merger in the airline 
industry, one would want to know how jet fuel costs have changed (supply) and how seasonality affects the 
mix of business and leisure travelers (demand).  Only after controlling for these factors can a study 
properly estimate a merger’s impact on price.  Some merger retrospectives model the relationship between 
price and its various determinants as follows: 
1
N
M M M
t n nt t t
n
p F PostMergerα γ β ε
=
= + + +∑  
                                                     
6  Examples of studies analyzing non-price effects of mergers include Gregory J. Werden, Andrew S. Joskow 
& Richard L. Johnson, The Effects of Mergers on Price and Output: Two Case Studies from the Airline 
Industry, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 341 (1991); Steven Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers 
Increase Product Variety? Evidence from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q.J. OF ECONOMICS 1009 (2001); 
Andrew Sweeting, The Effects of Mergers on Product Positioning: Evidence from the Music Radio 
Industry, 41 RAND J. OF ECONOMICS 372 (2010); and Patrick S. Romano & David J. Balan, A 
Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 18 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUSINESS 45 (2011). 
7  See Daniel Hosken, Daniel O’Brien, David Scheffman & Michael Vita, Demand System Estimation and Its 
Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis, in ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL, PRACTICAL & TECHNICAL ISSUES 
(ABA Sec. of Antitrust Law, 2005).   
8  For further detail, refer to Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Generating Evidence 
to Guide Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 57 (2009). 
9  This approach is referred to as a “reduced form” regression, because it specifies the net relationship 
between price and various market factors without estimating the underlying structural parameters of the 
supply and demand curves in the market. 
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In equation (1),  Mtp  represents the price in the merger market (M) at time t.  This price is determined 
by a market-specific, time-invariant factor Mα , a number (N) of supply and demand factors that shift over 
time ntF , and an idiosyncratic error term 
M
tε .  The indicator variable tPostMerger  allows for prices to 
differ (by the amount β) for reasons related only to the merger – assuming that all of the relevant demand 
and cost factors are observable and included in the regression.10
Identifying all relevant market conditions can be difficult.  A common alternative is known as the 
“difference-in-differences” method.  This approach identifies an alternative, “control” market and 
estimates the merger effect as the difference between any price change in the market where the merger 
occurred and the price change in the control market.  That is, if the price in the merger-affected market 
increases by three percent, but only increases by two percent in a properly defined control market, one 
could arguably infer that the additional one percent price increase was due to the merger.
  However, omitting any relevant supply or 
demand factor invalidates this approach because it would mistakenly attribute to the merger some price 
movement determined in part by changing market conditions. 
11
Similar to equation (1), the difference-in-differences approach posits that the price in the control 
market is determined by: 
   
(2)  
1
N
C C C
t n nt t
n
p Fα γ ε
=
= + +∑  
The difference-in-differences approach makes two critical assumptions.  First, it assumes that these 
demand and cost factors, Fnt, are identical across the control and merger markets.  Second, it assumes that 
these factors impact pricing in the exact same way, γn, in each market.  With those assumptions, subtracting 
equation (2) from equation (1) yields: 
(3)  ( ) ( )M C M C M Ct t t t tp p PostMergerα α β ε ε− = − + + −  
Subtracting the two equations eliminates the time-varying cost and demand factors and requires much 
less data to estimate the merger effect.  The merger effect can be estimated in equation (3) using data only 
on prices, precisely because (by assumption) the same set of supply and demand factors impact pricing in 
the merger market and control market in the same manner, throughout the period of study.  Of course, 
other factors may need to be controlled for in equation (3) – for instance, a brief supply outage during the 
time period of concern may affect only one of the markets – but this difference-in-differences approach can 
be much less data intensive than controlling for all of the supply and demand factors ntF  in equation (1). 
However, this simplicity requires stringent assumptions.  An ideal control market must be sufficiently 
similar to the merger market so that demand and cost conditions are the same, yet sufficiently different 
from the merger market so that the merger had no impact on prices.  In the example of hospitals, an ideal 
control market would contain neither (or at most one) of the merging firms while treating a patient 
population of similar demographics and similar medical needs.  In some instances, no market will 
                                                     
10  For an example of this type of approach, see Hayley Chouinard & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Gasoline Price 
Differences: Taxes, Pollution Regulations, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Conditions, 7 B.E. J. 
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2007), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=bejeap.  
11  An additional assumption to be considered is whether the price changes should be measured in percentage 
terms (i.e. relative changes) or units of currency (i.e. absolute changes). 
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simultaneously satisfy both criteria to a credible degree.  Comparing results across multiple control 
markets may help assuage concerns that any individual control market fails along one or more dimension.12
Plausible control markets are often nearby geographic markets in which one of the merging firms does 
not compete.  In evaluating airline mergers, for example, Kim and Singal (1993) compare price changes in 
airline markets (city-pairs) where a merger reduced the number of competitors to price changes in markets 
of a similar distance and similar supply and demand conditions.
  
13  Likewise, Taylor and Hosken (2007) 
compare gasoline price changes after a merger in Louisville, Kentucky to those in Chicago, Illinois, the 
nearest city requiring the same type of gasoline and least likely to have been affected by the merger.14
Finally, ex-post merger analysis must make tradeoffs in selecting a time window in which to measure 
pre- and post-merger prices.  A longer window ensures that enough time has elapsed for prices to settle 
into their new, post-merger equilibrium level.  Longer windows may also be required to measure 
accurately the effects of merger-specific efficiencies, which the merging firms may not realize immediately 
after they consummate the transaction.
 
15
3. Findings of existing merger retrospectives 
  However, shorter windows reduce the number of confounding 
factors that may also impact price.  Due to the importance of the event window, it is often good practice 
(when feasible) to determine how sensitive the estimated merger effects are to small changes in the time 
window.  This can be done by examining how much estimated price effects change when different time 
windows are used.  
To date, most merger retrospectives have been performed on a relatively small number of industries: 
railroads, banking, airlines, petroleum, and hospitals.  The common link between these industries is that 
they are (or were) regulated in ways that permit some amount of price competition while generating a 
substantial amount of publicly-available price (and in some cases quantity) data.  A recent search of the 
literature discovered 73 merger retrospectives published between 1985 and 2010, 42 of which related to 
these five industries.16
Most merger impact evaluation studies find that the mergers studied – which were likely “marginal 
mergers”– tended to lead to price increases.
 
17,18
                                                     
12  See David Schmidt & John Simpson, Differences-in-Differences Analysis in Antitrust: A Cautionary Note, 
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 623 (2008). 
  However, three important caveats apply.  First, of the 
merger retrospectives in the petroleum industry, a substantially smaller proportion (about half) found 
13  See E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 549 (1993). 
14  See Christopher Taylor & Daniel Hosken, The Economic Effects of the Marathon-Ashland Joint Venture: 
The Importance of Industry Supply Shocks and Vertical Market Structure, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 419 (2007). 
15  See Fabio Panetta & Dario Focarelli, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Italian 
Market for Bank Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152 (2003). 
16  See the presentation by Lanier Benkard during the panel on merger retrospectives at the FTC’s Third 
Annual Microeconomics Conference, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/microeconomics/2010/docs/benkard_slide.pdf.  
17  For recent surveys see Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger Retrospective 
Studies: A Review, 23 ANTITRUST 34 (2008); Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 
4 J. COMP. L. & ECON., 433 (2007); and Paul Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 
ANTITRUST BULL. 119 (2003). 
18  The sample selection issue discussed earlier implies that the set of mergers studied will consist of 
“marginal” mergers (from an enforcement perspective), rather than the “average” (or typical) merger.   
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statistically significant price increases.  This anomaly may be due to the FTC’s enforcement in this 
industry, which appears stricter than in others.19  In addition, the nature of petroleum price movements over 
time makes these studies relatively more sensitive to certain modeling assumptions.  Second, it may be 
difficult to generalize from this limited number of industries to merger policy as a whole – over the last 30 
years, tens of thousands of mergers have taken place, while fewer than 100 have been studied.  Third, most 
of these studies estimate the short-run price effects of mergers.  This limitation may be important.  Panetta 
and Focarelli (2003) find that Italian banking mergers are associated with short-run price increases but 
long-run price decreases, and postulate that merger-specific efficiencies may take longer to manifest than 
merger-related increases in market power.20
Merger retrospectives also provide evidence on the effectiveness of prospective merger enforcement 
tools, such as merger simulation methods.
 
21  To date, there appear to be only three papers that compare the 
estimates generated by merger simulation methods to directly estimated price effects of consummated 
mergers.22
Similarly, the effectiveness of other tools of merger enforcement has been analyzed by ex-post merger 
studies.  For instance, the review of the four consummated hospital mergers discussed earlier found that the 
Elzinga-Hogarty analysis of patient flow data did not accurately define the geographic boundaries of 
hospital markets.  In addition, these studies showed that nonprofit hospitals increase prices they charge 
insurers when they gain market power.
  This nascent literature provides mixed evidence, including both false positives (simulations 
indicate a merger would be anticompetitive, but the retrospective estimate does not) and false negatives 
(estimated effects suggest prices increased, but simulations did not predict them).  Even when the 
simulated and estimated effects point in the same direction, sometimes the rank order differs considerably, 
i.e. the most anticompetitive simulated merger turns out to have the smallest estimated effect, and vice-
versa. 
23
Very few studies have analyzed the effectiveness of U.S. merger remedies.  The sole paper on this 
topic that employed an econometric model of the counterfactual world for a specific merger concluded that 
the divestitures successfully maintained the premerger level of competition.
 
24  In addition, the 1999 FTC 
Bureau of Competition staff report, “A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process,” reached similar 
conclusions for a broader set of mergers, based on qualitative evidence from interviews with market 
participants.25
                                                     
19  See Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1996-2007 
(2008), available at 
 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/12/horizmerger.shtm.  
20  See supra note 15.  Although this particular study does not relate directly to the U.S. experience, the 
importance of its findings merits a mention.  
21  For a discussion of merger simulation methods, see Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of 
Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
407 (1994). 
22  See Peters, supra note 2; Matthew Weinberg & Daniel Hosken, Using Mergers to Test a Model of 
Oligopoly (Working Paper, 2008); Matthew Weinberg, More Evidence on the Performance of Merger 
Simulations, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. (forthcoming). 
23  See supra note 1 and Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken, Michael Vita & Matthew Weinberg, Retrospective 
Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUSINESS 5 (2011). 
24  Steve Tenn & John Yun, The Success of Divestitures in Merger Enforcement: Evidence from the J&J-
Pfizer Transaction, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 273 (2011). 
25  See supra note 3.   
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4. Merger retrospectives and policy 
While the policy-relevant benefits of merger retrospectives have been discussed at length, the costs of 
doing them have received less attention.  For research projects, the largest cost to the competition agency is 
the staff time devoted to data analysis, and in some cases, data collection.  Government agencies 
sometimes make data publicly available at little (if any) cost.  In most cases, however, market data must be 
purchased from commercial providers or collected by the staff conducting the study.  Analysis of data, 
either qualitative or quantitative, typically requires the most significant expenditure of staff time. While the 
research questions in merger retrospectives may seem straightforward, implementing the study can be 
time-consuming.  It is not uncommon to spend up to a year conducting a study, given the number of 
robustness and specification checks required to become confident in the result. 
By contrast, sometimes the Agencies conduct merger retrospective studies as part of a law 
enforcement investigation, as with the FTC’s study of consummated hospital mergers discussed above.  
While there may be little to no pecuniary cost in acquiring the data, considerable staff time may be 
required to draft and enforce appropriately-tailored subpoenas to the relevant industry participants.  In 
addition, complying with these subpoenas (and responding to any further requests for information) is costly 
for the industry.  While the staff time spent on the analysis itself may not differ from the time required to 
conduct a research project, substantial additional time may be necessary to distill the results so that they 
may be understood by a court that has had minimal exposure to antitrust theory and practice. 
The policy impact of merger retrospectives most likely varies significantly.  The Agencies’ recently 
revised 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines explicitly endorse their usefulness, at least for consummated 
mergers: “Evidence of observed post-merger price increases or other changes adverse to customers is given 
substantial weight.”26  Both the FTC and DOJ have challenged consummated mergers based in part on 
evidence of a price increase immediately after the transaction.27
Merger retrospectives may help inform prospective merger analysis. Ultimately, however, every 
merger is specific to its facts.  A merger’s impact on prices and consumer welfare cannot be predicted 
simply from the results of a previous retrospective study.  While merger retrospectives may constitute a 
useful piece of the puzzle in predicting the impact of similar mergers, there is no substitute for 
investigational inquiries and economic modeling in individual investigations. 
   
                                                     
26  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, at 3. 
27  See the DOJ’s investigation of Microsemi’s acquisition of Semicoa (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/microsemi.htm) and the FTC’s investigation of Evanston Northwestern 
Hospital’s acquisition of Highland Park Hospital (available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/04/evanston.shtm); 
see also Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two 
Retrospective Analyses, 18 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUSINESS 17 (2011). 
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EUROPEAN UNION 
1. Introduction  
As suggested by the OECD’s Competition Committee, this paper addresses the topic “Impact 
Evaluation of Merger Decisions”, including both the methodologies for carrying out the evaluations and 
the relevance of the results that have emerged from the evaluations that have already been done.  
Intrinsic differences exist when considering the impact evaluation of mergers in the context of 
competition advocacy or in the context of improving the substantive decision making process. On the one 
hand, the primary purpose of the impact evaluation of merger decisions in the context of the competition 
advocacy is essentially to obtain broad estimates of the harm prevented from the Commission’s 
intervention in the form of a prohibition or a clearance with remedies of mergers.  On the other hand, the 
primary purpose of the impact evaluation of merger decisions in the context of improving the substantive 
decision making process, in particular in areas that proved difficult or controversial, is to improve the 
quality of future enforcement and policy development.  
2. Competition advocacy perspective 
2.1 DG Competition approach 
2.1.1 Preliminary observations 
The largest benefits derived from the EU merger control are probably in the form of deterrence. In 
other words, the mere existence of the EU merger control leads to a situation where anticompetitive 
mergers (that would be implemented in the absence of merger control) are not even considered. However, 
these benefits are, by their nature, very difficult to measure.  
From a competition advocacy perspective, it seems therefore appropriate to benchmark the observable 
benefits derived from the merger decisions where the Commission has intervened. Naturally, irrespective 
of the technical sophistication of the methodology used, the complexity and the idiosyncrasies of the task 
(which requires the construction of a counter-factual) only allows, in any circumstance, to see the results as 
a "best estimate" and certainly not as a single “true” value of the observable harm prevented.   
The harm prevented through its enforcement actions has been considered by the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Competition”) in the context of its competition advocacy. DG 
Competition’s Annual Management Plan and Annual Report in 2011 benchmarks the observable consumer 
benefits from horizontal merger cases of 2010 on the basis of the methodology established in an internal 
report. In 2010, the estimated (observable) customer benefits from horizontal merger decisions were in the 
range of €4.2 billion to €6.3 billion. 
2.1.2 The methodology 
The approach followed to broadly estimate observable consumer benefits from the Commission’s 
intervention in the form of a prohibition or a clearance with remedies of mergers consisted in predicting the 
change in consumer surplus. The method used was to calculate the sum of the “price effect” and the 
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“deadweight effect”, both multiplied by the length of the period the market would need to self-correct the 
distortion of competition, i.e. by new entry or expansion of competitors. Therefore, the prevention of 
anticompetitive effects such as the negative impacts on innovation and choice, even though some cases are 
largely predicated on non-price effects, especially effects on innovation, are not taken into account.  
In practical terms, the calculation of the predicted change in consumer surplus arising from the 
Commission's intervention in each product market is based on three factors: (i) the total size (by value) of 
the product market concerned, (ii) the likely price increase avoided and (iii) the length of time that this 
market would have taken to self-correct either by the arrival of a new entrant or by the expansion of 
existing competitors.  Of these three factors, only the market value is usually available from the case file.  
The other two have to be calculated. 
• Avoided likely price increase 
The estimation of the avoided likely price increase is based on an ex-ante merger simulation 
methodology, which predicts post-merger prices using information about pre-merger market 
conditions, while building on simplified assumptions about the behaviour of firms and 
consumers.  
As regards differentiated products, the likely price changes are determined ex-ante using 
PCAIDS modelling techniques. PCAIDS, a software model developed by Epstein and Rubinfeld1, 
relies on the unilateral effects theory of harm for differentiated product markets. Unilateral 
effects analysis encompasses a broad set of issues that arise when differentiated brands produced 
by the merging firms constitute the first and second choice for some group of consumers. Absent 
a new entrant or a product repositioning, a unilateral price increase may become profitable as the 
result of a merger if a substantial number of customers who previously would have been lost can 
now be retained because the merger firm also offers the customer's second choice.2
PCAIDS assumes that firms' behaviour is consistent with Bertrand model pricing. According to 
this theory, each firm sets the prices of its brands to maximize its profit, while accounting for 
possible strategic, non-collusive interactions with competitors. An equilibrium results when no 
firm can increase its profit by unilaterally changing the price of its brands. PCAIDS predicts 
hypothetical post-merger prices based on information about a set of pre-merger market conditions 
and certain assumptions about the behaviour of the firms in the relevant markets. A major 
advantage of PCAIDS is that it considers the effects of the merger not just on the prices of the 
merging parties but on all brands in the market. 
 
                                                     
1  R. Epstein and D. Rubinfeld (2008), "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications" 
Antitrust Law Journal 69 (3), pp. 883-919. The simulation has been used by other competition authorities 
(including the Federal Trade Commission in the United States and the OFT in the UK), 
2  This effect is particularly strong when the two merging parties have been offering closely substitutable 
products, i.e. where they are the closest competitors. The impact of this effect depends on the rate of 
switching by customers between different products in the market in response to variations in prices. The 
rate of switching between two products is called the cross-price elasticity between products. The rate of 
customers leaving the product market is typically given by the industry price elasticity of demand. Some 
customers may leave the market altogether. This is so because competitors have differentiated their 
products from the competing products based upon certain characteristics, be they technical, related to 
quality or connected services or via branding and do not face one single price for the good in the entire 
market as is the case for homogeneous product markets. It is thus a plausible assumption that some 
customers would not opt to buy a competing product if their preferred product becomes more expensive 
but would choose to not buy any related product at all. 
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The Bertrand model is, however, not suitable for modelling changes in the market structure 
where the goods produced by each firm are near identical (homogenous) and it is reasonable to 
think of the strategic interaction between the firms to be "as if" they chose the quantity of 
production and not the price. In this case, the Cournot model is, in principle, best suited. 
Accordingly, the estimation of the likely price increase in homogenous product markets is based 
on an oligopoly formula derived from a simple Cournot model. 
• Length of the period each product market would take to self-correct 
As to the estimation of the length of the period each product market would take to self-correct, it 
was based on a case-by-case assessment of the likelihood of either a new entrant or the expansion 
of existing competitors in these markets.  
The "restoration" process depends upon the individual characteristics of each product market as 
well as the potential of each market entrant.  We looked at the barriers to entry and to expansion 
and other important characteristics of the product markets in each merger case.  Each market was 
categorised into one of the three groups: "Significant", "High" and "Very High". Each of these 
groups was then assigned a duration period in years which was an estimation of the minimum 
time it would take to restore competition to its pre-merger state. 
In merger analysis, the European Commission only intervenes if it has concerns that a lasting 
effect of the structural change would occur. In practice, such an effect must last for a period of at 
least two years3
There are, however a number of cases where, due to the structure and characteristics of the 
market, entry or expansion would have been highly unlikely for longer than two years.  In such 
cases, we classified the durations to be either "High" (alternatively three or five years) or "Very 
High" (alternatively five or seven years).  
. Had the merger gone ahead without remedies, it would therefore be prudent to 
assume that the new post-merger competition landscape would have lasted for at least two years. 
Therefore two years is set as the standard length for markets where entry barriers are considered 
to be "Significant", both for new entry and for expansion of production by competitors. 
Nonetheless, these timeframes seem to be very conservative in the light of the magnitude of the 
barriers to entry or expansion and other market characteristics mentioned in the decisions. In fact, 
the typical anticompetitive merger case is one that takes place in mature industries, where 
investments and the branding effects are very high, with no major technological development so 
that normally no sizeable new entry can be expected in a near future. A study by K. Gugler et al.  
(2003) in the International Journal of Industrial Organization4
2.1.3 Observations on the methodology  
 provides useful insight which 
corroborates the conservative nature of these estimations. 
It is well known that simulation models have considerable limitations in regard to the degree of 
certainty and precision that can be expected.  Bearing this in mind, we tried to mitigate these limitations by 
assigning conservative values where there was less certainty surrounding the input in order to ultimately 
                                                     
3  Pursuant to point 75 of the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers "The Commission 
examines whether entry would be sufficiently swift and sustained to deter or defeat the exercise of market 
power. What constitutes an appropriate time period depends on the characteristics and dynamics of the 
market, as well as on the specific capabilities of potential entrants. However, entry is normally only 
considered timely if it occurs within two years". 
4 K. Gugler et al.  (2003), "The effects of mergers: an international comparison", International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 21 (2003) 625–653 
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produce a lower estimate of consumer benefit. Still, there is an important number of limitations associated 
with this methodology that cannot be lifted.   
The most important of all is probably its ex-ante nature, i.e. the methodology is based on theoretical 
predictions whereby changes in the structure (ownership) of markets affect the pricing behaviour of the 
companies in that market. These ex-ante techniques simulate the difference between two counterfactuals 
with data available before the merger. Ideally, however, estimates of the consumer benefit from merger 
enforcement would be delivered from an ex-post evaluation of each merger decision on what has actually 
happened in the subject market after the merger with respect to prices and quantities and then compare it to 
a counterfactual.5
Secondly, the simulation approach has to make restrictive assumptions. One of the most restrictive 
assumptions is the proportionality assumption of PCAIDS (as explained above) which can introduce errors 
into the analysis. The fact PCAIDS focuses entirely on price competition and ignores factors such as 
product repositioning and advertising (which can be very important in branded consumer products 
markets) is also an important limitation.
 This requires also intensive market research which would certainly not have been 
possible, given the resources available, to apply, for instance, to the multiple market products 
corresponding to the horizontal merger cases in a given years. By contrast, it is feasible to model a high 
number of product markets in a rather straightforward way by using micro-simulation techniques. All in 
all, the ex-ante framework appears to be the most suitable one to estimate the consumer benefits from 
merger control at a large scale (see Point 2 on other possible approaches). 
6 It is also assumed there are no efficiencies in any of the merger 
cases looked at. None of the merger cases analyzed in this report mentions efficiency effects that could 
potentially compensate the anticompetitive effects. Moreover, empirical economic literature has not found 
support for a general presumption that mergers create efficiency gains (see Röller, Stennek, and Verboven 
(2006) survey the literature on merger efficiencies).7
Thirdly, the model simulation approach assumes that the Commission's decisions are correct and that 
the remedies imposed are able to address the anticompetitive effect identified. In other words, this 
methodology does not allow for checking whether the Commsion incurred in a type I error – i.e. case 
where the Commission should not have intervened or an inappropriate remedy was imposed – and whether 
the Commission incurred in a type II error - i.e. case where the Commission should have intervened but did 
not. 
 In any event, it is doubtful that possible efficiencies 
would be passed-on to consumers (as a matter of fact, none of the analysed merger cases has claimed the 
existence of efficiencies).  
Finally, it is worth noting that vertical mergers, co-ordinated effects mergers or other potential 
competition scenarios cannot be modelled with this type of models. 
                                                     
5  See Carlton (2009), "Why we need to measure the effect of merger policy and how to do it", NBER, WP 
14719. 
6  Product repositioning generally refers to activities undertaken by a firm to change the image of its product 
to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis other products. A merger simulation based on the Bertrand model 
focuses on how a change in ownership affects post-merger pricing decisions and implicitly assumes that 
product repositioning does not occur. Thus, the degree of competition across products is assumed to remain 
the same in the pre-merger and post-merger regimes (i.e., product “positions” are fixed in the two regimes, 
hence repositioning does not take place). The predictions from this merger simulation can therefore be seen 
as upper bounds on the likely price effects of a merger 
7  See also Iversen, H. (2010) "The efficiency defence in EC merger control", European Competition Law 
Review, 31(9). See Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (2010) for a slightly different point of view on this issue. 
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2.2 Other possible approaches 
Apart from the simple calibrated-demand simulation model such as PCAIDS, there exist a number of 
other econometric methodologies that could be used for benchmarking the consumer benefits derived from 
merger control for the purpose of competition advocacy. 
2.2.1 Structural demand estimations 
This methodology would involve the comparison of the results obtained in an ex-ante perspective 
(i.e., using data that are already available pre-merger) with the results obtained with post-merger data to 
allow for the formulation of a proper counterfactual for the merger (that is, what would have happened 
without the merger taking place.  
Sophisticated and useful as this methodology may be for individual cases, it is not suited for a 
systematic assessment of merger control. Structural models are very demanding both as concerns the 
construction of the underlying model of competition and with respect to its stochastic properties. If the 
modelling specifications chosen by the researcher do not reflect well the specifics of the industry under 
investigation, then substantial prediction errors can follow. Moreover, the amount and quality of data 
needed to estimate demand systems with structural models is large. In many industries, the necessary data 
is simply not available.  
For these reasons, sophisticated structural models have only been used in a small minority of merger 
cases and do not lend themselves for an overall investigation of the benefits of antitrust enforcement.  
However, for the increasing number of mergers for which demand estimations are performed ex ante, it 
might be relatively easier in the future to update the demand estimation and merger simulations ex post to 
evaluate the effect of the merger.    
2.2.2 Ex-post analysis of actual ex-post price developments 
This methodology would involve the investigation of price developments on a sample of "marginal 
mergers", i.e. mergers that were allowed to go through without substantial modifications but generated 
some degree of debate within DG Competition. In a nutshell, the purpose of this methodology is to identify 
a suitable control (or comparator) group of firms that should be sufficiently similar to the merging firms 
(e.g., in terms of costs and/or product mix), so that the difference in say, prices, between the two groups 
can reasonably be attributed to the merger.  Once a proper comparator group has been identified, 
techniques such as "differences in differences" (DiD) can be applied to isolate the effect of the merger. A 
recent study that implements the methodology described above and that goes beyond a single merger case 
has been presented by Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008).  
This exercise is less demanding in terms of data requirements than the so-called "structural 
estimations", as it is based upon the so-called "reduced form" specifications, which do not require knowing 
the residual demand faced by the merging firms. It should be borne in mind, however, that such studies are 
relatively resource intensive and require substantial econometric expertise, which is however available in 
DG Competition.  
Any price increase from such "marginal" mergers would eventually provide an "upper boundary" to 
the price increases that other authorised mergers may have produced and a "lower boundary" to any price 
increases that could otherwise have occurred in mergers that were substantially modified or blocked.  
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2.2.3 Event studies 
This method entails assessing the stock markets’ reaction to an event, for example the Commission’s 
decision, and to derive from such an event a view on the effect(s) on the relevant markets. Under the 
assumption that the financial markets are efficient and the acting agents act rationally the stock price of the 
merged firm should adapt to reflect the merger-specific expectations on the relevant market(s).8
In the case of a horizontal merger, the event study methodology assumes that competitors' share prices 
will react positively if a merger is anti-competitive but negatively if it is pro-competitive. The reasoning 
behind this is that the increase in market power arising from an anti-competitive merger makes it profitable 
for the merged entity to raise its prices and reduce its output. This benefits competitors by enabling them to 
raise their prices while profiting from the diversion of some demand from the merged entity. By contrast, a 
pro-competitive merger damages rivals' profitability (and hence lowers their share prices) by creating a 
more aggressive competitor. In the case of non-horizontal mergers, on the other hand, a fall in the 
competitors' share prices might signal that the merger has anti-competitive foreclosure effects.  
 
While this method requires a relatively low volume of data, it appears from the outset that it is not 
really an ex post instrument as stock price data is available prior to the decision. In other words, a different 
decision than the one suggested by the stock market reaction may be due to the fact that the authority had 
better information than the financial market (such as internal documents of the merging firms or the results 
of questionnaires submitted to competitors and customers).  
The event study methodology has also been criticised on theoretical grounds, partly because the 
"efficient markets hypothesis" is controversial (see, for instance, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and partly 
because almost any given shift in relative share prices following a merger announcement can be explained 
in a number of different ways.   
3. Substantive decision making process 
3.1 DG Competition approach 
The objective of this type of evaluation impact of merger decision is to learn from past experience in 
areas that proved difficult or controversial and, thus, improve the quality of future enforcement and policy 
development.  
3.1.1 The methodology 
The methodology would consist of assessing the main predictions upon which decisions were based 
against the backdrop of the subsequent market developments in the years following the decision. This is 
therefore a qualitative, practical approach which is not based on econometric techniques or model 
simulations. Instead, the analysis attempts to make a comparison between the predictions made during the 
merger analysis and the subsequent development of the market(s) since the decision was taken. 
In this context, it should be noted that an ex-post evaluation of predictions underlying a decision is 
more difficult in cases where the Commission had intervened than in cases of an unconditional clearance 
decision. In the latter case, the competitive development of the market may give a stronger indication 
                                                     
8  For a detailed discussion on this issue, see, for instance, Duso, T., Gugler, K. & Yurtoglu, B. (2006b) How 
Effective is European Merger Control? WZB, Markets and Politics Working Paper, No. SP II 2006-12. and 
Duso, T., Gugler, K. & Yurtoglu, B. (2006c) Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? 
A Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data. Governance and the Efficiency of Economic 
Systems, Discussion Papers, No. 163 
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whether or not the clearance decision was justified. By contrast, where a merger has been blocked or a 
remedy has been accepted, it is much less clear how the market would have evolved if the merger had been 
implemented or if the remedy had not been imposed. However, there is a particular interest of trying to 
verify ex-post to what extent the theory of harm in the cases of intervention was based on predictions 
which were later corroborated by the development of the market after the decision. Furthermore, in remedy 
cases an ex-post assessment can also attempt to shed some light on the efficiency of the remedies, of course 
to an extent the role of the remedy can be isolated from other external factors. Despite the difficulties, ex-
post evaluation should, therefore, not be limited to non-intervention cases. 
This methodology therefore allows for checking whether the Commission made a type I error – i.e. 
case where the Commission should not have intervened or an inappropriate remedy was imposed – or 
whether the Commission made a type II error - i.e. case where the Commission should have intervened but 
did not. 
3.1.2 The selection criteria  
The choice of decisions must be made on the basis of appropriate criteria. Appropriate criteria could 
be:   
• Whether the proposed outcome generated some degree of debate within COMP;  
• Whether the decision was of strategic importance, either in terms of sector policy remedies or 
general competition policy such as new elements in the approach to the analysis; 
• Whether there is sufficient time, insight and data for conducting sound economic analysis; 
• It would also be appropriate to select decisions that are neither the subject of proceedings before 
the European Courts or of ongoing litigation before the National Courts and/or for which the risk 
of ligation, irrespectively of the final conclusion of the post evaluation study, is rather low. 
3.1.3  DG Competition's practice  
DG Competition has already undertaken some ex-post evaluations of this type, either of horizontal 
issues or for specific cases.  
• Horizontal issues 
Regarding general horizontal issues, the Merger Remedies Study (2005) has reviewed with the 
benefit of hindsight the design and implementation of commitments offered and accepted by the 
Commission in previous cases so as to identify what factors and/or processes may have positively 
or negatively influenced the effective design and implementation of merger remedies. 
To this end, the study conducted an ex-post evaluation of 90 different merger remedies. The 
study has provided a solid empirical basis for the revision of the Merger Remedies Notice, which 
was adopted in 2008.  
In terms of sectoral horizontal issues, DG Competition has carried out an internal investigation 
on the effectiveness of commitments offered in merger cases in a specific sector. The evaluation 
has identified the reasons for a rather limited effectiveness of the remedies and suggested 
concrete improvements in terms of overall design as well as procedure. These recommendations 
have already been implemented in some recent merger cases concerning this industry.  
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• Specific cases  
Regarding specific cases, an internal DG Competition ex-post evaluation, whose first purpose 
was to test whether or not it is possible to carry out a meaningful ex-post evaluation based on 
information available from desktop research, analysed some selected merger cases, covering the 
classical industries, Industries of the future or the “new economy” and liberalised markets. The 
project aimed to verify if the assumptions that were made in past decisions were in fact a realistic 
basis for the decision.9
The outcome of the case studies clearly showed that the conclusions to be drawn from the ex-post 
analysis depend largely not only on the type of industry but also on the specific characteristics of 
the underlying competition concerns in the respective cases.  
  
In general, the ex-post analysis revealed that the Commission's decisions were made on a sound 
basis and provided an adequate forecast of future market developments. Furthermore, the ex post 
analysis of the merger case in the “new economy” has revealed that the emerging markets by 
their very nature pose difficulties in forecasting their future development. The Commission 
identified a possible risk arising from the transaction. However, in hindsight the forecasts about 
the market developments were found to be unjustified. Nevertheless, at the time of the decision 
this was hardly foreseeable and in can be argued that in this kind of new and fast developing 
markets an  intervention can be justified if – as in the case at hand -  it is largely based on 
plausible risks as otherwise an emerging market could be foreclosed at its infancy. 
4. Conducting the impact evaluation study 
4.1 In-house vs. outsourced work 
DG Competition has the expertise to carry out impact studies of merger decision in both the 
competition advocacy perspective and with the ultimate of improving its internal substantive decision 
making process.  
There are some aspects in both exercises, notably the need to deal with confidential information that 
may lead to the conclusion that a competition authority is better placed than an external consultant for 
carrying out this type of ex-post evaluation. Even if DG Competition has no formal investigation powers 
for carrying out ex-post evaluations, our past experience has shown that the relevant stakeholders were 
relatively co-operative when replying, on a voluntary basis, to our surveys. It may be more difficult to 
obtain such a co-operation if a private consultant would be leading the evaluation. Furthermore, the ex-post 
evaluation of a specific case may benefit significantly from the information in case-files of subsequent 
procedures, which may be confidential (and therefore not immediately accessible to a consultant). Finally, 
based on the large practical in-house experience, DG Competition may combine better the necessary 
expertise in the implementation of competition law and the sector specific knowledge than an outside 
organization. 
Nevertheless, there are ways to structure ex post analysis that could allow us to outsource all or part of 
the work to external consultants. For instance, it is an option to outsource the (econometric) ex-post 
evaluations of merger cases as it involves mainly the application of (advanced) econometric techniques to a 
dataset that must be obtained from commercial entities. In other words, this type of evaluation doesn’t 
require the participation of market players in the survey of market developments and the information 
                                                     
9  DG Competition has also commissioned to "Lear" an ex-post study on the merger between the power cable 
producers Pirelli and BICC. See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/lear.pdf 
 DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 119 
needed has not a confidential nature. The use of an external consultant may have also the advantage of the 
perception of increased impartiality in the analysis. 
4.2 Data sources  
When the methodological aspects related to the impact evaluation of merger are conveniently sorted 
out, the access to the relevant market data is the crucial element in carrying out a meaningful ex-post 
examination of a merger decision. 
4.2.1 Quantitative approaches  
The model simulation approach basically requires data on three parameters for each product market: 
the market shares (in value), the industry demand price elasticity and the own-price demand elasticity of at 
least one product of one of the merging parties. While the market shares are usually available from the case 
file, data on the two elasticities are not always available from primary sources. Whenever possible, the 
own-price demand elasticity of at least one product of one of the merging parties was derived from existing 
econometric studies or calculated by using a company's internal financial data. Financial data were used to 
compute the ratio gross margin per sales of specific product market(s) when the product market(s) 
corresponded to the core business of that company. As to the industry elasticity, studies and general market 
reports and articles in academic journals were a useful source (the pilot cases yielded significant 
information about typical industry elasticities in similar cases). 
As regards the data for the alternative econometric approach, such as the investigation of price 
developments on a sample of "marginal mergers", it seems that the necessary input can be obtained from 
commercial organisations that collect micro data on specific industries or products.  
4.2.2 Qualitative approaches 
Regarding the less formal methods of impact evaluation described above, it emerges that the most 
reliable data was to be found in both the original case files, which served as a starting point of the analysis, 
but more importantly in the case files from subsequent mergers in the same sectors. Reports from 
monitoring trustees in cases where commitments were subject to the clearance decision proved to be 
another useful source. Studies and general market reports are another useful source. Articles in academic 
journals and online searches in databases can also provide useful information. Since COMP has many 
academic journals in its library subscription list as well as access to a number of databases, it is possible to 
do a certain amount of desk research. Research for information on the internet is also a viable option.  
In addition, a well-structured survey among all involved industry participants can certainly contribute 
to a complete data set. For instance, for the analysis of the sectoral remedy cases, DG Competition has 
addressed quite detailed questionnaires to a number of involved parties in this industry and has held 
meetings and telephone interviews with some of the relevant stakeholders. The outcome was positive since 
most of the addressed parties were co-operative when replying, on a voluntary basis, to our survey. A 
similar experience was made in an ex-post evaluation project in the area of antitrust. 
4.3 Internal reaction  
In terms of competition advocacy, it must be highlighted that the study on the impact evaluation of 
merger decisions was welcomed by DG Competition. It is now the new tool for DG Competition's external 
and internal communication to benchmark the customer benefits derived from merger control. The results 
have been used in speeches made by senior management and are part of the DG COMP's Management Plan 
2011, which reflects the work carried out each year by DG COMP on key policy priorities set-out by the 
Commission.   
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Also, regarding the substantive decision making process, evaluations carried out so far achieved 
positive reactions. For instance, the Merger Remedies Study has provided a solid empirical ground for the 
revision of the Merger Remedies Notice. Another good illustration is provided by an internal report on the 
effectiveness of commitments offered in merger cases in a specific sector, suggesting concrete 
improvements. The recommendations have already been implemented in some recent merger cases 
concerning this industry. 
5. Conclusions 
The impact evaluation of merger control can be a useful tool of competition policy.  Its contribution to 
an effective competition advocacy is important, as this advocacy is much more effective when it is 
supported by empirical data resulting from an impact evaluation of our own enforcement record.  At the 
same time, the qualitative evaluation of selected merger decisions has proved to be a valuable instrument 
for improving the quality of our future enforcement and policy development. 
There are however intrinsic differences when considering the impact evaluation of mergers in the 
context of competition advocacy or in the context of improving the substantive decision making process. 
These differences are dictated not only by dissimilar scopes but also by the type of methodology employed.  
Obtaining broad estimates of the harm prevented from the Commission’s interventions in merger 
cases (deterrence effects are by far the most important source of consumer benefits but very difficult to 
observe) usually requires a large sample of markets. An ex-ante framework, i.e. a methodology based on 
theoretical predictions how changes in the structure of markets affect the pricing behaviour of the 
companies, appears therefore to be the most suitable one to estimate the consumer benefits from merger 
control at a large scale. Even if this method has limitations, it appears, in any event, more appropriate than 
simple rules of thumb.   
When the objective is to learn from past experience in areas that proved difficult or controversial and, 
thus, improve the quality of future enforcement and policy development, the methodology employed has a 
more qualitative nature, in order to assess empirically the main predictions upon which decisions were 
based some years after the closure of the case. In this respect, experience shows that it is possible to obtain 
the necessary data and other relevant information from the desktop research (in particular in-house files) 
and surveys among markets participants even if there is no formal investigative power for the purpose of 
ex-post evaluations. 
 
 DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 121 
BRAZIL 
1. Introduction 
The discussion over how to evaluate the impact of merger decisions by competition authorities is 
crucial for building a strong and efficient competition policy system. This contribution intends to briefly 
describe the Brazilian experience over this topic. First, an overview of the Brazilian Merger Control 
System will be presented. Second, the Brazilian criteria for merger control will be described. Then, the 
mechanisms of evaluation of merger decisions will be analyzed, together with a case study, before we 
reach a short summary of this contribution.  
2.  Overview of the Brazilian merger control system 
The Brazilian Merger Control System is s governed by Law nº 8.884, dated 11th June 1994. The 
“Brazilian Competition Policy System” (hereinafter, “BCPS”) is composed of three agencies: the 
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (“CADE”), the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) of the 
Ministry of Justice , and the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE) of the Ministry of Economy. In 
merger control, CADE has adjudicative authority, while SDE and SEAE are primarily responsible for 
providing legal and economic opinions. All decisions taken by these agencies may be subject to judicial 
review in Brazilian courts. 
Pursuant to the Brazilian legislation, any merger that may limit or otherwise restrain competition must 
be notified to the BCPS and submitted to CADE for review. The notification is mandatory if any of the 
merging parties had at least R$ 400 million (approximately € 175 million) in Brazilian revenues in the last 
fiscal year, or if the market share of the parties, in the relevant market as defined by the parties themselves, 
is equal to or in excess of 20%. There is no exception to the notification requirement where the thresholds 
are met. As a result, foreign-to-foreign transactions or transactions that do not involve overlap are subject 
to these same rules. The Brazilian merger control system may be considered a posteriori because mergers 
may operate before CADE’s final approval, and even before the notification to competition agencies. 
Nevertheless, considering the nature of this merger control system, the risk of denying approval and 
consequently undoing mergers that were already implemented exists, as it was the case with the merger 
between Nestlé and Garoto in 2002. 
One may notice that this ex post merger control system adopted in Brazil may change the perspective 
of a study over the evaluation of the impact of merger decisions by competition authorities. Indeed, in a ex 
ante merger control system it is necessary to predict the effects of a proposed merger, while in a ex post 
merger control system this matter is presented in a different way since the merger is already in place. 
3.  Brazilian criteria for merger control 
An analysis over the impact evaluation of merger decisions requires a previous study of the criteria 
adopted by a country’s legal system to control mergers. In Brazil, these criteria are set by Article 54 of the 
Brazilian Law nº 8.884, dated 11th June 1994: 
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Article 54. Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in the 
control of relevant markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE for 
review.  
Paragraph 1. CADE may authorize any acts referred to in the main section of this article, 
provided that they meet the following requirements:  
 I - they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to:  
  (a) increase productivity;  
  (b) improve the quality of a product or service; or  
  (c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic 
development; 
 II - the resulting benefits shall be ratably allocated among their participants, on the one part, 
and consumers or end-users, on the other; 
 III - they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a 
product or service; and 
 IV - only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for that 
purpose. 
Paragraph 2. Any action under this article may be considered lawful if at least three of the 
requirements listed in the above items are met, whenever any such action is taken in the public 
interest or otherwise required to the benefit of the Brazilian economy, provided no damages are 
caused end-consumers or -users. 
The main Brazilian criterion for merger control is based on competition grounds. However, CADE 
may authorize any merger that meets certain conditions, as established in the above-mentioned paragraph 1 
of Article 54. That means that a merger may be approved by the Brazilian competition agencies if it (a) 
increases productivity, (b) improves the quality of a product or a service, or (c) causes an increased 
efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic development. In addition to at least one of these 
elements, the following conditions must be, cumulatively, met: (i) the benefits shall be shared between 
companies and its final users, (ii) the merger shall not substantially lessen competition in a particular 
market; and (iii) the merger extension shall be limited to the necessary to achieve the gains foreseen. 
4.  Evaluation of merger decisions 
The Brazilian Competition Policy System does not have a formal procedure to evaluate the merger 
decisions taken by the Brazilian competition authority. However, informal and indirect mechanisms may 
offer important feedback over the impact of these decisions. 
For instance, one may notice that some decisions, i.e. those related to a conditional approval or to a 
prohibition of mergers, may be submitted to judicial review. From the moment that a new legal and 
economical analysis is driven by the Brazilian judicial courts, the impact of CADE’s decisions may be 
examined. This was experienced by the merger between Nestlé and Garoto that took place in 2002. The 
Brazilian competition agencies, within a system of post merger control, decided against the merger based 
on competition restraints and, thus, the merger had to be undone after two years of operation.1
                                                     
1  BCPS merger file nº 08012.001697/2002-89. Merging parties: CHOCOLATES GAROTO S/A et NESTLÉ 
BRASIL LTDA. The decision may be accessed on-line by ‘www.cade.gov.br’. 
 In order to 
prevent – or at least minimize – the negative effects related to the deconstruction of a merger, BCPS has 
developed an important practice called “Transaction Reversibility Preservation Agreement” which is 
 DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 123 
known in Brazil by its acronym in Portuguese “APRO” (“Acordo de Preservação de Reversibilidade de 
Operação”). In a nutshell, the “APRO” is an Agreement by which the merging party (or parties) assures 
the BCPS the possibility to undo the merger to the status quo ante in case CADE decides for an 
intervention over the merger. 
In Brazil, there are also “think-tanks” organizations that develop, in a regular basis, market studies. 
Even though these studies do not intend to directly examine the impact of merger decisions by competition 
agencies, they may offer important devices to the understanding of these effects. Thus, market studies may 
indirectly assist competition agencies to improve its application of different instruments and techniques in 
merger review system. 
5.  Case law 
In 2009 CADE verified the need of advisory to the council in the production of specific economic 
expertise related to Competition Defense. Ergo, in the same year, the Council created the Department of 
Economic Studies (“DES) in order to develop and maintain the economic evaluations of the Council 
balanced to contemporary economic perspective.  
Since its implementation DES has presented some valuable documents on major cases. In the matter 
of evaluation of the impacts of the Council’s decisions, DES is currently working on the calculation of 
possible damages in the decision compliance of the “Cartel das Britas”2: mergers of Supermix Concreto 
S.A. and Cimpor Cimentos do Brasil Ltda.3; and Polimix Concreto Ltda. and Camargo Corrêa Cimentos 
S.A.4
The Council analyzed a series of fusion and acquisition operations involving the cement and concrete 
market in Brazil. As an outcome of this work, CADE recognized that a thorough study of the market was 
needed in order to portray a more up-to-date view of the concrete sectors in Brazil. Accordingly the 
Council requested such study from DES, within the scope of the analysis of the Supermix Concreto S.A. 
and Cimpor Cimentos do Brasil Ltda. merger.  
  
Initially, DES notified companies that had been included in relevant markets in the mergers 
previously analyzed by CADE. Those notifications occured in 30 (thirty) different cities, throughout the 
country. The goal was to obtain information from those markets, specially on what concerns the openning 
and closing of companies and the emersion of new concurrents. DES was also able to gather information 
about companies in concrete services market and from suppliers of cement and their main clients. DES 
intends to carefully examine all this information in the next phases of the study. 
The study is in progress with the support of a Technical Cooperation Agreement between DES and 
the Applied Economic Research Institute (Portuguese acronym “IPEA”). This agreement is important to 
have a better assessment of the entrances and exits of independent concrete companies in those markets. 
Those studies have not reached a conclusion yet, but they will be an important asset to inform CADE of 
the impact of the Council’s decisions. 
                                                     
2  BCPS Administrative proceeding nº 08012.002127/2002-14. The decision may be accessed on-line by 
‘www.cade.gov.br’. 
3  BCPS merger file nº 08012.008947/2008-05. The decision may be accessed on-line by ‘www.cade.gov.br’. 
4  BCPS merger file nº 08012.000836/2009-23. The decision may be accessed on-line by ‘www.cade.gov.br’ 
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6.  Conclusion 
The analysis of the current Brazilian Competition Policy System attests the difficulties to evaluate the 
impact of merger decisions by competition agencies. On the one hand, the BCPS is still based on a post-
merger control system, which requires a different perspective over the problem of the evaluation of the 
impact of merger decisions. On the other hand, a large-set of criteria enables the Brazilian competition 
agencies to approve mergers that meet certain requirements, such as the increase of productivity, the 
improve of quality of a product or a service, as well as the creation of efficiencies and technological and 
economic development. 
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INDONESIA*
1. Introduction 
 
The measurement of the impacts of a decision is a critical matter for an antitrust agency in measuring 
the extent of the effectiveness of such agency in giving benefit to consumers or the public welfare. The 
existence of quantitative or measurable impacts of a decision will be beneficial for internal and external 
dimensions. Internally, evaluation of such impacts can serves as a reference for agencies in reviewing the 
effectiveness of the law enforcement function of the agency. Externally, the results of such evaluation can 
be useful for the advocacy efforts of the agency to increase the public awareness and acceptance about the 
importance of the implementation of business competition law and policy. This quantitative evaluation can 
also become an important addition to the achievement indicators of other agencies, specifically the 
statistical data on the achievements in law enforcement.   
Merger cases can be considered to be relatively different from other violations due to the element of 
remedies contained in the decision or recommendation of the antitrust agency on its in-depth analysis 
performed upon the merger proposals from business actors. The remedy frequently recommended is the 
divestment of a portion of company’s assets or only allowing a merger of certain units of the merger 
parties. Therefore, the measurement of the impacts can be different from the evaluation of a regular case.    
2. Analysis of impacts of a merger decision has never been conducted in Indonesia  
The practice is a quite different in Indonesia. The laws and regulations on merger, in relation to the 
enforcement of the business competition law, have not included the element of legal remedies as an output 
of the antitrust agency on merger which must be notified. With the implementation of the post notification 
mechanism, the opinion made by the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU) on 
a merger case is limited only to the statement on whether or not there is alleged monopolistic practice and 
unfair business competition resulting from a merger, except upon a voluntary consultation carried out by 
the merger parties prior to the implementation of the merger. Upon the consultation, the commission is 
able to provide a recommendation for improvement, such as remedies, however without any obligation to 
implement the recommendation. The recommendation provided also cannot impede the authority of the 
commission to evaluate such merger once the merger has been conducted. As from the implementation of 
Government Regulation No. 57/2010 concerning merger in July, 2010, to date, it is recorded that there 
have been 11 (eleven) mergers notified and 2 (two) consultations.  However, there is no merger affecting 
business competition.  
In such condition, the commission has never evaluated the impact of a merger decision. However, 
since a merger is treated equal as other provisions, then an impact assessment of other type of competition 
cases would be interesting to be shared.  
                                                     
*  This report is prepared by the Foreign Cooperation Division with valuable inputs from internal sources to 
contribute for series of the OECD Competition Committee Meeting in June 2011. Further information or 
clarification on stipulated issues may be obtained from Mr. Deswin Nur (Head of Foreign Cooperation 
Division) through his e-mail addresses, deswin@kppu.go.id or from our international team at 
international@kppu.go.id. 
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Currently, an in-depth quantitative evaluation has been conducted by the commission on the impacts 
of the commission’s decision related to the case of short text message (SMS) rate cartel by several 
telephone operators in Indonesia, which was pronounced on June 16, 2008. It is stated in the decision that 
six telephone operators in Indonesia were proven to have been involved in a cartel of SMS rates causing 
losses to consumers amounting up to Rp2.827 trillion (USD 332.6 million1
3. Methodologies 
). Such amount was calculated 
based on the difference between the revenues based on the cartel price and the revenues based on the 
competitive price of off-net SMS. The impacts of the decision were evaluated in 2010 by the KPPU in 
cooperation with University of Indonesia. This written submission will explain issues and results related to 
this evaluation.      
The study on the impacts of the Commission’s decision on the case of SMS rate cartel was intended to 
measure the effects of KPPU’s decision on SMS rates and the impact of an increased competition on 
consumer welfare. KPPU indicates 3 (three) types of measurement which are frequently used to evaluate 
the implication of amendments to policies on welfare, namely consumer surplus, compensating variation 
and equivalent variation. 
The measurement of consumer welfare by using consumer surplus is derived from the Marshallian 
Demand Function, which indicates the quantity of demand as a function of price by maintaining a constant 
income in line with the change in the consumers’ utility level.    
Compensating variation (CV) is defined as the amount of income that must be taken away from a 
consumer (positive or negative) after an economic change to restore the consumer to the original welfare 
level. The CV is the income adjustment required to make the consumer indifferent between consuming the 
original basket and facing the lower price basket in different utility level.  
In contrasts to the CV, the equivalent variation (EV) is defined as the amount of income that must be 
given to consumer (positive of negative) in lieu of an economic change to make him as well of as with the 
change. EV uses the level of utility after price and income changes as a basis. 
Comparison of three methods to calculate consumer welfare 
 
 Consumer Surplus Compensating Variation Equivalent Variation 
Demand Marshallian Demand Function, q(p,m) Hicksian Demand Function, q(p,u) 
Hicksian Demand 
Function, q(p,u) 
Path Dependency issue Arise Do not arise Do not arise 
Consumer Welfare (P1*Q1) – (P2*Q2) in MDF (P1*Q1) – (P2*Q2) in HDF 
(P1*Q1) – (P2*Q2) in 
HDF 
 
Based on the aforementioned three methodologies, there are strengths and weaknesses in each 
methodology and model used in the analysis to see the increase in consumer welfare due to the increase in 
competition where the Compensating Variation and Equivalent Variation Method do not have any path 
dependency issues as described in the consumer welfare method but required careful consideration in 
choosing between the two methods. From theoretical point of view, CV uses the new price as the base 
while EV uses initial price. If the study is conducted before an expected price change, EV is better suited. 
When the research of welfare measure has been done after a price change then CV is better suited. As for 
the demand function, each model usually follows certain unique econometrics method. In choosing an 
appropriate method, many things need to be considered especially for availability of the data that has 
                                                     
1  USD1 = Rp 8,500 
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always been a classic issue in developing country such as Indonesia. This study suggests the use of panel 
data in order to pool all the data to achieve better result. 
Based on such matter and from several measurement of welfare change, KPPU and the University of 
Indonesia decided to employ a Compensating Variation (CV) method. In essence, CV is the compensating 
payment (in monetary measures) that leaves the consumer as well off as before an economic change. The 
economic change phenomena could be in the case of a price rise, a price decline or an income change that 
leads to a change in consumer’s utility. The compensating payment will have positive sign if a welfare loss 
occurs and negative sign for a welfare gain. In this case, the verdict of KPPU is expected to create welfare 
gain for consumer due to its rate cut impact. 
4. How do we design the impact? 
During its establishment, it was the first time KPPU conducted an analysis of the impact of a decision 
of competition case (non-merger). The analysis was conducted incidentally and has not been conducted 
regularly. The intention to conduct such evaluation was based on the Commission’s needs for authentic 
(quantitative) evidence of the impact of the Commission’s decision on public welfare. It was intended as a 
supporting media for the advocacy conducted by the Commission to date.  
Such study can also provide the results of data analysis in the telecommunication sector related to the 
structure, behavior and performance of the relevant sector. The study can also become an input for KPPU 
in performing law enforcement and advocacy to the government in formulating the policies on the 
telecommunication sector. Moreover, the results of such study are expected to be able to harmonize the 
policies in such sector. Furthermore, through such study, it is expected that the models and methods 
applied can become guidelines and references for KPPU to be implemented in other cases and conditions.   
The main constraints in the implementation of this study were the availability of data and funds. The 
availability of data has been a classic problem in Indonesia since the government’s data has not been 
integrated. The government’s data are sometimes different from the data of business actors or associations. 
The government’s data oftentimes relies only on the reports submitted by business actors without any 
clarification process. The decision on SMS cartel was chosen upon the consideration that the data available 
in the telecommunication industry is relatively complete in Indonesia. The next problem was the 
availability of funds. The lack of reliable secondary data led to the increased needs for primary data. 
Primary data is certainly identical to the high costs of surveys and data purchase. For those reasons, KPPU 
has not been able to conduct regular evaluation of the impacts of its decisions. 
Evaluation of the impacts of decision should be conducted regularly, but by carefully choosing the 
types of cases and by focusing on the cases related to the interests of the general public. The evaluation of 
the impacts of decisions should also be conducted by a third party (e.g. an independent consultant or 
university) in order to constantly maintain the objectivity of the results of such evaluation. Currently, 
KPPU has had a special unit (under the Research Bureau) which is assigned to analyze the impacts of the 
commission’s decision. This unit is relatively new so that it still has limited human resources (3 staff) and 
very limited funds. The duty related to the evaluation of the impacts of decisions is also still limited to 
maintaining coordination with third parties in designing the evaluation design and providing inputs in each 
stage of evaluation.    
5. How do we conduct the study? 
The arrangement of SMS rates by operators had been under the KPPU’s attention for a long time 
since it can reduce the consumer welfare significantly. Based on the findings and facts found by KPPU 
during the period of 2004-2007, there had been a price agreement among operators. Such effort is usually 
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coordinated by the dominant player and followed by other telecommunication operators. Upon perusing 
the KPPU’s decision, consumers obtained SMS rate cut amounting to 50-70%. Prior to the pronouncement 
of the decision, the rate charged to consumers was Rp350.00 per SMS, then after the decision, it decreased 
to Rp100.00 per SMS. 
In order to find and prove alleged impacts of the decrease of SMS rates to the consumer welfare, in 
2010 KPPU appointed the University of Indonesia to conduct the research. In the process, KPPU staffs 
were directly involved in the formulation of the term of reference for the evaluation and were directly 
involved in supervising the implementation of the evaluation, especially in providing inputs for the 
questionnaires, choice of model, the parties to be surveyed, data support and evaluation of the report 
delivered.      
The data used in this research resulted from secondary and primary data. The primary data processed 
in this study was obtained from the results of questionnaires as well as interviews with respondents, while 
the secondary data on the telecommunication industry was obtained from several sources, namely KPPU’s 
data on decisions and studies , telecommunication operators (in the form of annual reports), the Directorate 
General of Postal and Telecommunication Services (in the form of data on the number of costumers), the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (in the form of consumption price indices for communication and real per 
capita Gross Domestic Product) as well as data obtained from the internet.    
The data obtained from those public sources was considered not satisfactory, such as the lack of data 
series before 2004 and complete data of rates so that the researcher had to determine a simple form of 
analysis model to ensure that the study would produce useful results. The researcher and KPPU did not 
have any power to “force” business actors to provide non-public information, but basically business actors 
were cooperative in providing the data needed since they believed that this study was quite useful and there 
was no internal party from the business competition agency which objected to this study.    
6. What we have learned from this evaluation? 
The research show that the KPPU’s decision resulted in increased competition and significant 
reduction of SMS rates. By using compensating variation (CV) calculation method, the total consumer 
welfare reached approximately Rp1.9 trillion (USD 223.5 million) for the entire 6 (six) operators from 
2007 up to 2009. Therefore, it can be concluded that the KPPU’s decision had an important role in the 
increase of competition among operators and the realization of the higher total consumer welfare. The 
results of the evaluation also show that the KPPU’s decision had an important role in maintaining 
competition among operators. The emergence of new players in the industry tended to encourage the 
reduction of rates and create competition among operators.  
The interpretation of the results and the delivery of recommendations were fully conducted by the 
third party in order to ensure the objective results and recommendations. KPPU did not convey any 
objection to the conclusions or recommendations conveyed in relation to the results of the research. In fact, 
KPPU paid due observance of the recommendations which can be applied in the law enforcement process 
in the Commission.   
The results of this research were subsequently published to external and internal stakeholders of 
KPPU through a public seminar attended by wide-ranging stakeholders, especially from business actors, 
academicians, governments, the press, etc. Most of the participants welcomed the results and there were a 
few debates in the context of the model and sample used. Public assessment was more focused on the 
reliability of data and the geographically narrow samples (limited to the State’s capital city). The results of 
this research were also disseminated through the official website of the Commission and used as 
consideration for the development of further evaluation.    
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This first research shows to KPPU that it is necessary to conduct evaluation of decision’s impact in 
order to convince the agency and the public about the benefits of the enforcement of the competition law in 
Indonesia. In formulating further researches, KPPU considers it necessary to use larger amount of samples 
in order to obtain better results. Especially for national level surveys, discrete choice model can be applied 
for calculating the welfare effect. However, in order to actualize such matter, cooperation among relevant 
institutions is required, especially with the central statistics agency and Regional Governments. Online-
based surveys can also be considered to be applied since it is more efficient even though it still requires 
further study on the appropriateness of its application in Indonesia.  
7. Conclusions  
Evaluation of the impacts of KPPU’s decision on M&A has never been conducted since there has not 
been any rejection to date to the proposed merger. The M&A case has been treated as a general case of 
business competition, such as cartel, monopoly and abuse of dominant position. Therefore, evaluation of 
the impacts of a certain decision will be equal to evaluation of the impacts of decision related to M&A in 
Indonesia.  
Currently, KPPU has conducted evaluation of the impacts of decision only once, namely the 
evaluation of the case of SMS cartel in the telecommunication sector in Indonesia. Such study was 
conducted by KPPU by appointing a university. KPPU was involved in the provision of the initial 
framework as well as inputs at every steps of research, from the choice of model, formulation of 
questionnaire, data presentation, recommendation of data sources, to the evaluation of the draft report.  
The study of impacts was conducted by using the compensating variation model after the change of 
price behavior in the industry. Based on such model, the results indicated that the KPPU’s decision was 
proven to have increased the competition in the communication sector and contributed to the significant 
reduction of the SMS rates which is useful for the community.      
The obstacles encountered in conducting this research were mostly related to the availability of 
human resources and funds. Such problems occurred due to the fact that secondary data in Indonesia was 
unreliable leading to the increase in the needs for primary data. The unavailability of funds also forced 
KPPU to limit the samples which were only limited to the state’s capital city and such study has never been 
conducted nationally. 
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ROMANIA  
Ex-post analysis of merger decisions: Introduction 
So far, Romanian Competition Council (hereinafter referred as RCC) has not developed any 
systematic methodology to assess the impact of its merger’s decisions at least due to the fact that until 
2010, the clearance test of a merger was the dominance test and the great majority of mergers raised no 
competition concerns. Moreover, RCC has adopted few merger decisions with remedies.  
Yet, measuring the effects of RCC’s decisions in merger cases has taken place only as part of RCC’s 
activity of monitoring the markets or in the form of verifying compliance with remedies in each case.  
1. Challenges 
Excepting the merger cases which have been conditionally authorized as well as those situations in 
which price rigidity or other circumstances suggest the possibility of preventing or distorting competition 
on the market, RCC can not force undertakings to supply data or information to evaluate the impact of the 
respective merger. 
In order to make an ex-ante analysis of a merger, RCC can oblige undertakings under the threat of a 
fine to supply data and information needed for carrying out an impact analysis of the proposed merger. 
Even if there have been no such ex-post studies, the market analysis performed in the past merger 
cases indicates a moderate will for cooperation from the part of the undertakings interviewed. However, 
there are situations where these companies notify potential competition problems to RCC but their remarks 
are not always backed by facts and relevant data. 
2.  Pilot-study: Telecom market 
At the beginning of 2011, RCC decided to perform an in-house study regarding the ex-post impact of 
a merger decision over the competition environment and consumer welfare in the telecom sector. This 
specific decision has been selected taking into account the oligopolistic character of the mobile 
communications markets, the fact that in 2009, RCC authorized this merger and last but not least, the 
economic importance of the telecom sector. 
Another reason for which this particular merger case was considered for an ex-post analysis was the 
possible competition concerns raised by the main competitors of the involved parties to the merger. 
This study is the first undertaken by RCC aiming at making an ex-post assessment of a decision issued 
by RCC in the merger field.  The study has been performed by RCC with its own resources. The outcome 
of the ex-post analysis confirms the conclusions from the initial analysis that the merger was beneficial and 
that the non-objection decision was well grounded. The study itself and its conclusions have not been made 
public due to its pilot status. 
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3. Used methodology  
For performing this study, RCC used the same methodology as in the case of the merger authorization 
which took into account the following: 
• The evolution of the relevant markets (volume, value, structure, consumption behaviour) in the 
existing macroeconomic framework; 
• The evolution of the regulatory framework; 
• The assessment of the post-merger behaviour of the involved parties; 
• A comparison between the estimated effects of the merger envisaged when authorizing the 
merger and the observed ex-post effects regarding the impact of the merger over the competition 
on the market and consumer welfare as well as the likelihood and motivation of the new entity to 
engage in anticompetitive practices.    
The analysis was based on data and information supplied by the regulatory authority in telecom field 
and the involved parties. RCC made use as well of information and data published by competitors on their 
website and studies/reports performed by the regulatory authority or other entities.   
4.  Outline of the Cosmote/Telemobil merger case 
The merger operation which was the object of the ex-post analysis performed by the RCC involved 
the take-over of Telemobil, the fourth player on the retail market of voice services and the third player on 
the mobile broadband Internet access services by Cosmote, ranked the third player on the voice services 
market who did not supply mobile broadband Internet access services. Cosmote is part of the OTE Group 
controlled by Deutche Telekom AG. Romtelecom is part as well of OTE Group, the incumbent on the 
market of fixed electronic communications services who also supplies mobile broadband Internet access 
services since November 2008. 
Although the transaction led to overlaps on several relevant markets, RCC gave special attention to 
the mobile telephony services retail market and to the mobile broadband Internet access services retail 
market from the vantage point of the impact of the transaction on the end user. 
Following the analysis made by RCC under the dominance clearance test which was in effect at the 
time of the merger, RCC considered that post-merger, the transactions would not raise competition 
concerns and authorized it in the phase one of the procedure. Through this take-over, Cosmote was aiming 
at acquiring the spectrum resources needed for completing its mobile services portfolio with 3G mobile 
services. 
On one hand, the involved parties were minor players on the relevant markets; therefore, there were 
no premises for the creation or consolidation of a dominant position for the new entity.  
On the other hand, although through this merger, the number of players would have been reduced 
from 5 to 4 on the mobile telephone services market, RCC considered that post-merger, the relevant 
markets’ structure would not suffer significant changes due to a powerful network effect induced to each 
telecom operator and in particular to the first two major players, Orange and Vodafone in the conditions of 
an already saturated mobile telephone services market. Although, prior to the merger, Cosmote played a 
maverick role on the mobile telephony markets, this operator did not manage to increase its market share. 
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Thus, RCC assessed that it was unlikely for Cosmote to abandon its maverick role, while its major 
competitors individually had a market power significantly greater than the one of the new entity. 
Prior to the merger, the commercial policy of the fifth player, namely RCS&RDS, a new entrant on 
the market (end of 2007) was an aggressive one including regarding the mobile telephony services. 
However, due to the low coverage level of its mobile network, this policy did not have a significant impact 
on the market, being focused on including mobile telephony services in the 4play services packets. 
Consequently, RCC concluded that there were no premises for the birth of a collective dominance 
from the part of the remaining four players post-merger.  
Regarding the mobile broadband Internet access services market, this was an emerging market at the 
time of the transaction, therefore, it was unlikely for a collective dominance to appear post-merger.  
It is important to note that when launching the market test, the first two competitors of Cosmote 
complained that a possible anticompetitive effect of the merger would be the concentration of the resources 
in general and of those of the 400 MHz frequency spectrum, in particular  (410 and 450, used in CDMA 
technology) at the level of the acquirer’s group.  The main concern of those players was the possibility for 
Cosmote to hinder competition on the fixed and mobile broadband Internet services market. 
Regarding these aspects, RCC noted that the low amount of network resources held by the target 
company was not capable of significantly influencing the position of the new entity on the wholesale and 
retail markets, especially because the acquired company was using a CDMA network different from that of 
the other mobile operators (900/1800 MHz bands used in GSM technology) and switching costs between 
the two types of technologies were high.  
Moreover, Telemobil’s license for the 450MHz frequency terminates on 24.03.2012. In the opinion of 
the regulator, a supposed divestiture of this frequency band before the license’s expiration would have 
harmed the end user, since a buffer period of time was deemed necessary for the final users’ migration to a 
different frequency band and for the operator to replace the existing terminals in the network which can not 
operate in the 410 MHz band. 
Although Romtelecom holds a dominant position on the wholesale market of access to infrastructure 
services (local loop), the concentration of the 400 MHz frequency spectrum and the supply of mobile 
broadband Internet access services through this spectrum were not capable of affecting fixed broadband 
Internet access services market due to a lack of sufficient degree of substitution between the two services 
on the retail market.  Moreover, Romtelecom was not holding a dominant position in the retail market of 
fixed broadband Internet access services. Also, Romtelecom’s presence on the retail market of mobile 
broadband Internet access services was a reduced one since it only entered this market at the end of 2008 
and there were no other mobile broadband spectrum resources at the level of the group of the acquirer. 
Thus, the data held by RCC did not point out towards likely anticompetitive effects of the merger on the 
fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services market as a result of the 400 MHz frequency spectrum 
concentration. 
5.  Ex-post assessment of the effects of the Cosmote/Telemobil merger 
5.1 Evolution of the relevant markets 
According to the data collected and processed by ANCOM, at the end of 2010, the broadband Internet 
access services recorded the most important growth, especially the connections to mobile broadband 
increased by approximately 59% relative to those existing at the end of 2009. However, the main source of 
revenues on this market remains the delivery of mobile telephony services. 
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The number of users (specifically the active SIM cards) of services of mobile telephony during 2010 
decreased by 3.15% relative to that recorded at the end of 2009. The level of revenues in the mobile 
telephone services market decreased. One of the reasons for this decrease is the modification of 
consumers’ behaviour due to the economic crisis, a significant number of users abandoning the telephony 
services of a second mobile operator.  
Although the total number of users decreased, the voice traffic continued to increase in 2010 by 
22.85% relative to 2009. This demonstrates that the operators managed to adapt their offers to the present 
economic context both through tariff reductions and more traffic included in the subscriptions/extra-
options. The studies performed by RCC and confirmed by the regulator show that the mobile telephony 
services market remains saturated, being characterized by a strong network effect that makes difficult a 
significant modification of its competitive structure. 
Also, the data submitted by the regulator do not reveal any significant structural changes of the 
relevant markets since the time of the merger authorization so far. 
5.2 The evolution of the regulatory framework 
Starting with 2010, the 900/1800 MHz frequency bands have been liberalized, making possible the 
supply of 3G type mobile services. The only operator that doesn’t hold spectrum in the more favourable 
900/1800 MHz band is RCS&RDS. 
5.3 The evaluation of the involved parties’ behaviour on the relevant markets post-merger 
5.3.1 Mobile telephony services retail market 
Given the insignificant contribution of Telemobil at the time of the merger’s authorization, the 
position of the acquirer’s group on the relevant market has not significantly changed following this merger. 
Cosmote remains the third ranked player on this relevant market, way ahead of its first two competitors. 
The market share of Cosmote in terms of total SMS traffic volume (Cosmote being leader for this market 
segment) increased in 2010 compared to 2008. The market share of Cosmote in terms of total voice traffic 
volume increased as well following the merger, Cosmote ranking second, up from third prior to the merger. 
However, Cosmote remained the third player on this relevant market in terms of total number of end-users 
(SIM cards) and revenues. 
These data reveal an aggressive market policy of Cosmote focused on increasing the traffic volume by 
maintaining a relatively reduced price level. This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that since the 
introduction of number portability in 2008, Cosmote is the leader regarding the ported mobile telephony 
numbers. 
5.3.2  Retail market of mobile broadband Internet access services 
The data provided by the regulator shows that the position of the resulting entity post merger hasn’t 
substantially improved up to date. Yet, Cosmote continues its aggressive market strategy especially by 
both expanding the amount of data included in its mobile broadband Internet access services and keeping a 
lower level of price in comparison with its main competitors.  
Regarding an alleged impact of the merger on fixed and mobile broadband services, data collected by 
RCC shows that the concentration of the 400 MHz frequency band did not lead to the consolidation of the 
acquirer’s group position either on the wholesale market of access to the infrastructure elements or on the 
retail markets of fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services. Even more, starting with 2010, the 
900/1800 MHz frequency bands have been liberalized making possible the delivery of 3G type mobile 
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services. This development makes possible for the competing mobile operators to significantly reduce the 
costs for covering the national territory and the population. 
Let’s note also that market studies among end users carried out by the regulator during March-April 
2010 show that from the demand point of view, the access to mobile broadband Internet is not a substitute 
for fixed broadband Internet, but a complementary service. 
5.4 The analysis of the merger effects 
5.4.1 The merger impact on consumer welfare 
According to the competing operators’ opinions, one of the reasons for the mobile telephony market’s 
value decrease is the aggressive market strategy of Cosmote. This strategy consists of constantly offering 
packets of services at low prices as well as an aggressive advertising campaign. 
This post-merger behaviour of Cosmote confirms the expectations of RCC with regard to the 
beneficial effects on the consumer welfare, namely increased choices for consumers as well as the 
reduction of their expenditures for the electronic communication services. 
5.4.2 The likelihood and motivation of the new entity to engage in anticompetitive practices 
The post-merger data collected by RCC indicate the non-existence of the premises for the creation or 
consolidation of a dominant position on the relevant markets as a result of the merger’s implementation. 
Cosmote continues its maverick behaviour on the mobile telephony retail market, pushing for an increase 
in its market share. This fact reveals the lack of motivation for Cosmote to engage in a tacit or express 
agreement with the other 3 remaining mobile operators.  Moreover, regarding the retail market of mobile 
broadband Internet access services, there is not sufficient evidence for RCC to currently conclude that 
there is a collective dominance of the four mobile operators on the market of broadband Internet access 
services. Thus, even if the concentration level indicates a concentrated market, the market shares of the 
operators are asymmetrical and the market has the characteristics of a contestable market, continuously 
growing (not mature yet). All these create the premises for a significant growth of this market. 
6.  Conclusions 
Taking into account the switching from the dominance test to the SIEC test as the clearance test in 
RCC’ s merger control analysis and the subsequent necessity of refining the economic analysis methods, 
RCC welcomes debating this issue within OECD and aims at implementing good practices in the field. 
Using the expertise of its peers in this area, RCC intends to draft its own methodology of ex-post analysis 
and to apply it on a case by case basis in its merger decisions. 
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SOUTH AFRICA 
1. Introduction 
Evaluating the impact of its interventions in the economy is becoming an increasing priority for the 
South African Competition Commission, as reflected in the Commission’s current three year strategic plan 
(2011-2014).1
This submission discusses the Commission’s past impact assessments conducted for three of these 
merger cases.
 Currently, the Commission is examining methodologies applied in other jurisdictions and is 
engaged in piloting a framework. However, the Commission has undertaken evaluations of several merger 
cases selected specifically for the issues they raised and in order to learn from them to improve future 
merger analysis. 
2
• in the steel processing sector (Trident/Dorbyl), approved on the basis of efficiencies; 
 These assessments were largely qualitative and were considered ex post mini ‘reviews’ of 
the developments following the merger. The three were as follows: 
• in the poultry and animal feeds industry (Astral/Natchix), where a divestiture and behavioural 
conditions were imposed; and 
• in the construction/mining services area (Murray & Roberts/Cementation), approved on the basis 
of there being bidding markets.  
In addition to the specific issues raised, the Commission had on-going enforcement matters in these 
sectors. For each review, we highlight the methodology used, how and by whom the studies were 
conducted and the outcome of the studies. All three the reviews were done internally by Commission staff 
who had not been directly involved in the original merger analysis. The reviews were done without powers 
to obtain information (unlike where there is a formal investigation). 
We also highlight the Commission’s proposed guidelines on impact assessment going forward. 
2. Reviews of three merger decisions 
2.1 Trident Steel / Dorbyl  
2.1.1 Summary of the merger 
The merger between Trident Steel and three plants of Baldwins Steel (a Dorbyl division) in 2001 was 
the first (and only) merger that was approved purely on efficiency grounds by the Competition Tribunal 
                                                     
1  Impact assessment in the context of the South African Competition Authorities is defined as any activity 
that is designed to measure or estimate the effectiveness, costs and benefits or value to society of the 
authority’s interventions, or the effectiveness or costs and benefits of the competition policy regime as a 
whole (Proposed draft guidelines on Impact Assessment, Competition Commission South Africa, 2010). 
2  The results of these reviews have not been published. 
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despite significant anticompetitive concerns. The transaction resulted in the merged entity being the sole 
producer locally of improved surface finish (ISF) steel material for the automotive sector, controlling 70 
per cent of the market with the balance being imported.3
Despite these effects, the Tribunal felt that certain efficiencies claimed by the merging parties were 
merger-specific productive efficiencies which would result in significant cost savings. These efficiencies 
came about due to post-merger production re-organisation that would result in equipment rationalisation 
and specialisation of production lines.
 The Tribunal took the view that customers, 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the automotive sector, lacked significant countervailing 
power and that the merger to monopoly would result in prices being pushed up to import parity levels. 
Barriers to entry were also considered very high. 
4 There were also ‘dynamic’ efficiencies resulting from the re-
organisation and coordination of the production facilities enabling penetration into new markets that 
neither firm would have been able to enter absent the merger.5
The other efficiencies claimed by the parties included what the Tribunal termed ‘supply efficiencies’. 
These referred to the ability of the merged entity to achieve improvements in ordering through larger 
buying volumes from raw material supplier (a steel mill), judged by the Tribunal as a real efficiency that 
could not have materialised absent the merger. The final set of efficiencies claimed by the parties was 
larger volume discounts that could be attained from increased buyer power of the merged entity. This the 
Tribunal found not to constitute a real efficiency gain in that it was merely a transfer of income from 
supplier to buyer.
  
6
Convinced of the significance of the efficiency justifications,
 
7 and that such efficiencies outweighed 
the identified anticompetitive concerns8
2.1.2 Design and methodology of review 
, the Tribunal approved the merger without any conditions. 
In 2008 the Commission undertook a review to assess developments in terms of the claimed 
efficiencies and the conduct of the firm. As part of the methodology, a review on literature of efficiencies 
and how other jurisdictions treated efficiencies was conducted to assess other possible interpretations of 
the efficiency justification. The analysis conducted was largely qualitative, with questionnaires sent out 
and interviews conducted with the merged parties, the supplier of the merged parties (steel mill) and 
customers (automotive manufacturers).  
The merged entity was contacted to understand whether the claimed efficiencies materialised, if the 
associated cost increases were realised as predicted, and how its pricing policy and product offering may 
have changed. The steel mill was contacted to see whether the larger volumes ordered allowed for it to 
                                                     
3  Although imports were not directly comparable products, and were products further down the value chain. 
4  Trident would take on the production (including that which Baldwins previously did) of ISF blanks which 
it had a cost advantage over Baldwins (Baldwins was inefficiently producing ISF blanks on a press line). 
5  Competition Tribunal (2001)- Merger Decision in the large merger between Trident Steel Pty Limited and 
Dorbyl Limited Case number 89/LM/Oct00. 
6  Such efficiencies the Tribunal classified as a ‘pecuniary’ efficiency. 
7  The Tribunal explained that when real efficiencies were demonstrated and verified, it was less important to 
show pass through to customers. But when efficiencies were less compelling, then pass through to 
consumers needed to be shown. 
8  While the Tribunal conceded that a formulaic weighting of anticompetitive effects and efficiency gains was 
attractive, it argued that this was often difficult in practice. 
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custom size the steel for the merging parties such that scrapping rates were reduced. Most importantly, 
from the customers, price and non-price effects of the merger were sought. 
The review was conducted internally at the Commission, with an employee hired on a short term basis 
who focused exclusively on the review (for a period of six weeks). This employee had previously not 
worked at the Commission and had no past involvement in the Commission’s assessment of the merger. 
2.1.3 Findings 
The study confirmed that the efficiencies claimed were realised. The plants were rationalised and 
specialised as planned, with all ISF product being produced on the less costly Trident line. Customers 
indicated that the merged entity had made the required investments to improve quality. Trident had indeed 
lowered its scrap rate by successfully engaging with the steel mill to get correctly sized coils on its price 
list. By ordering larger steel coils (20t) instead of smaller coils, a separate step in the production process 
was eliminated, reducing costs further. Finally, the dynamic efficiencies from using the Baldwins press line 
to press blanks instead of producing ISF blanks also materialised. 
In terms of the merged entity’s ability to raise prices, as recognised by the Tribunal, this was 
constrained to an extent by imports. While overall, customers interviewed revealed that prices had indeed 
risen post-merger, these increases were not greatly out of line with producer price inflation.  
An important finding of the review was that the countervailing power of the OEMs was significant, 
and perhaps to a greater extent than reflected in the original decision. The review revealed that certain 
OEMs started to import processed fenders and another set up a joint venture directly with a steel mill to 
produce its own blanks. This took away significant business from the merged entity, and suggests that 
barriers to sponsoring entry upstream were not insurmountable, and imports of finished components are an 
alternative for OEMs.  
2.2 Astral Foods/National Chick   
2.2.1 Summary of the merger 
The Commission prohibited the intermediate merger between Astral Foods and National Chicks 
(Natchix) on grounds that it increased concentration significantly in the animal feeds and day old chicks 
markets, and that it led to serious vertical foreclosure concerns in the markets for the supply of day old 
chicks and parent stock. These foreclosure concerns included favourable pricing and supply terms to own 
subsidiaries (especially in times of shortage and disease). The Commission also found high barriers to 
entry and that the leading competitor in the parent stock market, Cobb, did not have excess capacity to 
supply aggrieved customers of the merged entity. 
The parties took the matter to the Tribunal who then approved the merger subject to certain structural 
and behavioural conditions.9
The Tribunal did not share the Commission’s concerns around the foreclosure issues and was of the 
view that an outright prohibition was unwarranted. This was largely because the Tribunal accepted the 
merging parties’ argument that since they would be under the Ross International franchise for South Africa 
  To address the horizontal concerns in the animal feeds market, the Tribunal 
required the divestiture of Astral’s entire shareholding in Natchix’s Nutrex feeds business to an 
independent purchaser. Astral pre-merger had its own interests in animal feeds through Meadow Feeds.  
                                                     
9  Competition Tribunal’s decision in the appeal between Astral Foods Limited and National Chick Limited 
(69/AM/Dec01). 
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for parent stock, they were not at liberty to foreclose buyers of Ross parent stock. This was especially so 
given that Ross International was putting pressure on Astral to grow their local market share. The Tribunal 
found that the highest margins were in fact made at the upstream parent stock level and that would have 
incentivised the merged entity to expand sales, not limit them. The Tribunal therefore called for 
behavioural conditions that obliged the parties to enter into standard supply contracts with independent 
customers; reduce supply to all customers on a pro rata basis in the event of disease; not discriminate 
against independent customers who did not want to conclude the standard contract nor discriminate against 
customers on price or volume discounts who wished to sell Cobb birds. These conditions were to apply for 
5 years from April 2002.  
A number of industry players expressed concerns about the merger at the time of the Commission’s 
investigation and the Tribunal heard testimony from these players during the hearing. These concerns, 
along with rising food inflation, prompted the Commission to review the impact of the Tribunal’s decision 
on this merger in 2008.  
2.2.2 Design and methodology of review 
The review was undertaken by Commission employees who were not involved in the original merger. 
Again, largely qualitative evidence was collected through questionnaires and face-to-face interviews with 
the parties and independent players that would be most affected by the alleged foreclosure. The 
Commission at the time was also conducting research into the poultry industry in general and information 
from this research assisted in the review.   
2.2.3 Findings 
The Commission found that the divestiture had been very important in ensuring an independent feeds 
supplier in the market, notwithstanding wider competition concerns in feed (still being investigated).  
The behavioural remedies imposed to address the vertical foreclosure concerns appeared to have been 
far less successful. It was suggested in the market that the behavioural conditions may have been breached 
in that the merged entity may have sold at lower prices to its own downstream affiliates than to 
independents.  
The review also revealed that the Tribunal’s decision did not fully consider the implications of the 
unilateral control which Astral gained in the Elite JV through the acquisition of Natchix (and its share in 
the JV). The Commission has since found that this allowed the JV to be operated to undermine the 
emergence of effective rivalry in breeding stock. The unilateral exit of one party (Country Bird) ultimately 
led to entry of a new breed and lower margins. 
Finally, the Commission initiated three more enforcement cases following the approval of this merger, 
all which related to foreclosure and exclusionary concerns. 
2.3 Murray & Roberts /Cementation  
2.3.1 Summary of the merger 
In 2004 the Tribunal unconditionally approved the merger between Murray & Roberts (M&R) and 
Cementation despite concerns raised by the Commission, particularly in the sub-markets for raise drilling 
and shaft sinking.  The raise drilling and shaft sinking sub-markets were highly concentrated and the 
approval of the merger resulted in a three-to-two merger in the former, with two substantial competitors 
remaining in the latter.  The transaction also removed a significant competitor, Cementation, a company 
that had built a reputation for being a fierce competitor in both sub-markets.  The Commission further 
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contended that the two sub-markets were characterised by high barriers to entry, thus the transaction would 
allow the merged entity to exercise market power post-merger.  
After a detailed evaluation of the competition dynamics in the relevant sub-markets, the Tribunal cited 
several factors it believed ameliorated any potential anti-competitive effects of the merger.  These factors 
were put into two broad groups.  The first set contained the Tribunal’s main contention that the services 
provided by the merging parties are large lumpy projects sold to sophisticated customers (who could also 
integrate vertically) through a vigorous bidding process.  The Tribunal maintained that this market feature 
would weaken any exercise of market power by the merged entity.  The second category of factors 
assessed by the Tribunal was from the standard merger analysis toolkit; these included the assessment of 
countervailing power and barriers to entry, with the Tribunal being persuaded that the latter were relatively 
low.  
2.3.2 Design and methodology of review 
In 2009/10 an internal team from the Commission conducted a review of this merger to assess the 
performance of the raise drilling and shaft sinking sub-markets. Given the factors cited by the Tribunal, the 
team conducted a literature review on bidding markets. Market specific information was obtained from 
competitors, customers and associated suppliers through telephonic interviews and questionnaires.  The 
aim was to gather information on entry, pricing trends and to establish how well the bidding nature of the 
sub-markets worked. The Commission was also working on issues of bid-rigging more widely at the time. 
2.3.3 Findings 
The review revealed that there had not been any adverse effects on competition in the two sub-
markets (shaft sinking and raise drilling) as a result of the transaction.  In particular, there had been entry 
into the sub-sectors mainly in the form of migration of firms from related areas. While the Commission 
had raised concerns that lack of reputation would work against new entrants, firms active in related areas 
had a track record with the customers in question. It should be noted, however, that the Commission has 
uncovered extensive bid-rigging in construction, fostered by the relatively tight knit nature of the industry 
in South Africa. 
3. Way forward  
As mentioned, the three ex post merger reviews discussed above were all mini-studies conducted 
internally for the purposes of improving the Commission’s merger evaluations. They were carried out 
without powers to obtain information, meaning that the assessments were of a more qualitative nature. 
They were also conducted at a time when the Commission had not adopted a formal approach to 
measuring impact. More recently the Commission has included impact assessment as a strategic goal in its 
3-year strategic plan for 2011- 2014. 
Through conducting impact evaluations, the Commission aims to achieve the following: 
• Quantitative estimates of the impact of the Commission’s work for consumers. 
• Inform the process of prioritising sectors and cases.  
• Improve the quality of analysis in future investigations. 
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• Increase transparency and awareness of its activities for improved external accountability and 
engagement.  
• Create conditions conducive for achieving greater competition in the economy. 
Drawing from international experience, the Commission has developed an impact assessment 
framework and is in the process of developing internal capacity to implement the framework.  Different 
aspects of the impact assessment framework will be piloted during the 2011/12 financial year. 
According to the framework, three methodologies will be used to conduct impact assessments.  First, 
the overall impact of the competition authorities’ activities will be calculated using ex ante estimates of the 
direct savings to consumers resulting from each case. Second, ex-post monitoring and reviews will be 
carried out for selected cases in order to assess the actual competitive developments resulting from the 
actions taken by the competition authorities. Third, research will be conducted on an on-going basis into 
the broader benefits of the competition authorities’ work, including factors such as the deterrent effect of 
competition policy.10
 
 
                                                     
10  Proposed draft guidelines on Impact Assessment, Competition Commission South Africa, 2010. 
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BIAC 
1. Introduction 
Merger review is a prospective exercise which, by necessity, requires making predictions about the 
future effects of a transaction.  Since no one has perfect visibility on the future, it is important to take the 
time and make the effort to assess the efficacy of past decisions so that we can learn from history, with a 
view to improving decision making in the future.  To the extent that evaluating the impact of past merger 
decisions is used to improve decision making in the future, it is a laudable exercise that should be 
encouraged among relatively new and more experienced competition law authorities alike. 
This paper canvasses impact evaluation exercises that have been conducted (or, in one case, is 
currently being conducted) that assess past merger decisions.  By “decisions”, this paper considers both 
decisions to intervene (either to block a merger or to obtain remedies) and not to intervene.  Impact 
evaluations raise a number of methodological questions, including who should undertake them, how to 
select the merger decisions that should be included, how to collect and handle the data required for such 
studies, and, importantly, steps competition authorities can take to ensure that the results of studies lead to 
better future decision making in merger review.   
In light of the fact that merger transactions are often pro-competitive, and can otherwise provide 
substantial benefits to consumers by ensuring that companies and markets work efficiently, it is important 
that pro-competitive or competitively neutral transactions not be blocked or delayed.  Where properly 
employed, ex post impact assessments can help competition law authorities develop and refine the 
analytical tools for identifying whether remedial action is warranted with respect to any given transaction 
and, if so, what kind of remedial action would be most appropriate.  That is, impact assessments can 
provide significant value to competition authorities – and, indeed, to the business community and to the 
public at large – if they are used as a learning tool that helps inform continuous improvement in merger 
review processes and substantive outcomes.  When designing such studies it is important to consider the 
possibility that merger control may have been overly interventionist in certain instances and that some 
transactions which may not have been detrimental were blocked or subject to unduly harsh remedies. 
2. Studies on impact of past merger decisions 
2.1 Canada 
The Canadian Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) is undertaking a Merger Remedies Study, the main 
objective of which is to determine whether past merger remedies sought by the Bureau have been effective 
in addressing the competition concerns identified in the relevant market(s) at issue.  Through an 
assessment of the effectiveness of past merger remedies, the goal is to gain an understanding of the factors 
that either contributed to, or detracted from, the efficacy of such remedies.  The Bureau is in the process of 
finalizing this study, which reportedly involved a review of 50 cases between 1986 and 2005 that involved 
remedies.1
                                                     
1  Competition Bureau, “Merger Review Performance Report”, May 31, 2010, available online: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03236.html.  
  The Bureau held approximately 135 interviews with various market participants, including 
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merged entities, purchasers of divested assets, customers, competitors, and other parties. The Bureau has 
stated that it intends to publish the study’s findings and recommendations shortly after the study is 
completed, with a view to advancing the Bureau's practice with respect to the design and implementation 
of future merger remedies.2
Similarly, in 2007, the Bureau published a study, titled, “Ex Post Merger Review: An Evaluation of 
Three Competition Bureau Merger Assessments”,
 
3 that it had commissioned from CRA International, an 
economic and financial consulting firm.  The study evaluated whether the Bureau applied appropriate 
analytical approaches and took appropriate decisions the three transactions.4  In particular, the study 
examined whether any of the markets analyzed in those reviews were substantially less competitive 
following the merger in question.  The objective of the study was to consider mergers that had raised 
material competition concerns, but where the Bureau ultimately decided the merger did not merit a 
challenge before the Competition Tribunal.  The study found that, in general, the Bureau's analyses 
accurately assessed market conditions, and reasonably predicted outcomes. In addition, the report 
identified areas where the Bureau could make incremental improvements, including a greater use of 
quantitative analysis and more critical consideration before accepting claims about countervailing power.5
2.2 Europe 
 
In 2005, the European Commission, DG Comp, published its “Merger Remedies Study”, which 
analyzed the design, implementation and effectiveness of 96 remedies imposed in 40 cases under the EU 
Merger Regulation between 1996 and 2000.6  In selecting which remedies were to be analyzed, the study 
aimed at creating a balance with respect to three factors: (1) the types of remedies; (2) the number of 
remedies accepted in Phase I or after an in-depth Phase II investigation; and (3) the different industrial 
sectors involved.  After the selection of cases and remedies to be studied, interview teams reviewed the 
case files and prepared for the interviews sample questionnaires, which were evaluated in a pilot test of 
nine cases. The questionnaires were tailor-made to each type of interviewee: (1) the committing parties or 
sellers, licensors or grantors; (2) the buyers, licensees or grantees; and (3) trustees, respectively.7
                                                     
2  See “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Competition for the Year Ending March 31, 2008”, available 
online at: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03114.html and “Merger Review 
Performance Report”, available online at: Merger Review Performance Report.  
  The 
study acknowledged a number of limitations in its methodology.  First, for some remedies it was difficult 
to determine comprehensively market outcomes in the absence of fully fledged new market investigations.  
3  Mark Neumann and Margaret Sanderson, CRA International, “Ex Post Merger Review: An Evaluation of 
Three Competition Bureau Merger Assessments”, August 1, 2007, available online at: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02447.html.  
4  The transactions considered in the study were: (i) Corus Media acquiring the assets of WIC Broadcasting 
in 2000; (ii) the 2003 merger of a number of coal companies in western Canada collectively referred to at 
the time as the Fording group; and (iii) a 1998 joint venture between Carmeuse and Lafarge, both large 
suppliers of concrete and other building materials.  The study paid the closest attention to the first of these 
three transactions.  
5  See Competition Bureau Press Release: “Competition Bureau Publishes Post-Merger Review Study”, 
October 4, 2007, available online at: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/02468.html.  
6  DG COMP, European Commission, Merger Remedies Study (Public Version), October 2005, available 
online at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf.  
7  Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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Second, several exogenous factors can contribute to an observed market outcome.8  Third, to assess the 
market impact of a remedy, the study had to compare actual market developments with the results that 
would have been likely to occur in the absence of the remedy – i.e., the counter-factual scenario.  With 
respect to the third limitation, interviews proved to be a useful approach for obtaining the views of industry 
participants on these issues, but, admittedly, all counterfactual scenarios are, to some extent, speculative.9
Despite these limitations, the study made tentative assessments about the overall efficacy of the 
remedies analyzed, grouping the remedies into one of four categories: (1) “effective” (i.e., the remedies 
clearly achieved their competition objective); (2) “partially effective” (i.e., the remedies experienced 
design and implementation issues which were not fully resolved three to five years after the divestiture and 
which may have partially affected the competitiveness of the divested business); (3) “ineffective” (i.e., the 
remedies failed to restore competition as foreseen in the Commission’s conditional clearance decision); or 
(4) “unclear” (i.e., the remedies are those where the study could not determine whether the remedy had 
achieved its stated objective).
   
10  Commenting on the outcome of the exercise, then-Commissioner of 
Competition Neelie Kroes stated: “The findings of this important study will influence our future action in 
the field of merger remedies.  It demonstrates the Commission’s commitment to evaluate critically and 
transparently its past policy and practice in order to draw lessons from it. ...”11
2.3 United States 
 
In 1992, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released “Case Studies of the Price Effects of 
Horizontal Mergers”,12 a report prepared by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, which examined the effects 
of horizontal mergers on product prices in three case studies with a view to offering some insight on issues 
that may influence the efficacy of antitrust merger review policy.  The first case, Weyerhaeuser’s purchase 
of Menasha Corporation’s North Ben, Oregon corrugating medium mill, was one in which the FTC 
unsuccessfully challenged the merger that it alleged would likely lessen competition.  The other two cases, 
the merger of the Hawaiian cement operations of Kaiser Cement Corp. and Lone Star Industries into a 
single firm, and the purchase by SCM Corp. of Gulf & Western’s titanium dioxide manufacturing facilities 
in Ashtabula, Ohio, involved horizontal mergers that were not challenged by antitrust authorities.  In order 
to use the effect of the mergers on price as a measure of their effect on competition, the authors chose cases 
that involved essentially homogeneous products, thus minimizing the issue of competition in dimensions 
other than price.  The study was designed, in part, to assess criticism that merger enforcement was too lax 
during the 1980s and to identify any areas where the FTC’s merger analysis might need revision.13
                                                     
8  For example, in one case in the energy sector, remedies were ordered soon after significant liberalization 
measures had been introduced.  See Ibid., p. 16. 
  The 
study found a mix of results with likely pro-competitive outcomes in cement and paperboard, and a 
potentially large anti-competitive effect in titanium dioxide.  As a collection of case studies, the research 
9  Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
10  Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
11  European Commission Press Release dated October 21, 2005, “Mergers: Commission analysis of past 
merger remedies provides guidance for future cases”, available online at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1327&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
12  Laurence Schuman, Robert P. Rogers and James D. Reitzes, Case Studies of the Price Effects of  
Horizontal Mergers, FTC Bureau of Economics, April 1992, available online at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/232213.pdf.  
13  See “60 Minutes with the Honourable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,” 61 
Antitrust L. J. 187 1992-1993, p. 198. 
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was not intended to offer general conclusions about the efficacy of antitrust enforcement, but, nevertheless, 
was intended to provide insights that could inform future decision making.14
In 1999, the FTC Bureau of Competition released a study on merger remedies which evaluated the 
results of a study of divestiture orders entered between 1990 and 1994, including 35 orders in which asset 
divestitures--including licensing of intellectual property--were required.
 
15
The Divestiture Study findings confirm that feasible divestitures play a constructive role in the 
overall merger review process. That is especially true if the merger itself is likely to lead to 
efficiencies that ultimately benefit consumers. It remains true, however, that some kinds of 
proposed divestitures and other restructuring are unlikely to preserve competition in the market 
where the proposed merger would produce anti-competitive effects.
  The study found that most 
divestitures were successful and appeared to have created viable competitors in the markets with which the 
Commission was concerned.  As then-Chairman Robert Pitofsky stated: 
16
In 2004, the FTC Bureau of Economics released a study, “The Petroleum Industry: Mergers, 
Structural Change, and Antitrust Enforcement”,
 
17 updating two earlier FTC studies on mergers and 
structural change in the U.S. Petroleum industry.  Reviewing industry developments since the 1980s, the 
report found, among other things, that mergers have contributed to the restructuring of the petroleum 
industry but have had only a limited impact on industry concentration.  There have been some increases in 
industry concentration at certain levels of the industry such as refining and gasoline marketing, but 
concentration for most levels of the industry had remained low to moderate.  Economies of scale had 
become increasingly important in shaping the industry, although the incentives for firms to be vertically 
integrated throughout all or most levels of production and distribution had diminished.  By studying 
industry trends, including merger enforcement activity in the petroleum industry, the report’s intent was to 
further understanding of the petroleum industry and the factors that influence prices and other market 
outcomes in the industry.18
2.4 United Kingdom 
  Although the study was industry specific, the type of exercise could be applied 
more generally to the merger review context as well. 
In 2005, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Competition Commission (CC) released a report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC) titled, 
“Ex post evaluation of mergers”,19
                                                     
14  Laurence Schuman, Robert P. Rogers and James D. Reitzes, Case Studies of the Price Effects of Horizontal 
Mergers, FTC Bureau of Economics, April 1992, p. viii, available online at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/232213.pdf. 
 which provided an ex post evaluation of ten mergers between 1990 and 
2001.  All ten case studies were mergers that had been cleared after second phase CC review.  The analysis 
15 A Study of the Commission's Divestiture Process, prepared by the Staff of the Bureau of Competition of the 
Federal Trade Commission (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf. 
16 Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, Address Before Cutting Edge 
Antitrust Conference Law Seminars International (Feb. 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.shtm. 
17  FTC Bureau of Economics, The Petroleum Industry: Mergers, Structural Change, and Antitrust Enforcement, 
August 2004, available online at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/08/040813mergersinpetrolberpt.pdf.  
18  Ibid., p. 16. 
19  “Ex post evaluation of mergers: A report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading, Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Competition Commission by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP”, March 2005, available 
online at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft767.pdf.  
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was based largely on interviews with market participants in order to determine how the market had 
changed since the merger, with a particular focus on interviewing customers of the merging parties.  The 
report noted that studying mergers that were cleared by the CC is useful in three respects: (1) it enables us 
to test, ex post, the CC’s belief that the merger would not substantially lessen competition; (2) if there has 
not been a substantial lessening of competition, it enables us to test whether this was for the reasons that 
formed the basis of the merger review decision, or whether other competitive constraints were more 
important; and (3) if there has been a lessening of competition, it allows us to examine how, and how 
quickly, market participants respond (e.g. in terms of new entry, revising purchasing strategies, etc.)20
3. Key choices on methodology 
 
The studies above illustrate some of the key choices that need to be made regarding the design and 
methodologies underpinning an ex post assessment of merger reviews.  Some of the key decisions that 
must be made in designing such studies include: (1) who should undertake the study (i.e., internal staff vs. 
external consultants); (2) which cases should be included in the analysis; (3) what is the right balance 
between quantitative and qualitative analysis; (4) how frequently should such studies be undertaken; and 
(5) to what extent should the analysis and/or conclusions be made publicly available.  The various studies 
to date have employed a range of methodologies and, going forward, it is clear that there is no “one size 
fits all” strategy that would be appropriate for all competition law enforcement agencies in all 
circumstances.  The key to making the most of an opportunity to assess merger decisions ex post is to 
approach the exercise in an open-minded manner that will allow for lessons to be drawn from past 
decisions in order to better inform future decision making. 
When designing such studies it is important to consider the possibility that, in certain instances, 
merger control may have been overly interventionist and that some transactions which may not have been 
detrimental were blocked or subject to unduly harsh remedies.  Similarly, it may be particularly useful to 
consider examining past cases which were evaluated differently by different agencies to determine 
whether, with the benefit of hindsight, there may be lessons to be learned by the respective agencies.  
Where applicable, such lessons should be used to develop and refine merger review guidelines to ensure 
that the analytical tools and approaches mandated by such guidelines lead to appropriate results. 
4. Conclusion 
While the prospective nature of merger review presents competition authorities with the challenge of 
having to predict future developments, ex post analyses involve a number of challenges, as well – 
particularly because of the dynamic nature of markets.  That is, even with the benefit of hindsight, 
determining causation between merger decisions and subsequent developments is complicated by the fact 
that market conditions change with time, often quite quickly.  Nevertheless, it is a laudable exercise, 
especially when approached with a willingness to learn from both past mistakes and successes, and 
provided that the exercise does not impose significant burdens on the parties to a prior transaction. 
Tradeoffs exist between the different methodological approaches underpinning such studies and each 
methodological choice has its own strengths and weaknesses.  Given the relative infrequency that such 
studies have been conducted to date, this is an area where the sharing of information and past experiences 
among competition law authorities around the world would be of tremendous value.  In this way, 
competition law authorities can pool their experiences and knowledge with a view to improving their 
ability to identify which transactions should be cleared as expeditiously as possible and which transactions 
warrant remedial action.  For transactions in the latter category, competition law authorities can also learn 
from one another as to what kinds of remedial action are most effective and appropriate.  Moreover, 
                                                     
20  Ibid., p. 1. 
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sharing information with the broader public, to the extent possible, would also be beneficial in promoting 
public understanding of and maintaining public confidence in the work being done by competition law 
authorities. 
While competition agencies generally have conducted ex post assessments of merger decisions on an 
ad hoc basis, BIAC recommends, as an international best practice, that agencies conduct such assessments 
on a regular, pre-determined basis, using wide, representative samples of merger decisions.  The 
methodology chosen for such reviews should be sufficiently flexible to take into account the differing 
priorities of and resources available to any given competition agency.  Ideally, however, once an agency 
settles upon a methodology, that methodology should remain roughly consistent over time (allowing for 
fine tuning and incremental improvement) so that results from different time periods can be compared to 
one another.  This would allow agencies to track progress over time, helping to ensure that enforcement 
policy is neither too lax nor too interventionist, and helping to ensure that remedies, when implemented, 
are suitably tailored to achieve their stated objectives without imposing undue burdens on businesses.  
Consideration should also be given to the use of independent assessments of past merger decisions, as 
opposed to competition agencies relying solely on self-evaluation.  Such independent assessments could 
provide an additional, constructive perspective which could be used to improve the merger review process 
on an ongoing basis. 
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IMPACT EVALUATION OF MERGER DECISIONS 
 
By Mr. Oliver Budzinski *
1.  The impact of merger decisions 
 
Competition is a self-organized, decentralized coordination process. It coordinates suppliers and 
customers on markets through price signals reflecting changing scarcities. Without requiring individual 
knowledge on overall allocation issues and without requiring the individual goal to balance supply and 
demand, competition sets incentives for both market sides to adjust the individual supply and demand 
plans according to the scarcity relations just by acting self-interested (profit and utility maximization). 
Consequently, allocative efficiency is achieved through individual interaction in competition and without 
intervention or ex ante planning by any centralized authority (government, economic planning 
commission, etc.). Furthermore, competition provides incentives for producers and other suppliers to 
innovate. Only in competitive marketplaces, firms can benefit from being innovative by dragging 
customers away from competing firms and increasing their own market shares. At the same time, non-
innovative firms must fear that more innovative competitors drag their customers away by providing 
innovative products or services better suiting the preferences of customers. This ‘double incentive’ adds on 
the intrinsic motivation to innovate because of engineering curiosity and, thus, considerably increases the 
incentives to innovate compared to non-competitive ‘market’ places. Further on, this innovation effect of 
competition is turned into a permanent incentive by the incentive to imitate innovators. This entails the 
procompetitive effect of allowing only temporary competitive advantages through innovation, maintaining 
the incentive to further innovate for hitherto successful innovators. Next to the allocation effect (stationary 
efficiency) and the innovation effect (dynamic efficiency), competition keeps markets flexible and creates 
and maintains a high ability of markets to adapt to changing market environments. Firms (and customers) 
in competitive markets are trained to adjust their business behavior creatively and adaptively to each other 
(strategic interdependency) and, thus, are better capable of coping with external shocks (changing market 
environment) than firms in non-competitive settings (evolutionary efficiency). Through all three avenues, 
competition serves the normative goal of increasing economic welfare. 
In addition to these economic welfare-related competition effects, there is one more effect relating to 
societal goals. Competition is inevitably intertwined with economic freedom. Having competition among 
suppliers requires the freedom of choice on the side of the customers as well as the freedom to choose 
strategies (pricing, innovation, product design, service, industry, etc.) on the side of the enterprises. And, 
the other way around, economic freedom for enterprises and customers automatically and inevitably 
creates competition. 
All these beneficial effects of competition are achieved in a decentralized and self-organized way in 
the absence of centralized, political economic planning or organization. However, the notion of free 
markets unleashing the beneficial forces of competition is also misleading to some extent. Competitive 
                                                     
*  This paper was prepared by Prof. Oliver Budzinski, Professor of Competition and Sports Economics and 
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markets require an institutional framework in order to be sustainable and workable and this makes them a 
social construction. Among the institutional preconditions for competitive markets are property rights, 
commercial laws and many more. Among the necessary institutions for the sustainable existence and 
functioning of competitive markets are competition rules. Unfortunately, competition possesses an inherent 
tendency towards self-destruction. Instead of aiming to be better than its competitors, any enterprise can 
alternatively attempt to improve its market situation by eroding competition, for instance by colluding with 
its competitors (cartelization), predating and deterring competitors (abuse of market power and unfair 
competition) or by merging with its competitors into one entity (mergers and acquisitions). This incentive 
to circumvent and erode the forces of competition requires competition rules and its enforcement through 
competition policy. Therefore, the ‘impact’ of merger decisions (as part of competition policy) should be to 
protect and maintain competition by preventing the occurrence of anticompetitive mergers. As such merger 
decisions should exercise a low degree of interventionism into markets by ‘just’ preventing anticompetitive 
combinations of enterprise ownership (negative intervention). In contrast, merger decisions should not 
attempt to design or mould competitive market structures (positive, creative intervention).1
Now, in an imperfect world, merger decisions can be mistaken. Although the task at hand might look 
easy at first sight – procompetitive or anticompetitive, harm to competition or not – it is made rather 
complicated by the multidimensional character of competition (allocation, innovation, diversity, etc.). 
Competition can be harmed in many ways: price increases and output reduction, slowing down innovation, 
making markets more sclerotic, etc. From an economic theory perspective, it cannot be discriminated 
between the different dimensions of competition regarding their importance for overall welfare. The fact 
that emphasis of analysis and policy is oftentimes more put on prices and quantities (allocative efficiency) 
merely follows practical limitations regarding measurability and assessability of the other dimensions. In 
summary, the question when a merger has a negative impact on competition is far away from being trivial! 
 
Consequently, merger decisions can be wrong in two different ways: (i) merger decisions may 
erroneously allow anticompetitive mergers (type II errors), or (ii) merger decisions may erroneously 
prohibit procompetitive mergers (type I errors). Both error types change the impact of merger decisions. In 
case of type II errors, the merger decision fails to protect competition on the market in question. In case of 
type I errors, the merger decision represents an unnecessary intervention into competition and efficiency 
effects of procompetitive mergers may be discarded. 
2.  Methods of ex post impact evaluation 
2.1  Controlling of merger policy 
Merger control decisions are ex ante decisions. They attempt to estimate the effect that a notified 
merger will have on the underlying markets if it was cleared by the competition authority. If we assume 
that competition authorities aim to make correct merger decisions in the sense of avoiding both type I and 
type II errors, then an ex post evaluation of past merger decisions represents an instrument to improve 
future decisions by learning from past mistakes. As soon as merger effects display sufficient regularities 
(i.e. mergers do not represent unique single events), such a controlling of merger policy possesses the 
potential of beneficial improvements of merger decisions and, thus, welfare2
                                                     
1  Drawing the borderline between these two types of intervention may at times be difficult in practice, for 
instance, when it comes to conditional approvals of mergers. 
. 
2  Note that although competition authorities usually follow some type of welfare goal, the specificity of the 
welfare goal can differ, for instance and most famously between a consumer welfare standard and a total 
welfare standard. Also, goals like public interest or freedom of competition at least implicitly target a 
welfare goal, albeit through intermediate goals. 
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However, conducting an ex post impact evaluation of merger decisions is not automatically 
advantageous. A disadvantage occurs if many decisions of a competition authority are found to have been 
erroneous. Firstly, this may damage the reputation of the authority and, thereby, harming the deterrence 
effect of competition rules and policies as well as the acceptance of future merger decisions by the norm 
addressees. Secondly, the question of damage claims by enterprises (type I errors) or by customers and 
competitors (type II errors) being harmed by an erroneous decision must be taken into consideration 
(depending on the jurisdiction in question). Furthermore, it must be considered that evaluation results set 
incentives for competition authorities for the future selection of cases, possibly entailing a selection bias: 
rational agencies experience incentives to go for the easy options, i.e. cases with a high probability of 
receiving enforcement success and positive ex post evaluation (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 40).  
Another important disadvantage occurs if agencies rely on unreliable evaluation methods, displaying 
erroneous results regarding the accuracy of past merger decisions. Then, the decision quality could actually 
deteriorate as a consequence of learning from to the deficient ex post evaluation. In contrast to science, the 
rule ‘bad or weak information is still better than no information’ does not hold here since the information 
triggers a behavioral response (Neven & Zenger 2008) by the competition authorities. Therefore, any ex 
post impact evaluation must guarantee a sufficient reliability of its results. In other words, reliability 
becomes a knock-out criterion for the usability of any given evaluation method. Given a sufficient 
minimum reliability, additional criteria can be applied to comparatively evaluate the usefulness of ex post 
evaluation methods for competition authorities wanting to engage in systematic ex post evaluations of their 
merger decisions. 
2.1.1 Method evaluation categories 
• Reliability of results: competence of the method to identify decision errors. This is a prior 
category (knock-out criterion); any method that fails to meet a minimum reliability cannot be 
recommended.  
• Applicability: can the method be applied to all types of cases, all types of markets, etc.? 
• Agency resource intensity: what are the resource requirements of applying the method for the 
agency (“costs” of applying the method)?  
• Academic mainstream: acceptance of a method within economics science (‘mainstream’); for 
instance, number of (ranked) publications, etc. 
In contrast to other studies, these evaluation categories partly possess a hierarchical structure. 
Buccirossi et al. (2008: 464) argue that ex post evaluation “techniques cannot be ranked, as each has its 
advantages and drawbacks”; “they are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible, or even advisable, to use 
more than one simultaneously in order to minimize the probability of errors in the evaluation” (465). 
However, if a technique is not reliable to minimum standards, it cannot contribute to better evaluation – 
even within a mix of instruments. Quite in contrast, it actually jeopardizes any beneficial effect of an ex 
post impact evaluation and might even generate harmful effects (increase in type I and type II errors). This 
danger is particularly high if the feasibility bias comes into play: a comparatively unreliable but cheap and 
easy-to-do technique is likely to get an inappropriate high weight in practice because of economics of 
administration. For these reasons, reliability becomes the accentuated position of being a knock-out 
criterion: a failure in reliability cannot be compensated by a good performance in the other categories, for 
instance, it does not help that any given method can be easily applied with very few resources required if 
the results are not sufficiently reliable! 
The scientific mainstream criterion, on the other hand, resumes a downward position within the 
category hierarchy, since the frequency of method appearance in the scientific literature, inter alia, follows 
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motivations that need not go along with the goals of ex post impact evaluation of merger decisions (e.g. 
writing papers that are publishable in high-ranked academic journals for career considerations).3
The main methods that are available for conducting ex post impact evaluation of merger decisions can 
be summarized in the following types: 
 
• structural models and simulations, 
• difference-in-differences (DiD) approaches,  
• event studies, and 
• surveys. 
These methods are analyzed in the following sections according to the evaluation categories 
developed in this section. 
2.2 Structural models and simulations 4
This method of ex post impact evaluation is based on (i) an explicit formal model of the nature of 
competition in the relevant market(s) of the merger, (ii) calibrating this model with real world data, and 
(iii) an assessment how the actual equilibrium would change if a counterfactual scenario (e.g. merger vs. 
no merger; remedy x vs. remedy y, etc.) is simulated (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 12).
 
5
2.2.1 Reliability 
  
The main advantage of this method is its reliance on a sound and up-to-date game-theoretical 
foundation (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14; Budzinski 2011). Furthermore, the 
accuracy of the underlying model can be tested through the calibration with real market data. This is in 
particular true for an ex post analysis. Only a fine-tuned calibration of the estimated model to the 
characteristics of the underlying market will reproduce the actual market development (Buccirossi et al. 
2008: 465). In contrast to ex ante simulation where the extrapolation of the pre-merger market model to the 
– at the time of the decision – hypothetical post-merger equilibrium generates several shortcomings 
regarding the predictive power of simulation models (Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010; Budzinski 2011), ex post 
simulation alleviates many of these limitations. Insofar, criticism that this method requires a large set of 
assumptions whose fit to the actual market is sensitive for the reliability of the results (Buccirossi et al. 
2008: 466; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14) appears to be more fitting to ex ante simulations as to ex post 
simulations. This can actually be controlled rather well. Furthermore, the accuracy of the assumptions 
made at the time of the decision/intervention by the competition authority can be evaluated with this 
method (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14).  
                                                     
3  Due to space limitations, this criterion is left out in this paper version. It will be included in a forthcoming, 
substantial longer version. 
4  For overviews, see Buccirossi et al. (2008: 465-466); Budzinski & Ruhmer (2010: 312-314); Davies & 
Ormosi (2010: 12-15). For applications (examples), see Nevo (2000); Pinske & Slade (2004); Peters 
(2006); Weinberg & Hosken (2008). 
5  Merger simulations may also be used by the competition authority when deciding upon a merger 
(overview: Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). These ex ante simulations serve to predict the post-merger 
equilibrium, whereas ex post simulation compares the actual post-merger decision market equilibrium with 
counterfactual equilibria. 
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However, this is strictly true only for the actual market development. In order to assess whether the 
merger decision has been correct, the actual post-merger development must be compared to a 
counterfactual. It is one of the advantages of this method that it allows for simulating alternative scenarios 
(counterfactuals), corresponding to different changes in the underlying market environment (Buccirossi et 
al. 2008: 465). To some limited extent, the pre-merger market may provide guidance for the 
counterfactuals, however, more accurately, the model should be used to simulate alternative post-decision 
scenarios. These simulations, then, rely on the assumption that the underlying competition model would 
have been the same if the counterfactual scenarios actually happened. While this assumption may be true 
for many cases, it is well possible that a big merger impacts a market to an extent that it changes the 
fundamental nature of competition (Budzinski 2011). 
In this context, it certainly is a shortcoming of this method that a reliable evaluation requires the 
underlying market to match one of the popular standard models of modern oligopoly economics, in 
particular the game-theoretic homogeneous Cournot oligopoly model (quantity competition with rather 
homogenous goods) or the game-theoretic heterogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model (price competition 
with differentiated products). If real-market competition differs from these standard models, the reliability 
of evaluation results suffers. Furthermore and therefore, ex post evaluation of merger decisions through 
structural models and simulation focuses on price and quantity effects. It tends to neglect other dimensions 
of competition, like innovation, repositioning, structural breaks, market entry, etc. (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 
14; Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). In particular, the inclusion of several of these dimensions and the 
interaction between the dimensions represent a near-to-impossible task (Budzinski 2011).  
If done seriously and with a view to the limitations, however, structural models and ex post simulation 
produce reliable results, providing valuable insights in the accuracy of merger control decisions from an ex 
post perspective. 
2.2.2 Applicability 
The applicability range is firstly limited by the requirement that the relevant markets must be 
sufficiently matched by available structural models. As a result, the simulation method is skewed towards 
certain types of markets and suffers from a likely sample selection bias (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14). 
Secondly, the extensive and ambitious data requirements regarding quantity and quality further narrow 
down the number of cases where this method can be applied for ex post evaluations (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 
466; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14). Furthermore, this method is said to be not applicable to cases involving 
behavioral remedies as a special type of merger clearances under conditions or with commitments 
(Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465-466). In summary, the restrictions regarding applicability are considerable.  
2.2.3 Resource intensity 
Structural modeling and simulation probably represents the most sophisticated method to assess 
competitive impacts. Moreover, the evaluation must be done on a case-by-case level. Consequently, it 
requires extensive agency resources to either engage in producing this type of ex post evaluations or 
commission respective studies. A full-blown ex post merger decision impact analysis involves high-end 
economic expertise, time-intensive data collection and generation as well as in most cases comprehensive 
cooperation from companies within the relevant market. While the latter can normally be enforced in the 
context of a merger decision without considerable problems, any cooperation of companies regarding ex 
post analyses is voluntary and may require some compensation.6
                                                     
6  This is different, of course, if a competition policy regime can mandate companies to cooperate in ex post 
analyses. 
 Notwithstanding, simplified simulation 
approaches have been and are being developed (‘back-of-the-envelope simulations’) in order to reduce the 
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resource intensity and data requirements. However, there is trade-off between ease of applicability and 
precision of estimated results (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465). 
2.3 Difference-in-Differences7
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methods encompass roughly all methods that evaluate a merger 
control decision by comparing the post-decision performance of fundamental market data (like prices or 
market shares) with (i) the pre-decision market development and (ii) a control market, which is sufficiently 
similar to the relevant market but unaffected by the event (the merger control decision). Many studies 
belonging to this method are direct econometric analysis of price and market share evolution with the 
control market serving to isolate the impact of the merger control decision from other influences on prices 
and market shares (often called ‘external shocks’).  
 
2.3.1 Reliability 
The charm of DiD methods is that they analyze actual observed data from the relevant product 
market. Thus, it represents an analysis of what actually happened on the post-decision market. Moreover, 
the counterfactual is also real and does not depend on untestable and restrictive (or even heroic) theoretical 
assumptions (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 22). However, the sensitive problem is to find a suitable control 
group (markets, companies, etc.) that is (i) close enough to the relevant market in order to display the same 
‘external’ influences but (ii) sufficiently far away not to be influenced by the event (the merger control 
decision). Furthermore, the same ‘external’ influences must also exert the same impact on prices (etc.) in 
the relevant market and in the control market (Simpson & Schmidt 2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 21-22). 
While this is often challenging, modern econometric techniques provide suitable instruments to alleviate 
these problems – albeit, not erasing them.  
Another issue with DiD methods is that they are inherently atheoretical (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 22-
23). While this is a disadvantage in terms of understanding and learning from the evaluation results, it 
represents an advantage to the extent that complex competition dimensions that are rarely incorporated into 
modeling and simulation are implicitly accounted for by ‘just’ measuring the actual effects. However, this 
is only true to the extent that these competition dimensions (dynamic and evolutionary efficiencies of the 
competitive process) are reflected in measurable variables, like prices, elasticities, measures for the number 
and variety of products, etc.  
2.3.2 Applicability 
The applicability is firstly constrained by the requirement of the existence of a sufficiently appropriate 
control group (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 23). Secondly, it is much more difficult to ex post evaluate merger 
prohibitions with this method compared to cleared mergers wherefore a selection bias to analyzing 
clearances is likely to occur. Counterfactuals can be more easily constructed with cleared mergers because 
the market development prior and after the merger provides guidance for evaluation (prior to the merger 
the counterfactual actually existed, albeit at a different point in time). In contrast, in case of prohibited 
mergers, the market development does not provide much guidance. How the market would have been with 
the merger cannot be inferred from any real situation, neither from the pre-decision period, nor from a 
control market (Neven & Zenger 2008: 478). 
                                                     
7  For overviews, see Bergman (2008: 394-396); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 466-467); Weinberg (2008); Davies 
& Ormosi (2010: 20-24). For applications (examples), see Ashenfelter & Hosken (2011); Ashenfelter et al. 
(2011); Dobson & Piga (2011); Tenn & Yunn (2011). 
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On the other hand, from a data availability perspective, the range of applicability is rather 
comprehensive since the required data should be comparatively easily collectable for most markets. In 
summary, the most severe restriction appears to be the bias towards merger clearance decisions and, thus, 
towards detecting type-II errors (false allowances). 
2.3.3 Resource intensity 
Like structural modeling and simulations, DiD methods must be done on a case-by-case level and 
require sophisticated econometric knowledge. However, DiD analyses enjoy the advantage that they 
require comparatively fewer resources than simulations because of their atheoretical character (no 
sophisticated modeling is required) and the laxer data requirements. Furthermore, cooperation with 
companies in the market is usually not needed. 
2.4 Event studies8
The basic concept behind event studies is that welfare effects of horizontal mergers can be evaluated 
by looking at the stock price reactions (abnormal returns) of the willing-to-merger companies (Ellert 1976) 
and, in particular, of the rivals of the merging firms (Eckbo 1983). In a nutshell, an increase in rivals’ share 
prices implies an anticompetitive merger (price-increasing), a decrease implies a procompetitive merger 
(efficiency-enhancing). 
 
2.4.1 Reliability 
The event study method crucially relies on the efficient financial markets hypothesis (EFMH): if 
financial markets work perfectly and all actors on these markets act perfectly rational (actually: hyper-
rational) under perfect information (or at least under full knowledge of all relevant information), then share 
prices instantly reflect the ‘true’ values to investors. Thus, changes in stock prices that occur as a reaction 
to merger decision-related events (merger announcement, announcement of investigation by competition 
authority, merger control decision) reveal the respective market assessment, which under the condition of 
the EFMH can be thought of reflecting unbiased and superior (‘inside’) information. However, the 
plausibility of the EFMH is questionable at best. Neither do agents on financial markets act hyper-rational, 
nor do the markets in total reflect superior knowledge about competitive effects that, furthermore, at the 
time of the stock market reaction lie in the future. The implausibility and fundamental flaws of the EFMH, 
actually well-accepted in modern financial economics, alone render this method inappropriate to base 
policy decision on it. 
However, the reliability is further put into doubt (if still possible) by a couple of additional problems. 
For instance, ambiguities in interpreting the observed stock price changes (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 18), 
anticipation of events and their employment for evaluation purposes by the stock markets (especially if the 
EFMH would hold), and the unclear causal relationship of stock market movements with merger 
announcements and control decisions (Neven & Zenger 2008: 487). The fields of business activity that are 
affected by the merger decision must have a sufficiently high importance within the merging companies, 
which are oftentimes multi-product and multi-subsidiary-companies (i.e. groups of companies or 
concerns), whereas non-prohibition merger control decisions (which is the vast majority of decisions) 
usually merely affects few of the market involved. Furthermore, many studies assume a price-umbrella 
effect: rivals’ profits benefit from an anticompetitive merger because of the ‘rule of one price’. The price 
                                                     
8  For overviews, see Bergman (2008: 392-394); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 467-469); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 
15-20). For applications (examples), see Ellert (1976); Eckbo (1983, 1992); Stillman (1983); Eckbo & Wier 
(1985); Aktas, Bodt & Roll (2007); Duso, Neven & Röller (2007); Diepold et al. (2008); Serdarević & 
Teplý (2009); Duso, Gugler & Szücs (2010); Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2011).  
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for all companies in the market increases. In contrast, rivals’ profits suffer from a procompetitive merger 
because the merged entity is more efficient now. However, this refers to a specific oligopoly model 
(quantity competition with homogeneous goods) that (i) hardly reflects the nature of competition in many 
merger markets (heterogeneous product markets) and (ii) may not be the way that financial markets’ agents 
think about competitive effects from mergers. Consequently, a sound theoretical foundation, rooted in 
modern competition economics, is missing. 
Eventually, stock price reactions to merger announcements do not actually represent an ex post 
evaluation as they happen before or at the time of the merger decision. With the exception of the stock 
market reactions to the final merger control decision, the information is available to competition authorities 
during the decision process.9
In summary, the event study method fails to meet the knock-out criterion of providing a sufficient 
minimum reliability. There is no indication that financial market reactions represent an accurate prediction 
of the competitive effects, however, there is ample indication to the contrary. 
  
2.4.2 Applicability 
The applicability is promoted by easy-to-access data (stock market prices). An obvious – but also 
practically relevant – limitation is that merging companies and their rivals need to be stock market 
companies with a sufficient trade volume and frequency (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 20). Furthermore, non-
horizontal mergers are difficult to assess because of the many and ambiguous ways that anticompetitive or 
procompetitive effects can affect the relevant markets. 
2.4.3 Resource intensity 
Event studies can be done on large samples of mergers and without looking into many case details 
they can still provide results about type I and type II errors on a case level. The event study method does 
require econometric expertise. However, the easy access to data and the lack of theoretical modeling imply 
that comparatively few resources are needed to conduct these studies. Furthermore, cooperation with 
companies in the market is not needed. 
2.5  Surveys10
Survey-based ex post impact evaluations are merger decision reviews based on follow-up 
questionnaires and/or interviews. Two types can be distinguished. Firstly, the opinions and perceptions of 
involved companies (merging parties, competitors, suppliers, customers, etc.) and other interested parties 
are collected. Secondly, surveys among experts, peers and/or among practitioners can be conducted. 
 
2.5.1 Reliability 
The economics rationale behind conducting survey-based impact evaluations is rooted in information 
asymmetries. If market participants in the first type or experts and peers in the second type have superior 
explicit and/or tacit (ex post) knowledge about the impact of a merger decision on the underlying 
competitive process, then questionnaires and interviews serve to collect and reveal this knowledge to the 
                                                     
9  Competition authorities have additional information (internal documents, etc.) and are better informed than 
the stock market. Thus, they may decide deliberately and for a reason not to follow stock market reactions 
(Neven & Zenger 2008: 487). 
10  For overviews, see Buccirossi et al. (2008: 469-470); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 24-25). For applications, 
see PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005); Deloitte (2009). 
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evaluators. The nature of the asymmetric information implies an atheoretical character of this method, 
which at the same time means that all types of competitive effects, whether quantitatively measurable or 
not, can be potentially be captured. 
On the downside, surveys depend on the assumption that insiders and/or experts (i) actually have 
superior information and (ii) are willing to offer these information without strategic distortions. The danger 
of a respondent bias is particularly high in the case of market participants because they will rationally 
anticipate that their information influences future merger control decisions. At first sight, expert 
commentaries should be less prone to respondent bias, however, this is only true when the expert has no 
party interest and is not looking for future assignments either from norm addressees or the competition 
authority. 
Another issue refers to the number of potential survey participants. Since individual opinions are 
rather likely to suffer from strategic or cognitive perception biases, a sufficiently large number of potential 
respondents is required. Regarding expert commentaries, this implies that case reviews by single experts 
are less valuable than surveys among a larger number of experts. 
2.5.2 Applicability 
This method is applicable to all types of merger cases and demands virtually no data requirements. 
Thus, this method can also be applied when virtually no ‘hard’ data is available (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 
469). The applicability may be limited because of low respondent rates, however. Although this method 
has so far predominantly been done to assess the total performance of a competition authority 
(benchmarking, best practices) and not to evaluate merger decision on a case level (Davies & Ormosi 
2010: 25), both types (insider-based and experts-based surveys) can also be applied to evaluate single 
cases. Once the relevant questionnaires are available, it is comparatively easy to repeat the survey, so that 
this method is also realistically dynamically applicable in order to capture more long-run effects and 
changes. 
2.5.3 Resource Intensity 
Developing questionnaires, conducting interviews, motivating respondents and professionally 
analyzing the responses require manpower and statistical expert knowledge. However, the resource 
intensity is comparatively low. 
3.  Conclusions and recommendations 
With a view to the potential benefits and pitfalls of ex post evaluations of the impact of merger 
control decisions, two main problem areas must be considered: 
• the danger of employment of insufficiently reliable methods, and 
• excessive expectations from and/or interpretations of evaluations. 
The first issue, employment of insufficiently reliable methods, highlights the higher importance of 
minimum reliability standards for employed methods compared to applicability and resource intensity 
arguments. Obviously, all methods can be designed and executed in inaccurate and insufficient ways. 
Therefore, this is not the issue at hand. Instead, the question is whether any method in question produces 
minimum reliable results given a serious and accurate employment. Since all described methods display 
strengths and weakness, the literature consequently favors employing a method-mix (Buccirossi et al. 
2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 25-26). While Davies and Ormosi (2010) emphasize the benefits of 
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employing alternative methods to the same cases in order to learn from differences in the assessment, 
Buccirossi et al. (2008) put a stronger focus on relating the methods to case types that suit their individual 
strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, they emphasize the role of surveys. “Whenever feasible, a survey 
should always be carried out to add insights and help the interpretation of the results obtained through 
other techniques, as well as to investigate some aspects of the development of a market that are difficult to 
understand from hard data” (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 469). While principally agreeing to advocate methods-
mixes, my analysis deviates from the results of the previous literature by rejecting the event study method 
due to a lack of reliability (see section 2.4). As argued in section 2.1, if a technique is not sufficiently 
minimum reliable, it cannot contribute to better evaluation within any method-mix. Instead, it might 
generate harmful effects (increase in type I and type II errors), in particular if combined with a feasibility 
bias. 
The second issue deals with expectations about impact evaluation results and their interpretation. 
Since neither perfect methods nor a perfect method-mix are available, a cautious approach towards ex post 
evaluation of merger decisions seems appropriate.11
It is more beneficial to conduct ex post merger decision impact evaluations with a focus on broad 
learning about all the effects of these decisions (irrespective of contemporary decision constraints for the 
authority) in order to generate knowledge about improving the merger control framework and the actual 
decision practice. As this implies ‘learning from many cases for general policy’ instead of attempting to 
‘conclude from single cases to other single cases’. Such an approach is also a better fit to the capacities of 
the available evaluation methods. For instance, if a result of many case studies is that anticompetitive 
mergers are allowed because the standard of proof and the allocation of the burden to proof are too 
ambitious for the competition authority to succeed in blocking such mergers, then consequences for the 
rules about proof standards and burdens should be drawn. I would be dissatisfying ‘only’ to conclude that 
the competition authority committed no mistakes because it had no choice but to allow the anticompetitive 
merger due to institutional flaws outside its competence. 
 It should focus on generating knowledge and learning 
about actual effects of merger decisions. However, the focus should be not so much on counting mistakes 
or successes of competition authorities. Instead, it should focus on how both the merger control framework 
and the decision practices can be improved for future decisions. The reason for this shift in focus is 
threefold. Firstly, attempting to record the past mistake-success-balance of competition authorities requires 
to strictly acknowledge the original constraints for the decision (timeframes, available resources, available 
information, institutional flaws, standard of proofs, etc.). If an ‘erroneous’ decision was due to such 
constraints, the competition authority cannot really be blamed. However, secondly, such an approach 
overburdens the available methods and, moreover, limits the learning potential from ex post evaluations. 
Thirdly, if ex post evaluation is driven by the desire of external accountability of the competition authority, 
then a rational behavioral response of the authority would be to maximize evaluation success instead of 
consumer or social welfare.  
                                                     
11  Much in the same spirit, Davies and Ormosi (2010: 26) emphasize the problems, shortcomings and 
limitations of all available evaluation methods rather than the merits and demand further research. 
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THE NEXT STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EX POST EVALUATION OF MERGER 
REVIEW PROCEDURES: TOWARDS MORE UNIFORM METHODOLOGIES  
WITH STAGED OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
By Mr. Andrew I. Gavil *
1. Introduction 
 
There is now a rich body of commentary touting the benefits of ex post review1 of merger decisions 
by competition law enforcement agencies. Many commentators have argued persuasively that as a matter 
of good practice agencies should be willing to look back at their previous decisions, evaluate the results of 
their work, and utilize the lessons learned to improve future decision-making.2 Ex post review can also 
have broader policy implications if it reveals that the standards imbedded in specific laws, regulations, or 
interpretations used by agencies, systematically over- or under-deter harmful mergers. It is thus broadly 
consistent with the OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance, which include a 
direction that members “[r]eview and strengthen where necessary the scope, effectiveness and enforcement 
of competition policy,”3 and the OECD Recommendation on Competition Assessment.4
Advocates of ex post review identify both “internal” and “external” benefits of the practice. Internally, 
ex post review can build agency capacity. It can also provide valuable feedback on the agency’s 
methodologies and judgments in previous merger reviews, feedback that can be used to inform future 
review, i.e., to improve agency performance. Externally, to the degree it validates the quality of an 
agency’s work product, ex post review can enhance an agency’s authority as a competition advocate, 
promote public acceptance and support for its work and for competition more broadly, and strengthen the 
agency’s case for government funding.
 
5
                                                     
*  This paper was prepared by Mr. Andrew I. Gavil, Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law, 
Washington, D.C. The author wishes to acknowledge the support of Ms. Synda John Mark, Howard 
University School of Law, for her contribution to this report. The views reflected in this paper are the personal 
responsibility of the author.  
 As evidence of this growing consensus, a number of agencies have 
begun to implement ex post review, with some very promising results.  
1  In this Paper, I will refer to “ex post” and “retrospective” review or evaluation interchangeably. 
2  Commissioner William E. Kovacic was an early and vocal advocate of the practice.  See, e.g., William E. 
Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 J. 
Corp. L. 503 (2006); William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of 
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843 (2001).  
3  OECD GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATORY QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/51/37318586.pdf. 
4  For the formal Recommendation, as well as related links, see OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON COMPETITION 
ASSESSMENT, 22 October 2009 - C(2009)130, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_40381664_44080714_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
5   Some concern has also been expressed, however, that transparency in the event of ex post review that 
divulges agency error could have the opposite effect, undermining agency credibility and support. 
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With the emergence of a seemingly high degree of consensus that such reflective, self-review should 
be a “best practice” for any well-functioning agency, attention has turned to the more specific details of 
implementation. What are the best methodologies available for conducting ex-post reviews? What 
conditions tend to optimize the likelihood that ex post review will produce valid results and lessons? How 
can the necessary data be secured? Who will conduct such reviews, independent academics, agency staffs, 
outside consultants, or some combination of these in partnership? How will reflection translate into 
institutional advancement and improved future decision-making? These are the questions that we have 
been charged to address in our Roundtable.6
In this paper, I would like to make three points: 
 
• First, Step 1 in the discussion of retrospective merger evaluation is now complete. There is a 
widespread consensus supporting the value of retrospective review as a “best practice” for 
competition law enforcement agencies. As the Roundtable participants have been invited to do, it 
is time for the competition policy community to move on to “Step 2” -- refining methodologies 
and implementing more uniform and consistent approaches to retrospective review. 
• Second, given the wide range of methodologies available, it would be helpful at this juncture to 
undertake a cooperative, transnational effort to catalogue and synthesize the current “state of the 
art” in retrospective review of mergers. The goal would be to better define and describe various 
techniques, their strengths and weaknesses, and their fit for specific industries, tasks, and data 
sets. The end result could be a “Best Practices Handbook” that could provide a more uniform 
basis for retrospective studies, permitting more cross-border comparisons, and promoting more 
uniform merger review. 
• Third, in moving towards a definition of “best practices,” consideration should be given to the 
specific needs and resource limitations of various competition law enforcement agencies. As has 
been true with respect to the specification of competition law prohibitions and the design of 
competition policy institutions, “one size won’t fit all.” The literature to date and the gathering 
experiences of agencies that have undertaken ex post merger review suggest that it may be 
possible to conceive of varying “levels” or “stages” of review that would be productive, yet 
scaled to the resources and needs of various agencies.  
2. The next step in the development of ex post merger review 
Over the last decade there has been significant growth in both commentary promoting the use of 
retrospective merger evaluations and actual studies. Growth of interest in undertaking such studies has 
paralleled significant advances in the economic analysis of mergers, such as merger simulations, critical 
loss analysis, diversion ratios, and most recently the gross upward pricing pressure index, all of which have 
complemented traditional tools like market definition and presumptions based on levels of market 
concentration.7
                                                     
6  For a survey of  a number of merger retrospective studies conducted in the U.S., see Graeme Hunter, et al., 
Merger Retrospective Studies: A Review, 23-Fall ANTITRUST 34 (2008).  For an additional collection of 
citations to the relevant literature, see Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of Mergers on 
Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin, 53 J.L. & ECON. 417, 423-24 
(2010). 
 These various economic and legal tools all share a common goal: to facilitate the best 
predictions possible of the likely effects of a merger that has yet to occur. Questioning the value of 
7  There may not be any simple, binary choice between old and new methodologies.  For an argument that 
merger simulation models may work best when combined with traditional merger concentration criteria, 
see Oliver Budzinski  & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277 (2010). 
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predictive tools is not a new sport. A great deal of literature exists, for example, questioning the association 
of very high degrees of concentration with anticompetitive performance. Because all of these tools are 
necessarily predictive, it is fair to ask how well they work.  
Consensus has now developed that one way to test both traditional and more modern economic 
approaches is to more frequently conduct retrospective evaluations of agency decisions about mergers. As 
is evident in the charge fashioned by the Roundtable organizers, however, the time is ripe to move beyond 
discussion of whether such reviews are useful, to focus more narrowly on how they can best be done. This 
leads to my first recommendation: that the “next step” in the development of retrospective review should 
be a transnational effort by competition law enforcement agencies to prepare a “best practices” manual. 
The primary goal of such a document would be to help define more uniform methodologies for 
implementing quality ex-post review – to synthesize the current “state of the art.” Such a project could be 
conducted under the auspices of an organization such as the OECD8 or the ICN,9
Reviewing the submissions of the Delegates for this Roundtable, however, it is quickly clear that 
while all agree that ex-post review would be beneficial, a significant number of agencies have not 
undertaken such reviews due to lack of human and financial resources, lack of specific authority, or both. 
Some also report very minimal levels of merger review activity, which means they face both a small 
sampling pool to study and minimal benefits given the costs. In contrast, some of the largest, best-funded, 
agencies with the most experience in conducting merger reviews have embraced wide-ranging evaluation 
programs, sometimes pursuant to government mandates that require them to conduct periodic assessments 
of their work product and to quantify the consumer benefits of their actions. Some of these agencies thus 
go beyond ex post merger analysis to include reviews of agency actions with respect to other kinds of 
potentially anti-competitive conduct.
 or independently. As is 
further discussed in Part II, below, the “deliverable” would define some global standards for effective 
retrospective merger review studies.  
10
An essential question to ask in this next stage of development of the discussion of ex post review, 
therefore, is whether – and if so, how – a range of reasonably valid, standardized models can be developed 
to meet the needs and the budgets of different agencies. Rather than discouraging resource-limited agencies 
from undertaking the effort if they are not able to follow “state-of-the-art” review practices, perhaps more 
simple models could be developed. While not perfect, these “first stage” review models may still be 
instructive and may help to build capacity. The end result would be a more tailored approach to ex post 
review. As part of the effort described above to define best practices for all agencies, one can envision a set 
of options – “modules” – that would be constructed around standardized methodologies of varying 
complexity and requiring different kinds and levels of resources. The various modules might also come 
with training kits that would help guide agencies in implementing the modules. Some examples are 
described below in Part III. 
 While this sort of sophisticated and resource-intensive analysis may 
be a genuine option for the most advanced and well-funded agencies, it may not be a realistic alternative 
for many others.  
                                                     
8  For a possible model, see the Competition Assessment Toolkit that was developed in support of the OECD 
Recommendation on Competition Assessment.  See 
http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3746,en_2649_40381664_42454576_1_1_1_1,00.html 
9  For a possible model for such a guide, see International Competition Network, MARKET STUDIES GOOD 
PRACTICE HANDBOOK (Draft Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc646.pdf. 
10  See, e.g., European Commission, DG Competition Management Plan 2011, Annex 3 (discussing  DG 
Comp “Evaluation Plan”), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/comp_mp.pdf. 
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3. Towards standardized methodologies for ex post merger review 
The initial question in ex post review is “what is to be studied?” In countries that have pre-merger 
notification systems, attention is likely to focus on mergers that have been presented for review through the 
notification process, even though that likely represents but a subset of the general pool of mergers in the 
jurisdiction. Pre-notified mergers can be (1) challenged outright and blocked; (2) permitted outright; or (3) 
permitted with conditions, such as structural adjustments (divestitures) or behavioral restrictions (e.g., 
commitments to continue dealing with rivals or customers on specified terms).11
In some jurisdictions, agencies also have the authority to challenge mergers that are not subject to 
notification “post-consummation.” In those cases, the decision to challenge is likely constructed on post-
merger pricing and other evidence. The methodologies used in post-consummation merger analysis, 
therefore, may be relevant to ex post review of pre-consummation merger enforcement decisions. In either 
instance, the goal will be to compare actual post-merger performance with pre-merger benchmarks. Ex post 
review of post-consummation challenges also might be relevant and helpful in evaluating future decisions 
about whether to initiate additional post-consummation challenges. Such reviews could seek to evaluate 
the ultimate accuracy of arguments asserted by the parties as to both actual effects and efficiencies with the 
benefit of additional resources and a longer time horizon.  
  
Most often, ex post reviews have focused narrowly on specific transactions that were permitted to go 
forward after extensive review.12 But some have also sought to analyze whole industries in which merger 
activity has recently occurred or been proposed.13 Most case studies tend to focus on mergers that were 
permitted, because the counterfactual is in theory readily ascertainable in the form of the pre-merger 
industry. Provided other influences can be isolated, a “before-and-after” study can be attempted to 
determine whether the agency’s decision to permit the merger was correct measured by post-merger price 
effects.14 While the most obvious focus of these studies has been price effects,15 some studies have also 
focused on quality effects, which in one case were urged by the merging parties as a justification for the 
merger when it was undertaken.16 Retrospective studies also can focus on the efficacy of specific remedies 
in transactions permitted to go forward with conditions, such as divestitures.17
                                                     
11  In many jurisdictions, agency discretion is limited by judicial oversight, as with agencies who must seek 
court injunctions to block mergers and agencies whose decisions are subject to judicial review.  In such 
cases, assessment of judicial performance might be an implicit component of ex post evaluation.  
 
12  See supra, note 7 (sources collecting many examples). 
13  See, e.g., Viola Chen, FTC Working Paper No. 297, The Evolution of the Baby Food Industry 2000-2008 
(Apr. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp297.pdf (studying the baby food industry 
following the government’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of Beech-Nut and Heinz, but 
specifically reserving judgment on the likely path of the industry had the merger been permitted to go 
forward); Joseph Farrell, et al., Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on 
Hospitals, 35 REV. INDUS. ECONS. 369 (2009). 
14  Given the difficulty of isolating all factors that might influence price, these studies often utilize a 
“difference-in-differences” methodology, which uses a control product or location to help isolate cause and 
effect.  For an explanation of the method, see Hunter, et al., supra note 7, at 34-35.  For a relatively 
sophisticated application of some of the principals developed through “difference-in-differences” 
methodology, see Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 7. 
15  For a survey of the studies focused on price effects, see Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of 
Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433 (2008). 
16  See David J. Balan & Patrick S. Romano, Working Paper No. 307, A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical 
Quality Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare (Nov. 
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As Professor Dennis Carlton has persuasively argued, ex post review should not and cannot stop at 
price effects, however. Given that one of the critical determinants of agency decision-making is the quality 
of predictions agency economists and lawyers make about the likely effects of a merger, ex post evaluation 
must identify and critically evaluate those assumptions. As Carlton asserted, “[t]here are two types of data 
one requires in order to perform such an analysis. One is data on the relevant market pre and post merger. 
The second is data on the specific predictions of the government agencies about the market post-merger.” 
Carlton argues that “retrospective studies that ask whether prices went up post merger are surprisingly poor 
guides for analyzing merger policy. It is only when the second type of data is combined with the first type 
that a reliable analysis of antitrust policy can be carried out.”18
Others have emphasized the importance of what might be described as the collateral effects of a 
merger decision. Agency decision-making is likely to affect the likely future incentives of all industry and 
non-industry participants, including those who may be considering mergers. How does agency policy with 
respect to some mergers affect decision-makers in the same or other industries who may be contemplating 
mergers? These kinds of effects directly relate to and include an assessment of the deterrent effect of 
merger enforcement policy. The impact of a given regime’s perceived merger policy will likely be 
reflected in the advice given by attorneys and economic consultants to parties contemplating mergers, and 
it will affect their strategic planning.
  
19
The second question is “how to study it?” The choice of method is influenced by at least five factors: 
(1) perception of reliability and fit; (2) availability of data; (3) importance of the industry; (4) likelihood 
that merger activity will repeat in the industry, and (5) resources, human and financial. Many of the case 
studies conducted thus far have focused on heavily regulated industries, owing in large part to the 
availability of public data.
 
20
                                                                                                                                                                             
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp307.pdf (evaluating the quality effects predicted by 
the merging parties as a justification for the merger and finding a lack of evidence that they were realized). 
 The selection of cases for study might also be influenced by the perception 
that certain cases were “close calls.” Agency judgment is most obviously on display on these close call 
cases, which might involve a decision not to challenge or mergers that are permitted to go forward on 
condition. Given that conditions, both structural and behavioral, reflect very specific assumptions made by 
the agencies about the likely course of future competition, they may make inviting subjects of later study. 
Moreover, because the conditions are likely to be a product of negotiation between the parties, they may 
not represent the “ideal” remedy the agency might prefer in any given case. So ex post review could be 
very valuable in assessing the efficacy of these “compromise” remedies and could inform future negotiated 
settlements. 
17  See, e.g., Steven Tenn & John M. Yun, Working Paper No. 296, The Success of Divestitures in Merger 
Enforcement: Evidence from the J&J-Pfizer Transaction (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp296.pdf. 
18  See Dennis W. Carlton, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 07-15, The Need to Measure the 
Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It (Dec. 2007)(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/228687.pdf.  For a later version of the paper, see Dennis W. Carlton, 
Why We Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 77 
(2009). 
19  The point made here is arguably implicit in the survey of merger practitioners reported in Carl Shapiro & 
Jonathan B. Baker, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK 235 (R. PITOFSKY ED. 2008). 
20  “Most existing studies are of three historically regulated industries where pricing data are publicly 
available: airlines, banking, and hospitals.” Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note __, at 423. 
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As a way to strike a reasonable balance among these various factors, some agencies have focused in 
on specific industries, conducting repeated studies as they build their expertise. For example, due to a 
likely convergence of several factors, such as availability of data, incidence of mergers, lack of success in 
the courts, and consumer impact, the staff of the U.S. FTC’s Bureau of Economics has conducted a number 
of recent retrospective studies of hospital mergers.21 They have similarly focused on the petroleum industry 
on more than one occasion.22
What, then, might the “ideal” retrospective study tell us? Minimally, it might reveal whether the 
permitted merger resulted in higher prices, reduced quality, or other immediate anticompetitive effects. It 
might also evaluate the impact of the merger on the industry – how did it alter the behavior of other firms 
in the industry? Did entry or expansion occur? Did the merging firms or other firms pursue additional 
mergers and if so with whom? It might also examine the merging firms’ claims of efficiency to see 
whether they were in fact realized, and if so, to the degree promised. It might further study whether if 
realized those efficiencies were passed on to consumers. It might also evaluate the impact of the merger on 
more dynamic considerations, such as incentives to innovate. And finally, it could reveal the accuracy of 
the predictions of agency economists and lawyers. That might in turn expose something of the utility of the 
tools they used to formulate their views. Taken together, as the saying goes, that is a “tall order.” 
  
One last observation. Much of the literature on ex post review has focused on its immediate benefits 
for agencies. But there is a more global goal that can also be served, especially through an effort to define 
more uniform standards and protocols. Through such an undertaking, competition policy systems can 
collectively promote convergence of standards and uniformity of treatment of mergers – an especially 
valuable goal with trans-national mergers. More standardized models might promote more standardized 
approaches to merger review, and in turn, more consistent and defensible decisions across jurisdictions. 
4. Matching methods to means: Staged implementation of ex post review 
As already discussed, one challenge in developing the “state of the art” is that not all agencies will be 
equally well-suited to undertake the effort. The “ideal” described above, will be little more than a dream 
for many, without any hope of realization. If that is the only model available, many jurisdictions will 
simply abandon the effort, despite their appreciation for its value. Are there other options? Here I will 
briefly discuss four, although mostly my intention is to challenge others to continue thinking about the 
options that may be available. 
• Simplified Difference-in-Differences Models. Many of the price effects-focused case studies that 
have been conducted have utilized variations of the “difference-in-differences” model. It is worth 
                                                     
21  See, e.g., David J. Balan & Patrick S. Romano, Working Paper No. 307, A Retrospective Analysis of the 
Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp307.pdf; Aileen Thompson, 
Working Paper No. 295, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New 
Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp295.pdf; 
Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Working Paper No. 294, Two Hospital Mergers on 
Chicago’s North Shore: A Retrospective Study (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp294.pdf; Steven Tenn, Working Paper No. 293, The Price Effects of 
Hospital Mergers:  A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp293.pdf. 
22  See, e.g., Louis Silvia & Christopher T. Taylor, Working Paper No. 300, Petroleum Mergers and 
Competition in the Northeast United States (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp300.pdf; John Simpson and Christopher T. Taylor, Working Paper 
No. 278, Michigan Gasoline Pricing and the Marathon - Ashland and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock 
Transaction (July 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp278.pdf. 
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asking whether, under conditions that could be specified, there are rudimentary ways of 
implementing that basic methodology. Are there baseline controls that can be imagined? Publicly 
sourced data that could be used for certain industries? Simple product combinations? Perhaps 
there are ways that this common model could be adapted to produce reasonable results with more 
modest data and resources. 
• Event studies. While subject to limitations, event studies have proven to have some value in 
evaluating the effects of mergers.23
• Internal piggy-backing. At least one of the Delegates reported using the occasion of new mergers 
to evaluate previous ones in the same industry. With this approach, an agency can consciously 
take full advantage of the data provided by a new merger to look back and assess its previous 
decisions. Doing so solves two problems facing the agency: resource and data limitations. 
Although the practice could be subject to objection by the later merging parties if they perceive 
the agency’s demands for information as overly broad and unnecessary for evaluating their 
merger, it could be a creative and cost effective solution for agencies facing repeat mergers in 
specific industries. 
 As with “difference-in-differences” studies, if simplified 
models could be developed for event studies, they might provide a promising option for 
retrospective review in resource limited jurisdictions. To control for other possible causes, they 
might work best for mergers of single product firms in publicly traded companies, where publicly 
available data can easily be sourced. 
• Seed-planting. One final technique that may be relevant for any jurisdiction is identifying 
candidates for retrospective review at the time of initial review – and planting some seeds for 
future observation. Candidates for future reflection are not all that difficult to identify. The most 
obvious candidates will be transactions that are permitted on condition – by definition, these are 
“close call” cases. And the conditions reflect very specific assumptions about what will and will 
not solve the competitive problems likely to arise from the merger. In that event, some of the 
included conditions, such as reporting requirements, could specifically be designed to facilitate 
future evaluation of the effectiveness of the conditions. Even without concessions for future data, in 
“closing the file,” the agency could internally prepare the foundation for later, retrospective study, 
by documenting its greatest concerns and identifying the steps to be taken in the future to test them. 
5. Conclusion 
In this Discussion Paper, I have sought to identify two steps that could be taken as ex post merger 
review moves towards maturity as a competition policy “best-practice.” First, an effort could be 
undertaken to define the current “state of the art,” by preparing a best practice guide or handbook on the 
performance of various types of retrospective review. I have suggested, however, that if such a project is 
launched, one of its guiding principles should be that “the perfect should not be the enemy of the good” – 
while optimal models may be useful for some, efforts should be devoted to developing a range of models 
that could be utilized by agencies of varying levels of experience and resources. In this way, ex post review 
can continue to move from the conception phase to the design and implementation phase as an inclusive, 
not an exclusive process. 
                                                     
23  See, e.g., Tomaso Duso, et. al, Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? A Comparison 
of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 30 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 186 (2010). 
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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 
 
By the Secretariat  
Competition Committee Chairman Frédéric Jenny proposed to organise the discussion around the 
following topics:  
• How can competition authorities use ex-post reviews of their merger decisions as a quality 
control tool? 
• How can competition authorities use ex-post evaluation for advocacy purposes? 
• What can be done to help a larger number of authorities become involved in these exercises and 
could the OECD help by developing best practices or a toolkit? 
He then introduced the expert speakers:  Ms. Cristiana Vitale, an economist with the consultancy 
LEAR, who was invited to share her experience in conducting ex post reviews; Prof. Oliver Budzinski 
from the University of Southern Denmark, who wrote a paper for this roundtable on the methodological 
aspects of ex-post evaluations; and Prof. Andrew Gavil from Howard University Law School, who was 
asked to discuss whether it would be feasible to develop some best practices in this area.   
1. Ex-post reviews of merger decisions as a quality control tool 
Prof. Budzinski started his presentation by reminding the delegates that the evaluation of merger 
decisions plays a double role: 1) it is a quality control tool; and 2) it is an advocacy tool. He argued that the 
main reason for conducting ex-post evaluations of merger decisions is to determine whether the agency 
made the correct decision, which implies assessing whether the conclusions on which a specific merger 
decision was based were justified in light of the evidence available at the time. He mentioned that ex-post 
evaluations can also be used to determine whether the aggregated welfare effects generated by the merger 
control regime justify the resources required to operate it and hence can be used to justify the existence of 
such a regime. Prof. Budzinski explained that he would focus only on the first of these two reasons. In 
particular he would focus on the evaluation methodologies available and on how to choose which one to 
adopt.  
He argued that three criteria should be used in making such a choice: reliability, applicability, and 
resource intensity. Reliability refers to the ability of a method to identify whether the decision was the 
appropriate one. Applicability refers to whether a method is applicable in that specific context (i.e. 
appropriate given the specific characteristics of the market(s)). Resource intensity refers to the amount of 
technical expertise, data, time and other resources that a method requires. He added that reliability is the 
most important one. Hence, if a method is not sufficiently reliable it should not be adopted even if it scores 
well under the other two criteria. 
Prof. Budzinski then examined the available evaluation methodologies one by one. Structural models 
are the most sophisticated approach.  They require an economic model that describes how the affected 
market works.  This model then has to be calibrated with empirical data in order to derive conclusions on 
how the merger would have affected the market.  
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He argued that this method has sound theoretical foundations, so it is very reliable.  Moreover, he 
claimed that, even though this method requires a lot of assumptions about the type of competition, demand 
elasticities and the like, when adopted in the ex-post assessment of a merger the validity of these 
assumptions can be tested. Hence, the usual critique that this method is too sensitive to the assumptions 
made becomes less relevant when it is used in an ex-post evaluation. Further, this method is applicable to 
all types of merger decisions and it allows considering dynamic effects, such as innovation and efficiency 
gains.  
However, structural models have shortcomings. They rely on standard oligopoly models and they 
cannot be used if competition in the market does not follow one of these models. In addition, they cannot 
capture any structural change in the market. Their biggest challenge, however, is the extensive data 
requirement and the sophisticated econometrics skills needed. 
Prof. Budzinski then considered the difference-in-differences approach. This method consists in 
comparing the developments in prices, quantities, and other variables in the market where the merger has 
taken place with those in a “control market”, i.e. a market that is sufficiently similar to be subject to the 
same external shocks, but which will not have been influenced by the merger.  
This method is, in principle, applicable to all types of mergers, and the data requirements are 
significantly less than for structural models, though still high. Its application requires good econometric 
skills. The biggest challenge posed by this method is to find an adequate control market. If such a control 
market cannot be found this method cannot be applied. For this reason it is very difficult to apply it to a 
prohibition decision.  Indeed, finding a market that is comparable, and in which a merger has taken place 
so that it can be compared to the market where the merger was prohibited, will be possible only in 
exceptional situations.  
Turning to event studies, Prof. Budzinksi explained that this method relies on an analysis of the 
reaction of the stock market after a merger or a merger decision is announced. It assumes that financial 
markets are efficient and that they swiftly transfer any information they have into stock market prices.  
This, he argued, is a heroic assumption that financial economics dismissed a long time ago.   
Furthermore, this method has limited applicability. It is necessary for the merging firms and their 
main competitors to be quoted on the stock market. Beyond that, its use is problematic in markets with 
differentiated products, as well as in mergers with foreclosure effects or in which other vertical or 
conglomerate effects play an important role.  
Event studies require good econometric skills, but the data necessary to run them is limited and easily 
obtainable. Consequently, this method is easy to apply, but not very reliable. Prof. Budzinski warned 
against being lured by it. 
The last method he discussed was surveys of market participants. This method does not rely on any 
economic theory. Surveys require a large number of respondents, which may not always be available. He 
added that the resources needed to run a survey are limited compared to other methods. Surveys require 
some expertise in statistical methods and in drafting questionnaires. Where not much market data is 
available, surveys might be the only helpful method. Their major shortcoming is that participants may 
answer in a strategic way, since they may consider that their answers might shape merger decisions in the 
future. 
To conclude, Prof. Budzinski highlighted that a perfect method for ex/post evaluations does not exist.  
All methods have strengths and weaknesses, and therefore a combination of different methods is advisable. 
However, he cautioned against events studies.  
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Ms. Vitale explained that LEAR had been involved in the ex post evaluations of three merger 
decisions for competition authorities.  In addition, LEAR consultants also prepared a report for DG 
Competition on the methodology for performing ex post evaluations of merger decisions. This report is 
available on the EU Website.  
Ms. Vitale discussed the elements that, based on her experience, she considered to be important when 
performing an ex post evaluation.  
First, the assessment should be complete. It should allow determining if the decision was appropriate, 
but also whether the analysis that underlies it was thorough and correct, given the information available at 
the time. Only in this way can an authority really improve its decision making process.  
Second, since these assessments are resource-intensive and just a few decisions can be evaluated, it is 
important to choose them carefully. Close calls can be very useful decisions to examine, as it is likely that 
there is much to be learnt. Approval decisions are easier to evaluate, but it can be interesting to assess 
prohibitions and approval decisions with remedies. The time that has elapsed from when the decision was 
adopted is also quite important. If the decision is too recent, not enough time might have passed for the 
effects of the decision to materialise. But if too much time has passed, it could be more difficult to 
disentangle the effects of the decision from other market phenomena. It is also easier to obtain data from 
market participants if some time has passed.  She mentioned three to five years as the right gap, depending 
on the nature of the market. In addition, the choice should take into account data availability: without 
enough data no analysis is possible. 
Further, it is very important that a fresh pair of eyes performs the review.  The same team that took 
the original decision should not do the assessment. Nevertheless, some help from this team will be required 
because of their knowledge of facts, data and documentation. However, a problem Lear often encountered 
is that no members of the original team were working in the authority three/five years after the decision.  
Impartiality in the analysis is also quite important. Internal reviews sometimes can be biased, as 
authorities may not want to admit that they may have committed an error.  In addition, it is necessary to 
have the appropriate quantitative skills. If a method is not properly implemented, the overall assessment 
becomes useless. These skills may not always be available internally. Moreover, review exercises can be 
quite time consuming. For all these reasons it might be advisable to have external consultant or academics 
perform the review.   
Ms. Vitale added that surveys should always be carried out when an impact evaluation is done. They 
represent a check on quantitative assessments and they are also a good source of information, in particular 
on less easily measurable aspects such as the effects of a merger on quality and innovation. She added that 
surveys require expertise, as it is not an easy task to prepare a questionnaire, though it may seem so. Also, 
surveys require some statistical skills to ensure that the appropriate sample is used. However, if one 
surveyed competitors, suppliers and wholesalers, whose number is often not very high, it is often possible 
to survey the whole population, thus avoiding the difficulties associated with building the appropriate 
sample.  
Ms. Vitale then turned to the last, and in her view most important, point -- the data requirements. The 
data needed depends on the empirical methodology and the empirical methodology depends on the data. 
Data requirements also are a function of the effects of the decision that the assessment will focus on, such 
as price effects or the impact on innovation. Data can be difficult to obtain. Sometimes data on prices and 
quantities can be bought or found through public sources, but not always. Data on quality, efficiency, and 
innovation are very difficult to obtain in most cases. Therefore, involving market players is important, 
maybe through a survey, because they have most of the necessary information.  
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A delegate from Norway asked the experts how smaller jurisdictions with fewer merger decisions 
could do ex-post reviews.  Would it be useful to have qualitative reviews that compare a number of case 
studies over time or across countries and to compare different reviews already undertaken? 
Prof. Budzinski replied that a small number of merger decision could be a particular problem when 
considering a study on the overall impact of merger review, but should be less of a problem if the goal is to 
analyse a single case. He confirmed that qualitative methods, such as surveys and expert commentaries, 
can be useful. Ms. Vitale added that every ex-post assessment will always have a qualitative component. 
She argued that both a quantitative and qualitative assessment should be done together to perform an 
accurate assessment, and that even from a purely qualitative study one can learn a lot. 
A delegate from the UK explained that to date the two UK authorities had conducted four in-depth ex 
post evaluations of a number of merger decisions. One study had been done in-house by Competition 
Commission staff, while all the others were conducted by external consultants. These evaluations have 
looked at a mixture of conditional clearances, unconditional clearances and prohibitions. The analyses 
were both qualitative and quantitative, but for assessing the prohibition decisions only qualitative methods 
were used.  
The most recent of these studies was commissioned by the CC and involved two cleared mergers in 
retail markets. These mergers had been selected because both the OFT and the CC receive a large number 
of retail merger references and they felt it was important to understand how to improve their decision 
making process in this area. Further, retail markets lend themselves very well to quantitative analyses, due 
to the availability of data.  However, some practical issues had been encountered in obtaining the data, 
because commercial sources had proved very expensive. The lessons learnt from these ex-post evaluation 
exercises have been spread among the staff mostly through internal seminars.   
A delegate from the Netherlands explained that in 2009 the NMa had undertaken an ex-post 
assessment on the price effects of two hospital mergers. One merger had been cleared in phase one, and the 
other had been cleared in phase two but it was a very controversial decision. The study showed that the 
first merger had not led to any price increase, while prices had risen between 3.5 and 5 per cent after the 
second merger. The NMa interpreted this outcome as an indication that the market power of the hospitals 
in the second merger increased as a result of the merger, and that the competitive constraints were not 
strong enough to counteract this increase. This indicated that the geographic market was probably smaller 
than the one used in the decision.   
The assessment was based on the difference-in-differences method and it focused on the effects on 
prices, because data concerning quality was not available.  The study was done internally because this 
reduced confidentiality issues (the price data was provided by the Dutch Health Department).  It also gave 
the NMA’s staff the opportunity to develop some experience in conducting this type of studies. 
A delegate from Canada explained that the Competition Bureau had undertaken two ex-post studies 
with the aim of improving their decision making process.  
For the first study, an economics consulting firm was hired to determine whether the Competition 
Bureau had correctly performed the analyses and took reasonable decisions in three separate merger 
reviews. The three decisions selected to be examined were chosen together with the consultants and the 
criteria used in selecting them were: 1) whether sufficient evidence had been gathered at the time of the 
review to formulate reasonably detailed predictions about likely competitive effects; 2) whether sufficient 
time had passed that the market(s) in question would have adjusted to the merger;  3) whether the market 
was not in a considerable state of flux at the time of (or after the merger) such that it would be difficult to 
determine the response of the market to the merger; 4) whether the participants would likely be willing to 
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be interviewed and provide useful information; and 5) whether useful public data about market conditions 
before and after the merger was available. The mergers analysed in this study had each raised material 
competition concerns, but the Competition Bureau had ultimately decided that the mergers did not merit a 
challenge before the Competition Tribunal or warrant seeking a remedy from the parties. In addition, the 
mergers selected were in three different industries. The study concluded that the Bureau’s analyses had 
accurately assessed market conditions based on the information available at the time. The consultants put 
forward a number of observations and recommendations regarding the Bureau’s merger analysis that the 
Bureau included in its recently published draft merger enforcement guidelines.  
The second study assessed the effectiveness of the design and implementation of remedies imposed 
by the Bureau in 23 cases between 1986 and 2005. This study was resource intensive and was done in-
house, although officers who had worked on the Bureau’s original reviews were not involved. The analysis 
was purely qualitative. In particular, Bureau staff interviewed approximately 135 market participants. On 
the basis of the information obtained through the interviews, the team made a number of observations for 
the Bureau to consider in the future design and implementation of merger remedies.  
The Chairman asked whether there was not a risk that in the first study the Bureau might have 
suggested cases where it felt comfortable that the review would not show any major shortcomings in the 
analysis. The delegate from Canada replied that such a choice would have generated little or no benefits 
from the study and that borderline cases that raised material competition concerns had been chosen for 
exactly this reason. 
In connection with the second study the Chairman raised the concern that there was a risk that the 
market participants could have answered strategically because they knew that the outcome of the study 
would affect how the Bureau behaved in merger investigations. More generally he asked how one can 
avoid such a risk in any survey linked to ex/post evaluations. 
The delegate from Canada explained that the identity of the interviewees was taken into account in 
assessing the value of the information provided, for example whether the information came from 
competitors or from a potential buyer that did manage to obtain the divested assets. Ms. Vitale added that 
LEAR had run quite a few surveys and that the information provided by market participants seemed 
accurate, since responses from different parties tended not to differ. Furthermore, in many markets mergers 
are rare; hence market players may not consider that their behaviour could affect future merger reviews. 
The Chairman asked Ms. Vitale whether she believed that over time, if these surveys became more 
common, the issue could become more pronounced. He noted that companies could start consulting with 
their lawyers when receiving questionnaires and could behave more strategically. Ms. Vitale replied that 
this could indeed happen. So far LEAR had received responses to their questionnaires directly from the 
commercial divisions, who did not appear to have involved their lawyers.  The only problem they had had 
with eliciting responses from market participants was that the parties to the merger never wanted to 
co-operate, probably out of fear that the review may reveal that the merger had had anticompetitive effects. 
A delegate from Sweden explained that they also had some experience with ex-post evaluations and 
had faced data issues.  He explained that the KKV does not have any legal powers to compel firms to 
provide data during ex-post assessments. Thus, in some cases they had had to buy the necessary data from 
commercial sources at a high expense. The delegate asked whether other jurisdictions have found a way to 
address this problem, or whether they had a legal provision enabling them to compel firms to provide data 
for ex-post analyses.  
The UK delegate echoed this difficulty. The CC also had had to buy data for their most recent 
quantitative study, and had to forgo reviewing a third merger because no data was available from 
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commercial sources and the parties were not willing to provide it. Overall the CC has found that parties are 
more willing to co-operate in qualitative studies. 
On this issue, the delegate from the US added that data collection is not always so difficult. For 
example, in a close call decision where the authority ultimately approves a merger on the ground that entry 
is very likely, or that an alternative technology would soon be commercially available, it is easy to verify 
whether it actually happened.  A similar argument is valid in cases were efficiency claims were important 
in reaching the decision. Recently the FTC investigated a joint venture between two producers of heavy 
launch vehicles for satellites. The companies claimed that the scale of production was currently too small 
and that everyone would benefit from the joint-venture. It was easy to verify whether this claim was 
correct at a later date.  
The Chairman said that in most merger cases the level of post-merger competition could depend on a 
complex set of factors, which would make it difficult to assess the impact of the merger. He stated that the 
examples provided by the United States might be useful to verify whether firms gave accurate information 
to the agency, but that in most actual cases it would not be so easy to assess whether competition had 
diminished following the merger decision. The US delegate replied that the parties typically make a 
number of arguments, but that in “close calls” there is frequently one key argument that determines the 
decision. Even though there are other factors at work in every case, in many instances an agency is forced 
to decide on the basis of one key argument and this is the one that could and should be assessed ex/post.  
Ms. Vitale agreed with the Chairman’s statement that parties frequently raise a number of arguments. 
Often most of them prove correct (e.g. entry actually happened), but one does not know whether they were 
enough to counter the anti-competitive effects of the merger. However, she agreed that when a decision is a 
close call, authorities should clearly indicate which ones were the key arguments that drove the decision so 
that in the future it can be easier to verify whether they actually developed as it was assumed at the time of 
the decision. Nevertheless she claimed that often the ex-post assessment was not so easy and that the 
availability of data was an important factor in determining whether an ex/post assessment could be 
undertaken. 
The US delegate added that this issue was closely linked to the care with which an agency defines 
why it is taking a specific decision. Parties will always bring numerous reasons why a deal should be 
approved, but an agency can screen these and identify the few that are really relevant. Therefore, in any 
decision it is important (and it pays later on) to spell out with great care the key arguments on which it was 
based, rather than hide behind a number of reasons.  
A representative of the OECD Secretariat intervened. He agreed that a variety of circumstances could 
change following a merger decision and not all of them may be due to the decision itself. This is exactly 
what ex-post reviews are supposed to help understand. Merger decisions are all about making predictions. 
It is important to look back from time to time and check whether those predictions were right. Much can be 
learnt from these exercises. As an example he referred to the US submission, which discussed the ex-post 
evaluation of a hospital merger decision. This evaluation had found that the Elzinga/Hogarty test used in 
the decision had not made very accurate predictions. This was a very useful finding, which could help in 
future assessment of similar mergers.  
A delegate from Norway explained that the Norwegian competition authority is required by law to 
retrospectively assess at least one merger decision every year, together with one cartel decision and one 
abuse of dominance decision. She pointed out that small jurisdictions are especially challenged by ex-post 
reviews because they often have a limited set of decisions to choose from. For example, over the last five 
years, the Norwegian competition authority examined only two mergers per year on average.  
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The Chairman returned to the US contribution and wondered what the contribution’s message really 
was, because it gave plenty of reasons for undertaking ex post evaluations, but it also emphasised that such 
reviews can be very costly and difficult. A delegate from the US replied that ex-post evaluations are both 
useful and costly.  
He further explained that the FTC performed most of their reviews internally and in general relied on 
the difference-in-differences method. The FTC could afford to do so because they have sufficient resources 
and, in particular, they have a large pool of highly skilled economists. Further, the FTC have a statutory 
mandate to undertake research, hence they can use their staff for these activities without having to penalise 
other activities. Hence, they do not have to hire external consultants.  The FTC also believe that there are 
incentives internally not just to confirm that they have taken the right decision, but to really get the right 
answer and learn from past errors. Indeed, most of the FTC’s retrospective analyses are published as 
working papers and often the authors also try to get them published in academic journals where they are 
subject to peer reviews.  
The delegate also commented on Prof. Budzinski’s views on event studies.  He did not share such a 
negative view of this method. He claimed that before a merger was announced, there was some probability 
that a merger was going to happen, and when it is announced, that probability increases.  Those discrete 
changes are useful to examine and event studies can help in assessing their impact. 
A delegate from Greece commented that the Greek authority had used event studies on a couple of 
occasions and found them quite useful.  
A delegate from Japan explained that the JFTC had applied several of the methods discussed for ex-
post evaluations.  One such review had been published in 2007.  The JFTC assessed a cross-section of 
several mergers and provided a more detailed analysis of some specific mergers. The reviews relied on the 
quantitative analysis of publicly available data and interviews with the parties concerned. Another study on 
merger efficiencies had been conducted by the Competition Policy Research Center (the CPRC), which is 
the research center of the JFTC where the JFTC staff and outside experts conduct joint studies. The experts 
sought to analyse the effects of mergers on (1) profitability, (2) stock prices, (3) R&D, and (4) selling 
prices, for which they conducted econometric analysis. They primarily used data from publicly available 
sources, except for scanner data used for the price analysis. The results of the review exercise were that the 
claimed efficiency effects were not always achieved in the cases examined.  
A delegate from BIAC argued that the merger review process is necessarily a forward looking 
theoretical exercise, but that the consequences of allowing mergers that have anticompetitive effects or of 
blocking mergers that are not anticompetitive are very real. It is therefore appropriate that competition 
authorities devote time and effort to assess the efficacy of past mergers decisions with a view of improving 
their decisions making in the future. The issue is, of course, how to achieve the most informative results. 
Hence, ex-post assessments should be very open and frank exercises where not only past successes, but 
also past errors are identified.  
The delegate insisted on the desirability of inter-agency co-operation in this area. He argued that 
careful consideration should be given to cases whose evaluation gave different results to different agencies. 
Similarly, given the relative infrequency with which such studies have been conducted in the past and are 
likely to be conducted in the future, agencies should share all the lessons learnt from them. Further, he 
argued that agencies should conduct post-merger assessments on a regular basis and that they should use 
external consultants rather than rely too much on self-assessment to ensure impartiality. 
A delegate from South Africa explained that the South African authority had identified ex-post 
reviews as a priority and that this was clearly stated in its strategic plan for the next three years. The 
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authority had started performing some “mini-exercises” in the steel, poultry, and mining services industries 
to establish whether its decisions were correct. The authority had relied principally on information 
available at the time of the merger investigation and obtained from stakeholders. Resources, time, and 
expertise had definitely proved to be a constraint. The authority had been in close contact with other 
agencies, in particular in the UK, to share their experience and expertise in doing ex post evaluations. They 
would welcome a toolkit on methodologies for ex-post merger evaluations.  
2. The use ex-post evaluation for advocacy purposes 
A delegate from the EU argued that the real difficulty in performing ex-post evaluations, whether for 
advocacy or for improving decision-making purposes, is how to establish what the proper counterfactual is. 
The delegate noted that Prof. Budzinski’s presentation gave the impression that structural estimation was 
always extremely complex. This was true if one planned to estimate all the parameters of the model. 
However, one could also use very simple hypotheses to calibrate the parameters of the model. This is what 
the EU had been doing. The evaluation unit in DG Competition uses the PCAIDS (proportionally 
calibrated almost ideal demand system) model for merger simulations. This model is fairly simple to use 
and requires very few parameters to estimate the impact of a merger. Clearly, as with all very simple 
methodologies, it has strong limitations. First, it leaves no room for type 1 or type 2 errors. Further, it does 
not allow the identification of type 3 errors, which occur when the right decision is made but for the wrong 
reasons. However, it determines the benefits of the right decisions. 
In the EU, there had been requests in the past to produce data on the benefits generated by its 
competition enforcement activities. Initially the EU only produced a figure which was a linear 
transformation of the number of the cases examined. However, there had been methodological 
improvements since then, and currently the EU provides an estimate of the benefits obtained by consumers 
from all the important merger decisions it adopts in the course of a year.  
He also reminded participants that when analysing decisions for advocacy purposes, one should not 
forget that the main justification for having a competition policy is deterrence. This effect is normally not 
accounted for in the assessments of the benefits of having a merger review because of methodological 
difficulties. However, it is very important. He gave an extreme example to explain this concept. Suppose 
that an authority deterred all anti-competitive mergers, then only pro-competitive or competitively neutral 
mergers would be notified. In that case through its direct merger review activity the authority would not 
generate any benefit for consumers. However, such an authority would be doing a better job than an 
authority that blocked many anticompetitive mergers. Thus, he warned, the actual numbers derived from 
these estimates, although very useful, tell only part of the story. 
A delegate from Hungary commented that there is a general consensus that the ex-post assessment of 
merger decisions is a very important activity, but that there is less of a consensus that it a good use of an 
authority's limited resources. Hence, it would be very important to develop best practices or simple 
methods to support smaller agencies.  
A delegate from Korea noted that Korea had performed some ex-post assessments of merger decisions 
in an effort to improve their merger review system, especially with respect to behavioural remedies in 
horizontal mergers. This evaluation exercise was limited to assessing how market shares, firms’ financial 
performance, and the prices of relevant products had changed after the merger. The assessment found that 
many of the stand-alone behavioural remedies did not offset the anti-competitive effects arising from the 
mergers. This result led the KFTC to change its policy approach in merger enforcement toward a greater 
use of structural remedies, at least in horizontal mergers. 
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A delegate from the US said that the spectrum of possible evaluations techniques ranges from ultra-
expensive and very refined methods, to less expensive and relatively easy to use ones. The delegate 
referred to a roundtable the FTC held in the fall of 2001.  During this roundtable a panel of economists, 
including Carlton, Willig, Ordover, Schmalensee, and Winston, collectively made the following proposal: 
if an agency approves a close-call merger, for example a three to two merger with a soon-to-happen entry 
or powerful efficiency story, it should do so on the condition that it will review the market later on to 
determine whether the decision was indeed appropriate. The panellists acknowledged that this would not 
be easy, but that if the agency is taking a difficult decision it should be willing to take the risk to review it 
and accept any error it may have made. 
Prof. Budzinski said that perhaps not all close call cases are interesting, because sometimes it is not 
the economic impact that is unclear in such cases, but rather the facts.  The cases one should consider for 
ex post evaluations are those where there is uncertainty about the economic impact, because these are the 
ones where one can learn something. One example is mergers on the verge between conglomerate and 
horizontal. Economists still do not have a very good understanding of those cases. It is also interesting to 
look at cases where one can learn something about the methods employed in the ex ante analysis. For 
instance, if a case involved a lot of simulations ex-ante, it would be interesting to come back to this case to 
verify how good the ex ante simulations models were.  
The Chairman asked Prof. Budzinski whether he agreed that in performing ex-post evaluations for 
advocacy purposes one could adopt simple techniques even if these are less accurate. Prof. Budzinski 
replied that this can be done when the analysis is meant to show that a merger control regime is justified. 
Also he argued that “back of the envelope” techniques can be used to assess large numbers of cases, but 
not necessarily for the in-depth analysis of a specific case. He also agreed with the EU that one has to be 
aware that these assessments of how much merger control regimes are worth to taxpayers and consumers 
represent only a small fraction of their actual benefits, because of the deterrence effect that is normally not 
quantified but plays a big role. 
A delegate from Brazil raised the question whether an agency should review previous decisions in the 
same market when assessing a merger. This happens in Brazil quite often. Indeed the ex-post evaluation of 
previous decisions may help to reach a decision in the new case. He offered the example of a case that 
involved minority rights in a cement company. An acquisition was approved subject to some remedies. A 
few years later the company decided to merge with other cement companies, as well as to vertically 
integrate with some concrete companies. At the time of the second transaction the agency assessed the 
commitments that led to the approval of the first case and found that these had not proved sufficient. It 
therefore had to ignore to a certain extent these undertakings in assessing the possible effects of the new 
transaction.  The overall analysis led to the conclusion that the merger would have led to a reduction in 
competition and CADE blocked the transaction.  
The delegate then asked Prof. Budzinski how one could use econometrics tools to isolate the 
consequence of the decision from other phenomena taking place in the affected market.  Prof. Budzinski 
replied that it all depends on whether one can find a good control group. If one can identify a market that is 
subject to the same external shocks and the same macroeconomic development as the market where the 
merger take place, but which is not affected by the merger, then econometrics tools can be used to isolate 
the effects of the merger.  
3. How to get more authorities involved in these exercise  
The Chairman moved to the issue of how to develop best practices and how to help a larger number of 
authorities perform these evaluations. He introduced Prof. Gavil, who explained that while there is a 
consensus that ex-post merger evaluations are useful, an effort is still necessary to define generally 
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accepted best practices and methods to undertake them.  This is a much needed effort and it should include 
developing simplified approaches so that all agencies, even small and resource-constrained ones, can 
undertake such assessments.  
Prof. Gavil provided some suggestions. Data availability is often mentioned as an expensive 
constraint. A possible solution is to study industries where there is publicly available data. A number of 
countries have found it useful to focus on particular industries and to do repeated evaluations of them. 
Internal piggy-backing can also be employed, so that when you get a new merger in the same industry, you 
have some information to use from prior merger decisions. Another option is "seed planting" where the 
staff reaching a decision clearly identify the issues that concerned them the most and the key assumptions 
that drove the decision. This leaves an open path for a future evaluation. Economists could also try to 
develop methods that could be valuably implemented in stages with various levels of resources.   
Ms. Vitale agreed that indeed there are short cuts. For example, one of the big issues is that data 
collection can be expensive or time-consuming, and time can be expensive. Using public available data 
helps to overcome that problem, when this is available. Through the approach Prof. Gavil calls seed-
planting an authority can simplify future evaluations and reduce the time and resources required.   
Sometimes small authorities lack the skilled resources to apply some methodologies. Then more 
qualitative approaches, such as surveys, can be used, as they can still provide many insights on the quality 
of a decision. However, Ms Vitale warned against excessive simplification.  Econometric studies require 
some minimum standards and if an authority does not have the right skills or the appropriate data it should 
not embark in one, as a badly done econometric analysis is worse than no analysis at all. 
Prof. Budzinski said that quantitative methods entail a fundamental trade-off between sophistication 
and reliability. Consequently, there are no short cuts to a good and reliable econometric analysis. He 
argued, however, that if the goal is to learn about the effects of mergers, jurisdictions may be able to learn 
from each other. If one wants to find out how mergers in specific markets or specific types of remedies 
affect competition, these do not necessarily have to be analysed anew in every jurisdiction in the world.  
A delegate from Belgium commented on the difficulties faced even by larger, well-endowed 
authorities when performing ex post reviews and wondered whether this should be a cause of relief or of 
distress for smaller authorities.  He then expressed support for sharing each other’s experiences in this 
field.  
A delegate from the EU followed up on the issue of remedies.  Although this was not yet in the public 
domain, he explained that the Commission has internally done work on the effectiveness of remedies in 
particular industries. The Commission had used surveys that were well designed and resulted in clear-cut 
answers. This was an area where much could be learnt by everyone to improve merger reviews. 
A UK delegate acknowledged that there can be substantial benefits from doing ex-post reviews.  For 
example, there may be opportunities to understand when economic theories that had been applied in 
merger cases could be improved.  However, she thought it that it was extremely ambitious to plan a “one 
size fits all” set of best practices for ex-post merger evaluations. 
A representative of the Secretariat expressed similar concerns.  Attempting to develop a single set of 
best practices would be wrong.  One size does not fit all. However, it could be possible to build a tool kit, 
with a set of tips and suggestions.  Sometimes highly sophisticated methods are necessary to get an answer, 
but this is not always the case and sometimes simple analyses can go a long way. Further, experienced 
agencies can contribute by sharing their knowledge with less experienced ones. 
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The Chairman added that this last exchange was particularly interesting because delegates have 
different ideas on how one could handle some of the problems associated with ex-post reviews and there 
was currently no place where all those ideas could be found. So, while he agreed that it is not advisable to 
try to develop a set of recommended practices, it could be useful to develop a document that offers a range 
of approaches to assessment problems, as well suggestions on possible simplifications.  
A delegate from Romania expressed support for the view that the Committee could develop a tool kit 
that could provide support for authorities that are just starting to do evaluations. The ex post review of 
merger decisions is not yet a high priority in Romania because merger cases tend not to be very complex.  
Also at this stage it would be preferable to perform them internally. Having a collection of best practices, 
examples and methodologies would be of great help.   
A delegate from the US commented that in some respects one size does fit all. Common to all is the 
larger aspiration to have an ability to answer questions like: how do you know if a method works? How do 
you know if what you are doing is sensible? The tool kit on regulatory reform is an excellent example of 
how to share experiences, assemble techniques and discuss the existing economic literature.  Something 
similar could be done in this field.  
The Chairman concluded the roundtable by expressing his support for the idea of a toolbox for the ex-
post evaluation of mergers.  This would not be one-size-fits-all answer to all the questions, but it would 
allow jurisdictions to have at their disposal references, examples and ideas. 
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COMPTE RENDU DE LA DISCUSSION 
 
Par le Secrétariat 
M. Frédéric Jenny, Président du Comité de la concurrence, propose d’articuler les débats autours des 
thèmes suivants :  
• Comment les autorités de la concurrence peuvent-elles se servir des examens ex-post de leurs 
décisions relatives aux fusions en tant qu’instruments de contrôle de la qualité ? 
• Comment les autorités de la concurrence peuvent-elles se servir des évaluations ex-post à des fins 
pour promouvoir leur action ? 
• Que peut-on faire pour aider un plus grand nombre d’autorités de la concurrence à réaliser de tels 
exercices ? L’OCDE pourrait-elle les y aider en élaborant un recueil des meilleures pratiques ou 
un manuel dans ce domaine ? 
Il présente ensuite les orateurs experts : Mme Cristiana Vitale, économiste auprès du cabinet de 
conseil LEAR, qui a été invitée à faire part de son expérience concernant le déroulement des examens ex-
post ; M. Oliver Budzinski de l’université du Danemark du Sud, qui a rédigé pour cette table ronde, une 
note consacrée aux aspects méthodologiques des évaluations ex-post et M. Andrew Gavil de la faculté de 
droit de l’université Howard, qui a été invité à partager ses vues sur la question de savoir s’il est possible 
de mettre au point un recueil compilant un certain nombre de meilleures pratiques dans ce domaine. 
1. Utilisation des examens ex-post des décisions relatives aux fusions en tant qu’instruments de 
contrôle de la qualité 
M. Budzinski commence son exposé en rappelant aux délégués que l’évaluation des décisions 
relatives aux fusions joue un double rôle : 1) ces évaluations constituent un instrument de contrôle de la 
qualité et 2) servent d’instruments de promotion. Il fait valoir que la réalisation d’évaluations ex-post a 
pour principal objet de déterminer si l’autorité de la concurrence a pris la bonne décision, ce qui suppose 
d’évaluer si les conclusions sur lesquelles elle a fondé sa décision étaient justifiées, compte tenu des 
éléments dont elle disposait au moment où elle a pris sa décision. Il précise que les évaluations ex-post 
peuvent aussi servir à déterminer si les effets agrégés sur le bien-être, engendrés par le régime de contrôle 
des fusions en vigueur, justifient les ressources mobilisées pour le faire fonctionner et peuvent donc être 
invoqués pour justifier l’existence même de ce régime. M. Budzinski traitera uniquement du premier de ces 
deux objectifs. Son exposé portera donc principalement sur les méthodes d’évaluation applicables et sur les 
critères selon lesquels il convient de choisir la méthodologie à utiliser. 
Trois critères doivent être retenus pour faire ce choix : la fiabilité, l’applicabilité et l’intensité 
d’utilisation des ressources. M. Budzinski entend par fiabilité le fait qu’une méthode donnée permette de 
déterminer si les décisions prises étaient les bonnes. L’applicabilité désigne le fait de savoir si telle ou telle 
méthode est applicable dans un contexte donné (à savoir si la méthode est appropriée compte tenu des 
caractéristiques particulières du/des marchés concernés. L’intensité d’utilisation des ressources désigne la 
quantité de compétences techniques, de données, de temps et autres ressources que nécessite le recours à 
une méthode donnée. De ces trois critères, la fiabilité est le plus important. Par conséquent, il convient de 
DAF/COMP(2011)24 
 182 
ne pas utiliser une méthode qui ne serait pas suffisamment fiable même si elle est jugée satisfaisante au 
regard des deux autres critères. 
M. Budzinski passe ensuite en revue, une par une, les différentes méthodes d’évaluation applicables. 
Les modèles structurels constituent l’approche la plus élaborée. Ils nécessitent de recourir à un modèle 
économique décrivant le fonctionnement des marchés concernés. Ce modèle doit ensuite être calibré à 
l’aide de données économétriques pour en tirer des conclusions sur l’incidence qu’aurait pu avoir la fusion 
sur le marché. 
Cette méthode repose sur de solides fondements théoriques et elle est donc très fiable. Elle nécessite 
de faire appel à de nombreux postulats sur la nature de la concurrence, les élasticités de la demande, etc. Il 
est cependant possible de tester la validité de ces postulats lorsque cette méthode a été adoptée pour 
réaliser l’évaluation ex-post d’une opération de fusion. Par conséquent, la critique habituelle selon laquelle 
cette méthode est trop tributaire des postulats de départ perd de sa pertinence lorsque cette méthode est 
utilisée pour ce type d’évaluation. En outre, cette méthode est applicable à tous les types de décisions 
relatives aux fusions et ménage la possibilité de prendre en compte les effets dynamiques, comme 
l’innovation et les gains d’efficacité. 
Cela étant, les modèles structurels ne sont pas dénués d’inconvénients. Ils reposent sur des modèles 
d’oligopole standard et ne peuvent être utilisés si la concurrence sur le marché n’obéit pas à l’un d’entre 
eux. En outre, ils ne peuvent rendre compte d’aucun des changements structurels survenant sur le marché. 
La plus grande difficulté les concernant, cependant, est liée à l’ampleur considérable des données 
nécessaires et aux compétences économétriques complexes qu’ils requièrent. 
M. Budzinski mentionne ensuite l’approche des doubles différences. Cette méthode consiste à 
comparer l’évolution des prix, des quantités et d’autres variables du marché sur lequel la fusion a eu lieu 
avec celles d’un « marché de référence » à savoir un marché suffisamment similaire pour être soumis aux 
mêmes chocs extérieurs, mais sur lequel la fusion n’aura pas eu d’influence. 
Cette méthode est, en principe, applicable à tous les types de fusions et l’ampleur des données 
nécessaires est nettement plus limitée qu’avec les modèles structurels, tout en restant importante. Son 
application exige de bonnes compétences économétriques. La plus grande difficulté qu’elle pose consiste à 
trouver un marché de référence adéquat. Faute d’y parvenir, cette méthode ne peut être appliquée. C’est 
pourquoi il est très difficile de l’appliquer à une décision de refus d’agrément d’une opération de fusion. Le 
cas échéant, il ne sera en effet qu’exceptionnellement possible de trouver un marché analogue, sur lequel 
une fusion a eu lieu, que l’on puisse comparer au marché pour lequel l’autorité a interdit la fusion. 
Citant ensuite les études d’événement, M. Budzinksi explique que cette méthode repose sur une 
analyse de la réaction du marché boursier après l’annonce d’une fusion ou d’une décision relative à une 
fusion. Elle se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les marchés financiers sont efficients et qu’ils répercutent 
rapidement toutes les informations dont ils disposent sur les prix des valeurs boursières. Selon 
M. Budzinksi, il s’agit là d’un postulat bien téméraire, démenti depuis longtemps déjà par l’économie 
financière. 
En outre, l’applicabilité de cette méthode est limitée. Il faut en effet que les entreprises candidates à la 
fusion et leurs principales concurrentes soient cotées sur le marché. De surcroît, son utilisation est 
problématique pour les marchés sur lesquels les produits sont différenciés ou sur lesquels les opérations de 
fusion engendrent des effets de verrouillage ou encore sur lesquels des effets verticaux ou congloméraux 
jouent un rôle important. 
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Les études d’événement exigent de bonnes compétences économétriques, mais les données 
nécessaires pour les mener à bien sont limitées et faciles à obtenir. Par conséquent, cette méthode peut 
facilement être appliquée, mais n’est pas très fiable. M. Budzinski met en garde contre toute tentation de 
l’utiliser malgré tout. 
M. Budzinski s’intéresse pour finir aux enquêtes menées auprès des acteurs du marché, méthode qui 
ne repose sur aucune théorie économique. Cette méthode requiert d’interroger un grand nombre de 
personnes, qui ne sont pas nécessairement disponibles. Par rapport aux autres méthodes, les ressources 
nécessaires pour mener à bien de telles enquêtes sont limitées. Ces enquêtes exigent de disposer de 
certaines compétences statistiques et de savoir préparer des questionnaires. Lorsque l’on ne dispose guère 
de données sur le marché concerné, ces enquêtes peuvent s’avérer la seule méthode présentant un intérêt. 
Leur principal inconvénient est lié au fait que les participants du marché peuvent y répondre dans une 
optique stratégique, considérant que les réponses qu’ils donnent sont susceptibles d’orienter les décisions 
qui seront rendues dans l’avenir en matière de fusions. 
M. Budzinski souligne en conclusion qu’aucune méthode n’est parfaite s’agissant des évaluations ex-
post, chacune présentant des avantages et des inconvénients. Il préconise donc de combiner les différentes 
méthodes disponibles et met en garde, en tout état de cause, contre le recours aux études d’événement.  
Mme Vitale explique que le cabinet LEAR a pris part, pour le compte d’autorités de la concurrence, 
aux évaluations ex-post de trois décisions relatives à des opérations de fusions. En outre, les consultants de 
LEAR ont également préparé pour la DG Concurrence un rapport sur la méthodologie d’exécution de ces 
évaluations. Ce document peut être téléchargé sur le site Internet de l’UE. 
Mme Vitale passe en revue les éléments qu’elle considère, forte de son expérience, comme importants 
pour mener à bien une évaluation ex-post. 
Premièrement, l’évaluation doit être exhaustive. Elle doit permettre de déterminer si la décision prise 
était la bonne, mais également si, au moment où elle a été prise, l’analyse sur laquelle elle reposait était 
approfondie et valable à la lumière des informations qui étaient alors disponibles. L’autorité de la 
concurrence ne pourra améliorer son processus de décision qu’à cette seule condition. 
Deuxièmement, sachant que ces évaluations mobilisent beaucoup de ressources et qu’un petit nombre 
de décisions seulement peuvent donner lieu à une évaluation, les décisions en question doivent être 
choisies avec soin. Il peut être très intéressant d’examiner les décisions pour lesquelles les avis ont été très 
partagés, qui sont de nature à livrer un grand nombre d’enseignements. Les décisions d’agrément sont plus 
faciles à évaluer mais il peut être intéressant d’évaluer les décisions de refus ainsi que les décisions 
d’agrément assorties de mesures correctives. Le délai écoulé depuis le moment où la décision a été adoptée 
est également important. Si la décision rendue est trop récente, ses effets n’auront pas eu le temps de se 
matérialiser. Si ce délai est trop long, il peut être plus difficile de distinguer les effets découlant de la 
décision prise d’autres phénomènes qui sont apparus sur le marché. Il est en outre plus simple de recueillir 
des informations auprès des acteurs du marché après un certain temps. Le laps de temps idéal est de trois à 
cinq ans, selon la nature du marché concerné. En outre, le choix des décisions à examiner doit aussi être 
fonction de la disponibilité des données : aucune analyse n’est possible si les données sont insuffisantes. 
Par ailleurs, il est très important que les personnes procédant à l’évaluation portent un regard neuf sur 
la situation. De ce fait, l’équipe ayant rendu la décision ne doit pas être celle qui effectue l’évaluation. Elle 
devra peut-être quand même apporter son concours en raison de sa connaissance des faits, des données et 
de la documentation. Cela étant, l’un des problèmes que LEAR a souvent rencontré tenait au fait que trois 
à cinq après la décision rendue, aucun membre de l’équipe d’origine ne travaillait plus au sein de l’autorité 
de la concurrence. 
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L’impartialité de l’analyse est également importante. Les examens menés en interne peuvent parfois 
être biaisés, car les autorités peuvent rechigner à admettre qu’elles ont pu commettre une erreur. De plus, 
pour ces examens, l’autorité doit être dotée des compétences quantitatives requises. Si une méthode n’est 
pas mise en œuvre dans les règles de l’art, l’évaluation dans son ensemble perd tout intérêt. Or de telles 
compétences ne sont pas toujours disponibles en interne. En outre, ces examens peuvent être longs et 
fastidieux. Pour toutes ces raisons, il peut être souhaitable que des consultants extérieurs ou des 
universitaires s’en chargent. 
Mme Vitale ajoute qu’il convient toujours de mener une enquête d’opinion lorsqu’une évaluation 
d’impact est réalisée. Ces enquêtes permettent de vérifier la validité des évaluations quantitatives tout en 
constituent une bonne source d’informations, notamment concernant les aspects moins quantifiables 
comme les effets d’une fusion sur la qualité et l’innovation. Selon elles, les enquêtes nécessitent certaines 
qualifications, car la préparation d’un questionnaire n’est pas aussi simple qu’il y paraît. Elles exigent en 
outre certaines compétences statistiques pour assurer qu’un échantillon approprié est utilisé. Cela étant, si 
l’on interroge les concurrents, les fournisseurs et les grossistes, il est souvent possible de les interroger tous 
sans exception puisqu’ils ne sont généralement pas très nombreux. Cela permet d’éviter l’écueil avoir à 
constituer un échantillon représentatif. 
Mme Vitale en vient ensuite au dernier point qui est aussi le plus important pour elle, à savoir 
l’ampleur des données nécessaires. Ces données sont fonction de la méthodologie économétrique utilisée 
laquelle dépend, à son tour, des données utilisées. Les données requises sont également fonction des effets 
qu’a eus la décision sur laquelle porte l’évaluation (ses effets sur les prix ou son impact sur l’innovation). 
Ces données peuvent être difficiles à obtenir. Il est parfois possible d’acheter les données sur les prix et les 
quantités ou de se les procurer auprès de sources publiques, mais ce n’est pas toujours le cas. La plupart du 
temps, il est très difficile de recueillir les données relatives à la qualité, l’efficience et l’innovation. Il 
importe donc d’associer à l’examen mené les acteurs du marché, par exemple en les interrogeant dans le 
cadre d’une enquête, car ce sont eux qui détiennent la plupart des informations nécessaires. 
Un délégué de la Norvège demande aux experts comment les petits pays dont les autorités ne rendent 
que peu de décisions peuvent procéder à des examens ex-post. Ont-ils intérêt à effectuer des analyses 
qualitatives comparant un certain nombre d’études de cas couvrant plusieurs années ou plusieurs pays et à 
comparer entre eux les différents examens déjà réalisés ? 
M. Budzinski répond que le petit nombre de décisions rendues peut constituer un problème particulier 
si l’on envisage de mener une étude sur l’impact global du régime de contrôle des fusions, mais qu’il est 
moins problématique dès lors qu’il s’agit uniquement d’analyser un seul cas. Il confirme que les méthodes 
qualitatives, comme les enquêtes ou les commentaires d’experts, peuvent présenter un intérêt. Mme Vitale 
ajoute pour sa part que chaque examen ex-post comporte toujours une composante qualitative. Elle estime 
que, pour que l’évaluation réalisée soit exacte, il est indispensable de procéder concomitamment à une 
évaluation quantitative et à une évaluation qualitative et que même une analyse purement qualitative peut 
nous en apprendre beaucoup. 
Un délégué du Royaume-Uni explique qu’à ce jour, deux autorités britanniques ont mené à bien 
quatre évaluations ex-post approfondies d’un certain nombre de décisions relatives à des fusions. L’une de 
ces deux évaluations a été réalisée en interne par le personnel de la Competition Commission et les trois 
autres par des consultants extérieurs. Lors de ces évaluations, des agréments assortis de conditions, des 
agréments sans conditions et des refus ont été examinés. Les analyses menées ont revêtu un caractère à la 
fois qualitatif et quantitatif. Cependant, pour l’examen des décisions de refus, seules des méthodes 
qualitatives ont été utilisées. 
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La CC a commandé la plus récente de ces analyses qui a porté sur l’agrément de deux opérations de 
fusion sur les marchés de la distribution. Ces opérations ont été choisies car l’OFT comme la CC reçoivent 
un grand nombre de dossiers de fusion entre distributeurs qui leur sont renvoyés et ont donc estimé 
important d’améliorer leur processus de décision dans ce domaine. De plus, les marchés de la distribution 
se prêtent très bien aux analyses quantitatives en raison de la disponibilité des données. Pourtant, les 
autorités ont rencontré certaines difficultés pratiques pour obtenir les données nécessaires car les sources 
commerciales d’information se sont avérées très onéreuses. Les enseignements qui ont été tirés de ces 
évaluations ex-post ont été diffusés auprès du personnel des autorités lors de séminaires internes. 
Un délégué des Pays-Bas explique qu’en 2009, la NMa a mené à bien un examen ex-post sur les effets 
qu’ont eu deux fusions hospitalières sur les prix. L’une des deux opérations a été approuvée dès la 
première phase et la seconde lors de la deuxième phase, à la suite toutefois d’une décision très 
controversée. L’analyse a montré que la première fusion n’avait occasionné aucune majoration des prix 
alors que les prix avaient augmenté de 3.5 à 5 % après la deuxième. Selon l’interprétation de la NMa, ces 
résultats donnent à penser que le pouvoir de marché détenu par les établissements hospitaliers ayant 
fusionné lors de la deuxième fusion a augmenté à la suite de cette opération et que les pressions exercées 
par la concurrence n’étaient plus suffisantes pour neutraliser cette hausse. Cela laisse supposer que le 
marché géographique était probablement plus petit que le marché ayant servi de référence lorsque la 
décision a été rendue. 
L’évaluation, effectuée à l’aide de la méthode des doubles différences, portait sur les effets qu’a eus 
cette fusion sur les prix, fautes de données disponibles relatives à la qualité. Cette analyse a été réalisée en 
interne afin de limiter les problèmes de confidentialité (les informations sur les prix ont été communiquées 
par le ministère de la Santé néerlandais). Elle a en outre donné l’occasion au personnel de la NMa 
d’acquérir plus d’expérience concernant la réalisation de ce type d’analyse. 
Un délégué du Canada explique que le Bureau de la concurrence a réalisé deux examens ex-post dans 
l’intention d’améliorer son processus de décision. 
Pour le premier, un cabinet de conseil économique a été engagé pour déterminer si le Bureau de la 
concurrence avait correctement mené à bien les analyses qu’il devait réaliser et avait pris des décisions 
justifiées dans le cadre de trois procédures distinctes de contrôle des fusions. Les trois décisions retenues 
pour cet examen ont été choisies en concertation avec les consultants. Le choix de ces décisions a reposé 
sur les critères suivants : 1) le fait qu’au moment au moment où il a procédé au contrôle de la fusion, le 
Bureau de la concurrence avait réuni assez d’éléments pour pouvoir prédire, de manière suffisamment 
précise, quels en seraient les effets probables sur la concurrence, 2) le fait qu’un délai suffisant s’était 
écoulé depuis que le Bureau avait rendu sa décision pour que le marché concerné aient eu le temps 
d’évoluer après l’opération, 3) le fait que le marché concerné n’était pas en mutation constante au moment 
de la fusion (ou après) de sorte qu’il aurait été difficile de déterminer sa réaction après la fusion, 4) le fait 
que les acteurs du marché seraient probablement disposés à être interrogés et à communiquer des 
informations utiles et 5) le fait que des données publiques sur les conditions prévalant sur le marché avant 
et après la fusion étaient disponibles. Les opérations de fusion examinées dans le cadre de cette analyse 
avaient toutes suscité d’importantes préoccupations du point de vue de la concurrence, mais le Bureau de la 
concurrence avait finalement décidé qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de les contester devant le Tribunal de la 
concurrence ou qu’il n’était pas justifié de demander aux parties des mesures correctives. En outre, les 
opérations retenues avaient eu lieu dans trois secteurs d’activité différents. Selon les conclusions formulées 
dans l’analyse, le Bureau de la concurrence avait évalué avec exactitude les conditions de marché à l’aide 
des informations qu’il avait alors à sa disposition. Les consultants ont formulé un certain nombre 
d’observations et de recommandations relatives à l’analyse des fusions réalisée par le Bureau de la 
concurrence, que celui-ci a incluses dans son projet de lignes directrices récemment publié (Fusions – 
Lignes directrices pour l’application de la loi). 
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Le deuxième examen évaluait si les mesures correctives que le Bureau a imposées dans 23 cas de 
1986 à 2005 avaient été conçues et mises en œuvre avec efficacité. Cet examen a mobilisé d’importantes 
ressources et a été réalisé en interne, même si les agents du Bureau qui avaient procédé aux premières 
analyses n’y ont pas pris part. Cet examen était purement qualitatif. Le personnel du Bureau a ainsi 
interrogé quelque 135 acteurs du marché. À partir des informations recueillies lors de ces entretiens, 
l’équipe chargée de réaliser l’examen a formulé un certain nombre d’observations que le Bureau devra 
prendre en compte dans l’avenir lors de la conception et de la mise en œuvre des mesures correctives dans 
les cas de fusion. 
Le Président s’inquiète, pour le premier examen, du risque que le Bureau ait choisi de ne soumettre 
que les affaires pour lesquelles il était convaincu que cet exercice ne ferait apparaître aucune lacune 
importante de sa part. Le délégué du Canada répond que si un tel choix avait été fait, l’examen mené 
n’aurait eu que peu voire aucun intérêt et que c’est du reste précisément pour cette raison que le choix avait 
porté sur des affaires « limites », suscitant des préoccupations du point de vue de la concurrence. 
S’agissant du deuxième examen, le Président se soucie du risque que les acteurs du marché aient pu 
répondre dans une optique stratégique, sachant que les résultats de cet exercice auraient une incidence sur 
le comportement du Bureau lors de ses enquêtes portant sur des opérations de fusion. Le Président 
demande plus généralement comment éviter un tel risque lorsque des enquêtes sont menées dans le cadre 
d’une évaluation ex-post. 
Le délégué du Canada explique que l’identité des personnes interrogées a été prise en compte pour 
apprécier la valeur des informations fournies, par exemple si ces informations provenaient de concurrents 
ou d’un acquéreur potentiel ayant réussi à racheter les actifs cédés. Mme Vitale ajoute que LEAR a réalisé 
un petit nombre d’enquêtes et que les informations communiquées par les acteurs du marché semblaient 
exactes, dans la mesure où les réponses données par les différentes parties ne divergeaient généralement 
pas. En outre, sur de nombreux marchés, les fusions sont rares ; de ce fait, les acteurs du marché peuvent 
faire abstraction du fait que leur comportement pourrait avoir une incidence sur les futures procédures de 
contrôle des fusions. 
Le Président demande à Mme Vitale si elle pense qu’au fil du temps, si de telles enquêtes se 
généralisent, ce problème s’accentuera. Les entreprises pourraient en effet commencer à prendre conseil 
auprès de leurs juristes lorsqu’elles reçoivent un questionnaire et se comporter ensuite dans une optique 
plus stratégique. Mme Vitale répond qu’en effet une telle attitude n’est pas à exclure. Jusqu’à présent, les 
réponses aux questionnaires que LEAR a reçues lui étaient directement adressées par les services 
commerciaux des entreprises qui ne semblaient pas avoir fait appel à des juristes. Le seul problème que son 
cabinet rencontre concernant les réponses données par les acteurs du marché tient au fait que les parties à 
la fusion ne sont jamais disposées à coopérer, probablement par crainte que l’examen mené puisse révéler 
que la fusion réalisée a eu des effets préjudiciables pour la concurrence. 
Un délégué de la Suède explique que les autorités de son pays ont elles aussi une expérience des 
évaluations ex-post et ont été confrontées à des problèmes liés au recueil des données. La loi ne confère à 
la KKV aucun pouvoir lui permettant d’obliger les entreprises à lui fournir des données au cours des 
évaluations ex-post. De ce fait, cet organisme a dû parfois acheter au prix fort à des sources commerciales 
les données nécessaires. Le délégué demande si d’autres pays ont trouvé un moyen de régler ce problème 
ou sont dotés d’une législation leur permettant d’imposer aux entreprises de fournir les données nécessaires 
pour mener à bien les analyses ex-post. 
Le délégué du Royaume-Uni reprend à son compte cette difficulté. La CC a dû, elle aussi, acheter des 
données pour réaliser ses toutes dernières analyses quantitatives et a dû renoncer à contrôler une troisième 
opération de fusion faute d’avoir pu se procurer des données auprès de sources commerciales et du fait que 
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les parties n’ont pas souhaité les lui fournir. Dans l’ensemble, la CC trouve que les parties sont davantage 
disposées à coopérer lorsqu’il s’agit d’analyses qualitatives. 
En ce qui concerne ce problème, le délégué des États-Unis ajoute que le recueil des données n’est pas 
toujours aussi difficile. Ainsi, s’agissant des décisions compliquées pour lesquelles les avis sont très 
partagés, lorsque l’autorité finit par approuver la fusion au motif que l’arrivée de nouveaux concurrents est 
très probable ou qu’une technologie alternative va être prochainement mise sur le marché, il lui est très 
facile de vérifier par la suite que la situation a bien évolué comme elle s’y attendait. Il en va de même dans 
les cas où, pour prendre sa décision, l’autorité a largement tenu compte du fait que les parties avaient mis 
en avant les gains d’efficience qui découlerait de l’opération. La FTC a récemment ouvert une enquête sur 
une coentreprise formée par deux fabricants de lanceurs lourds permettant de placer en orbite des satellites. 
Les entreprises concernées ont fait valoir que le volume de production était trop limité et que la formation 
d’une coentreprise serait avantageuse pour tout le monde. La FTC a pu vérifier sans difficulté par la suite 
le bien fondé de cette affirmation. 
Le Président explique que dans la plupart des cas, le niveau de concurrence après la fusion peut 
dépendre d’un ensemble complexe de facteurs compliquant l’évaluation de l’impact de l’opération. Il 
précise que les exemples fournis par les États-Unis peuvent présenter un intérêt pour vérifier si les 
entreprises ont communiqué des informations exactes à l’autorité de la concurrence, mais que 
concrètement, dans la plupart des cas, il n’est pas facile d’évaluer si la concurrence a diminué après la 
décision relative de fusion. Le délégué des États-Unis objecte que si les parties à une fusion font 
généralement valoir un certain nombre d’arguments, c’est en fait généralement un unique argument 
indiscutable qui détermine la décision prise lorsque les avis sont très partagés. Même si dans chaque cas de 
figure, d’autres facteurs jouent un rôle, l’autorité de la concurrence se trouve bien souvent contrainte de 
trancher en ne se fondant que sur un seul argument irréfutable et c’est alors ce seul argument qui peut et 
doit faire l’objet, le cas échéant, de l’évaluation ex-post. 
Mme Vitale convient avec le Président que les parties à une fusion présentent généralement un certain 
nombre d’arguments. La plupart du temps, la majorité de ces arguments s’avèrent fondés (par exemple, de 
nouveaux concurrents ont bien fait leur entrée sur le marché), mais on ne peut savoir si les facteurs 
invoqués par les parties ont suffi à neutraliser les effets anticoncurrentiels de la fusion. Cela étant, lorsque 
les avis sont très partagés, les autorités doivent clairement préciser quels arguments indiscutables les ont 
conduites à prendre telle ou telle décision de sorte qu’il sera plus facile de vérifier à l’avenir si la situation 
a bien évolué comme l’autorité l’avait supposé au moment où elle a rendu sa décision. Néanmoins, les 
évaluations ex-post ne sont généralement pas si simples et la disponibilité des données est un facteur 
important pour déterminer s’il est possible de procéder à un tel examen. 
Le délégué des États-Unis ajoute que cette question est étroitement liée aux précautions que prend 
l’autorité de la concurrence pour justifier telle ou telle décision rendue. Les parties à une fusion avanceront 
toujours quantité de raisons plaidant en faveur de l’agrément de l’opération. L’autorité de la concurrence 
peut toutefois passer toutes ces raisons au crible pour ne retenir que celles qui sont réellement pertinentes. 
Pour toute décision, il est donc important – et cela sera payant par la suite – qu’elle indique clairement, 
avec beaucoup de précautions, les arguments irréfutables sur lesquelles elle a fondé sa décision et qu’elle 
s’abstienne de se retrancher derrière une multitude de raisons pour justifier sa décision. 
Un représentant du Secrétariat de l’OCDE prend la parole. Il convient que toutes sortes de 
circonstances peuvent évoluer après une décision relative à une opération de fusion mais que toutes les 
évolutions qui surviennent alors ne peuvent être attribuables à la décision en question, ce que les examens 
ex-post sont précisément censés permettre de comprendre. Pour rendre leurs décisions, les autorités doivent 
toujours se livrer à des prédictions. Il importe de faire le point de temps à autre et de vérifier si leurs 
prédictions se sont révélées justes. De nombreux enseignements peuvent être tirés de ces exercices. Le 
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représentant du Secrétariat de l’OCDE cite, à titre d’exemple, la contribution des États-Unis se rapportant à 
l’évaluation ex-post d’une décision relative à une fusion hospitalière. D’après cette évaluation, le critère 
d’Elzinga-Hogarty que l’autorité de la concurrence avait utilisé pour rendre sa décision ne lui avait pas 
permis de faire des prédictions très exactes, un constat très utile qui pourra lui resservir lors de l’évaluation 
future d’opérations de fusion du même genre. 
Une déléguée de la Norvège explique que la loi impose à l’autorité de la concurrence norvégienne 
d’évaluer rétrospectivement au moins une décision relative à une fusion par an, ainsi qu’une décision 
relative à une entente et une décision concernant un abus de position dominante. Elle souligne que pour les 
petits pays, il est souvent particulièrement difficile de procéder à des examens ex-post car les autorités ne 
peuvent choisir que parmi un ensemble limité de décisions rendues. Ainsi, ces cinq dernières années, 
l’autorité de la concurrence norvégienne n’a eu à évaluer que deux opérations de fusion par an en 
moyenne.  
Le Président revient sur la contribution des États-Unis et s’interroge sur le sens réel du message 
qu’elle contient. En effet, de nombreuses raisons avancées dans cette contribution plaident en faveur des 
évaluations ex-post mais il y est également souligné que ces analyses peuvent être très onéreuses et 
difficiles. Un délégué des États-Unis confirme que ces évaluations sont à la fois utiles et coûteuses. 
Il ajoute en outre que la FTC réalise la plupart de ces examens en interne en utilisant généralement la 
méthode des doubles différences. La FTC peut se le permettre car elle dispose de ressources suffisantes et 
qu’elle est dotée, en particulier, d’un vivier d’économistes extrêmement qualifiés. En outre, la loi lui donne 
pour mandat de mener des études. La commission peut donc employer son personnel à ces activités sans le 
faire au détriment d’autres activités. Elle n’a donc pas besoin de recourir à des consultants extérieurs. La 
FTC estime par ailleurs que certains mécanismes en interne l’incitent à vérifier qu’elle a pris de bonnes 
décisions, mais aussi à obtenir la bonne réponse et à tirer des enseignements des erreurs passées. De fait, la 
plupart des analyses rétrospectives qu’elle réalise sont publiées sous forme de documents de travail que les 
auteurs s’efforcent souvent de faire paraître dans des bulletins universitaires, les soumettant ainsi à 
l’appréciation de pairs. 
Le délégué formule en outre des commentaires sur l’avis exprimé par M. Budzinski sur les études 
d’événement, sur lesquelles son opinion n’est pas aussi négative. Avant l’annonce d’une fusion, la 
probabilité que cette opération va avoir lieu est déjà forte et elle s’accroît encore au moment où l’annonce 
est faite. Il est utile de suivre ces évolutions discrètes dont l’impact peut notamment être évalué grâce aux 
études d’événement. 
Un délégué de la Grèce fait observer que l’autorité grecque de la concurrence a eu recours à deux 
reprises à des études d’événement qu’elle a trouvées relativement utiles. 
Un délégué du Japon explique que la JFTC applique plusieurs des méthodes évoquées pour réaliser 
ses évaluations ex-post. Elle a publié un examen de ce type en 2007. La JFTC a évalué un échantillon de 
plusieurs opérations de fusion, procédant à une analyse plus approfondie de certaines d’entre elles. Pour 
mener à bien ces évaluations, elle a fait appel aux données quantitatives rendues publiques et à des 
entretiens avec les parties concernées. Une autre analyse consacrée aux gains d’efficacité résultant des 
fusions a été effectuée par le Centre de recherche sur la politique de la concurrence (CPRC) de la JFTC, au 
sein duquel le personnel de la JFTC et des experts extérieurs mènent à bien des études conjointes. Les 
experts cherchent à analyser les effets des fusions sur la (1) rentabilité, (2) le cours des actions, (3) la 
recherche-développement et (4) les prix de vente, pour lesquels ils ont effectué une analyse économétrique. 
Ils ont principalement utilisé des données provenant de sources publiques, sauf pour les données obtenues 
par lecture optique utilisées pour les besoins de l’analyse des prix. Selon les résultats de cet examen, 
s’agissant des cas examinés, les effets d’efficience revendiqués ne s’étaient pas toujours matérialisés.  
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Un délégué du BIAC affirme que le processus de contrôle des fusions est nécessairement un exercice 
théorique prospectif, mais que l’agrément de fusions ayant des effets anticoncurrentiels ou le blocage de 
fusions qui n’auraient pas d’impact préjudiciable sur la concurrence a des répercussions bien réelles. Les 
autorités de la concurrence seraient donc avisées de consacrer du temps et des efforts à évaluer si les 
décisions passées ont été efficaces afin d’améliorer celles qu’elles rendront dans l’avenir. La question est, 
bien entendu, de savoir comment obtenir les résultats les plus instructifs. De ce fait, les évaluations ex-post 
doivent être des exercices très ouverts et réalisés sans arrière-pensée mettant en avant les réussites mais 
aussi les erreurs passées. 
Le délégué insiste sur le fait qu’une coopération entre les autorités de la concurrence dans ce domaine 
est souhaitable. Il estime qu’il convient d’examiner de près les affaires qui ont été évaluées par différents 
organismes quand les résultats des évaluations menées ont divergé. De même, du fait que ce type 
d’analyses ont été relativement peu fréquentes dans le passé et le seront probablement encore dans l’avenir, 
les autorités seraient avisées d’échanger entre elles tous les enseignements qu’elles ont pu en tirer. Les 
autorités de la concurrence devraient réaliser périodiquement des évaluations ex-post, faire appel, dans un 
souci d’impartialité, à des consultants extérieurs et s’abstenir d’évaluer les décisions qu’elles ont elles-
mêmes rendues. 
Un délégué d’Afrique du Sud explique que l’autorité sud-africaine reconnaît que les examens ex-post 
sont une priorité, ce qui a clairement été précisé dans son plan stratégique pour les trois prochaines années. 
L’autorité a commencé à réaliser certains « mini-exercices d’évaluation » dans les secteurs de la sidérurgie, 
de l’aviculture et des services miniers pour déterminer si ses décisions se sont avérées fondées. Pour cela, 
l’autorité a principalement eu recours aux informations qu’elle a pu avoir à sa disposition au moment de 
l’enquête préalable à la fusion et qui lui ont été communiquées par les parties prenantes. Les ressources, le 
temps et les compétences dont elle a disposé se sont avérées sans conteste limitées. L’autorité de la 
concurrence sud-africaine est en contact étroit avec certaines de ses homologues, notamment l’autorité 
britannique, avec lesquelles elle échange des expériences et des compétences en matière d’évaluations ex-
post. À cet égard, elle apprécierait de disposer d’un manuel sur les méthodes à utiliser pour réaliser ces 
évaluations. 
2. Utilisation des évaluations ex-post à des fins de promotion 
Un délégué de l’UE soutient que la difficulté réelle liée aux évaluations ex-post, qu’elles soient 
réalisées pour promouvoir les règles de concurrence ou pour améliorer le processus de décision, consiste à 
déterminer le bon scénario contrefactuel. L’exposé de M. Budzinski a donné l’impression que les 
estimations structurelles sont toujours extrêmement complexes, ce qui est vrai si l’on prévoit d’estimer tous 
les paramètres du modèle. Cela étant, on peut aussi utiliser des hypothèses très simples pour calibrer ces 
paramètres. C’est ce que l’UE a fait. L’unité de la DG Concurrence chargée des évaluations utilise le 
modèle PCAIDS (« proportionally calibrated almost ideal demand system ») pour les simulations de 
fusion. Ce modèle est assez simple d’utilisation et ne nécessite de tenir compte que d’un petit nombre de 
paramètres pour estimer l’impact d’une fusion. À l’évidence, comme toutes les méthodes très simples, 
celle-ci présente des limites importantes. Premièrement, elle ne laisse aucune marge pour les erreurs type 1 
ou de type 2. Elle ne permet pas non plus de mettre en évidence les erreurs de type 3 qui se produisent 
lorsque la décision rendue est bonne mais qu’elle a été prise pour de mauvaises raisons. Cette méthode fait 
toutefois ressortir les avantages découlant des bonnes décisions. 
Au sein de l’UE, des demandes se sont exprimées dans le passé en faveur d’une production de 
données relatives aux avantages découlant des activités exercées par l’Union pour faire respecter le droit de 
la concurrence. Dans un premier temps, l’UE s’est bornée à présenter un chiffre qui constituait une 
transformation linéaire du nombre d’affaires examinées. Cela étant, des améliorations méthodologiques ont 
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été apportées depuis et l’UE présente désormais une estimation des avantages que les consommateurs tirent 
de toutes les décisions importantes concernant les fusions qu’elle a prises en cours d’année. 
Le délégué de l’UE rappelle en outre aux participants que lors de l’analyse des décisions à des fins de 
promotion du droit de la concurrence, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la politique de la concurrence a pour 
principale justification la dissuasion. En raison de difficultés méthodologiques, cet effet n’est normalement 
pas pris en compte lors de l’analyse des avantages découlant des contrôles des fusions. Il est pourtant très 
important. Le délégué cite un exemple extrême pour expliquer cette idée. À supposer qu’une autorité de la 
concurrence dissuade toutes les fusions anticoncurrentielles, alors seules les fusions pro-concurrentielles 
ou neutres du point de vue de la concurrence lui seront notifiées. Le cas échéant, il ne découlerait de 
l’activité directe de contrôle des fusions exercée par l’autorité aucun avantage pour les consommateurs. Le 
cas échéant, cette autorité ferait malgré tout un meilleur travail qu’une autorité qui bloquerait un grand 
nombre de fusions anticoncurrentielles. Par conséquent, le délégué rappelle que les chiffres effectivement 
issus de ces estimations, quoique très utiles, ne laissent entrevoir qu'une partie de la réalité. 
Un délégué de la Hongrie fait observer que nul ne conteste que l’évaluation ex-post des décisions 
relatives aux fusions est une activité très importante, mais que le consensus est toutefois moindre sur le fait 
qu’il s’agit là d’une bonne utilisation des ressources limitées des autorités de la concurrence. Il est donc 
très important de compiler les meilleures pratiques ou de mettre au point des méthodes simples pour aider 
les autorités de la concurrence de moindre envergure. 
Un délégué de la Corée note que son pays a réalisé certaines évaluations ex-post de décisions relatives 
à des fusions dans l’intention d’améliorer son régime de contrôle des fusions, notamment concernant les 
mesures correctives comportementales lors des fusions horizontales. Dans le cadre de ces évaluations, 
seule l’évolution des parts de marché, des résultats financiers et des prix de produits de référence après la 
fusion a été examinée. Selon les conclusions de ces évaluations, nombre de mesures comportementales 
imposées isolément n’ont pas neutralisé les effets anticoncurrentiels des fusions. Ces résultats ont conduit 
la KFTC à modifier son approche en matière d’application de la loi s’agissant des fusions en vue de 
recourir davantage à des mesures structurelles, à tout le moins pour les fusions horizontales. 
Un délégué des États-Unis déclare que l’éventail des techniques d’évaluation que l’on peut utiliser va 
de méthodes extrêmement onéreuses et très élaborées à des méthodes moins coûteuses et relativement 
faciles à appliquer. Ce délégué fait état d’une table ronde organisée à l’automne 2001 par la FTC. Lors de 
cette table ronde, un groupe d’économistes, (Carlton, Willig, Ordover, Schmalensee et Winston 
notamment) a fait collectivement la proposition suivante : si une autorité de la concurrence approuve une 
fusion au sujet de laquelle les avis étaient très partagés, par exemple une fusion se caractérisant par le 
passage de trois à deux acteurs sur le marché et l’arrivée imminente de nouveaux concurrents ou par la 
perspective d’importants gains d’efficacité, elle doit le faire à la condition d’évaluer le marché 
ultérieurement afin de déterminer si son agrément était vraiment approprié. Les économistes ont reconnu 
que cela ne serait pas facile, mais que si une autorité de la concurrence prend une décision difficile, elle 
doit être prête à courir le risque de réexaminer cette décision par la suite et d’accepter les erreurs qu’elle 
peut avoir commises. 
M. Budzinski explique que les cas pour lesquels les avis sont très partagés ne présentent peut-être pas 
tous un intérêt. Parfois en effet, c’est moins leur impact économique qui n’est pas évident que les faits eux-
mêmes qui ne sont pas clairs. Les cas qu’il faut envisager d’évaluer ex-post sont ceux dont l’impact 
économique n’est pas clair, car ce sont eux qui permettent aux autorités de tirer certains enseignements. 
Les fusions situées à la frontière entre les conglomérats et les fusions horizontales en sont un exemple, les 
économistes n’ayant toujours pas une très bonne compréhension de leur impact. Il est également 
intéressant de se pencher sur les cas susceptibles de nous en apprendre beaucoup sur les méthodes 
employées lors de l’analyse ex-ante. Par exemple, s’il a fallu procéder dans une affaire à un grand nombre 
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de simulations ex-ante, il serait intéressant de revenir sur cette affaire pour vérifier la qualité des modèles 
de simulation ex ante utilisés. 
Le Président demande à M. Budzinski s’il convient que, pour réaliser des évaluations ex-post à des 
fins de promotion, on peut utiliser des techniques simples, même si celles-ci sont moins précises. 
M. Budzinski répond que cette solution peut être envisagée lorsque l’analyse vise à démontrer le bien-
fondé d’un régime de contrôle des fusions. On peut utiliser des techniques sommaires pour évaluer un 
grand nombre d’affaires, mais pas nécessairement pour analyser en profondeur une affaire donnée. 
M. Budzinski convient en outre avec le délégué de l’UE qu’il faut savoir que les évaluations visant à 
déterminer le coût des régimes de contrôle des fusions pour les contribuables et les consommateurs ne 
couvrent qu’une petite fraction des avantages réels de ces régimes, puisque ceux-ci ont un pouvoir de 
dissuasion que l’on ne mesure pas normalement, mais qui joue toutefois un grand rôle. 
Un délégué du Brésil demande si, lorsqu’elle évalue une opération de fusion sur un marché donné, 
l’autorité de la concurrence doit effectuer un réexamen de toutes les décisions prises dans le passé 
concernant ce même marché. L’autorité de la concurrence procède assez souvent de la sorte au Brésil. En 
effet, l’évaluation ex-post de décisions antérieures peut aider l’autorité de la concurrence à prendre une 
décision dans une nouvelle affaire. Il cite l’exemple d’une affaire concernant les droits des actionnaires 
minoritaires dans une société de ciments. Une opération de rachat a été approuvée, sous réserve de 
certaines mesures correctives. Quelques années plus tard, l’entreprise décidait de fusionner avec d’autres 
sociétés de son secteur et de réaliser une intégration verticale avec certaines entreprises de production de 
béton. À l’occasion de cette seconde opération, l’autorité de la concurrence a analysé les engagements pris 
à l’époque qui l’avaient conduite à approuver la première opération, concluant alors que ces engagements 
s’étaient révélés insuffisants. De ce fait, elle a donc dû, dans une certaine mesure, ne pas en tenir compte 
pour évaluer les effets possibles de la nouvelle opération. Cette analyse globale l’a conduite à conclure que 
la fusion aurait abouti à une réduction de la concurrence et la CADE a donc bloqué l’opération. 
Ce délégué demande ensuite à M. Budzinski comment utiliser les outils économétriques pour isoler 
les conséquences de la décision rendue d’autres phénomènes survenant sur le marché en cause. Selon la 
réponse de M. Budzinski, tout dépend du fait que l’autorité réussit ou non à trouver un bon groupe de 
contrôle. Si elle ne peut trouver de marché exposé aux mêmes chocs extérieurs et à la même évolution 
macroéconomique que celui où la fusion a lieu, mais sur lequel cette opération n’a pas d’incidence, elle 
peut alors recourir à des outils économétriques pour isoler les effets de la fusion. 
3. Comment faire participer un plus grand nombre d’autorités à ces exercices  
Le Président aborde ensuite la question de savoir comment élaborer un recueil des meilleures 
pratiques et aider un plus grand nombre d’autorités de la concurrence à réaliser ces évaluations. Il présente 
M. Gavil, lequel explique que si nul ne conteste l’utilité des évaluations ex-post, un effort est encore 
nécessaire pour définir les meilleures pratiques généralement admises dans ce domaine et les méthodes à 
utiliser pour les mettre en œuvre. Cet effort est indispensable et suppose également de mettre au point des 
approches simplifiées permettant à toutes les autorités de la concurrence, même les petites qui sont dotées 
de ressources limitées, de réaliser de telles évaluations. 
M. Gavil formule quelques suggestions. L’accès aux données est souvent cité comme une contrainte 
onéreuse. Une solution possible consiste à centrer les examens sur les secteurs d’activité pour lesquels des 
données publiques sont disponibles. Dans un certain nombre de pays, les autorités ont jugé utile de cibler 
leur action sur certains secteurs donnés et de procéder, pour ces secteurs, à des évaluations répétées. Elles 
peuvent également procéder en adossant les évaluations réalisées en interne sur les précédentes. 
Lorsqu’une nouvelle fusion a lieu au sein d’un même secteur, l’autorité dispose ainsi déjà d’informations 
provenant des précédentes décisions et peut les mettre à profit. Une autre solution consiste à « semer des 
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petites graines » : les personnes qui doivent rendre une décision recensent les problèmes qui les 
préoccupent le plus ainsi que les postulats fondamentaux qui les conduisent à prendre telle ou telle 
décision, autant d’éléments qui baliseront les futures évaluations. Les économistes peuvent aussi s’efforcer 
de mettre au point des méthodes que les autorités pourront utilement mettre en œuvre par étapes en 
mobilisant différents niveaux de ressources. 
Mme Vitale convient que certaines méthodes permettent en effet d’économiser temps et argent. Ainsi, 
l’un des grands problèmes qui se pose est lié au fait que le recueil des données peut être onéreux ou 
prendre beaucoup de temps, sachant que le temps passé est un facteur de coûts. L’utilisation de données 
publiques, lorsqu’elles sont accessibles, permet de surmonter ce problème. En « semant des graines », 
selon la formule de M. Gavil, une autorité peut aussi simplifier les futures évaluations qu’elle réalisera en 
limitant le temps et les ressources qu’elle doit y consacrer. 
Les petites autorités de la concurrence ne disposent toutefois pas toujours des compétences dont elles 
auraient besoin pour mettre en œuvre certaines méthodes. Elles peuvent alors recourir à des approches plus 
qualitatives, comme les enquêtes d’opinion, qui peuvent leur fournir de nombreuses informations sur la 
qualité d’une décision. Toutefois, Mme Vitale met en garde contre toute simplification excessive. Les 
études économétriques doivent reposer sur des normes minimales et, si une autorité ne dispose pas des 
compétences qui conviennent ou des données appropriées, il est préférable qu’elle y renonce, une étude 
économétrique mal menée étant pire qu’une absence d’analyse. 
M. Budzinski explique que les méthodes quantitatives donnent lieu à un arbitrage fondamental entre 
la complexité de l’analyse et sa fiabilité. Pour réaliser une analyse économétrique qui soit à la fois fiable et 
de bonne qualité, on ne peut se permettre de prendre de raccourci. Pour autant, si l’objet de l’évaluation est 
de tirer des enseignements sur les effets des fusions, les pays doivent pouvoir apprendre les uns des autres. 
Si l’on cherche à comprendre de quelle manière des fusions réalisées sur un marché donné ou certaines 
catégories de mesures correctives ont une incidence sur la concurrence, il n’est peut être pas nécessaire que 
les autorités de chaque pays du monde procède chacune de nouveau à l’examen de ces questions. 
Un délégué de la Belgique formule des observations sur les difficultés que rencontrent, lorsqu’elles 
réalisent des examens ex-post, les autorités de la concurrence, fussent-elles de grande envergure et bien 
dotées, et se demande si cela doit être un motif de soulagement ou de consternation pour les autorités de 
moindre envergure. Il se déclare ensuite favorable à un échange d’expériences dans ce domaine.  
Un délégué de l’UE revient sur la question des mesures correctives. La Commission européenne a 
réalisé des travaux, en interne, consacrés à l’efficacité de ces mesures dans certains secteurs donnés, même 
si ces travaux ne sont pas encore dans le domaine public. Elle a eu recours à des enquêtes qui ont été bien 
conçues, auxquelles les personnes interrogées ont donné des réponses précises. Il s’agit là d’un domaine 
dans lequel les pays auraient beaucoup à apprendre les uns des autres pour améliorer leurs procédures de 
contrôle des fusions. 
Une déléguée du Royaume-Uni reconnaît que la réalisation d’examens ex-post peut engendrer des 
avantages substantiels. Ces examens peuvent ainsi donner l’occasion de comprendre qu’il convient 
d’améliorer les théories économiques jusque-là appliquées aux opérations de fusion. Il lui semble 
cependant très ambitieux de programmer la compilation d’un ensemble unique, applicable à tous les cas de 
figure, de meilleures pratiques à mettre en œuvre pour les évaluations ex-post des fusions. 
Un représentant du Secrétariat exprime des préoccupations analogues. Toute tentative visant à 
élaborer un recueil unique de meilleures pratiques serait une erreur. Il n’existe pas de modèle universel. 
Cela étant, il est possible d’élaborer un manuel contenant un ensemble de conseils et de suggestions. S’il 
est parfois indispensable de mettre en œuvre des méthodes très élaborées pour obtenir une réponse, cela 
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n’est pas toujours le cas et quelquefois des analyses simples peuvent largement faire l’affaire. En outre, les 
autorités de la concurrence expérimentées peuvent apporter leur aide à celles qui le sont moins en 
partageant leurs connaissances avec elles. 
Le Président ajoute que ce dernier échange a été particulièrement instructif, les délégués ayant 
exprimé différentes idées sur la manière de gérer les problèmes inhérents aux examens ex-post alors même 
qu’il n’existe pour l’heure aucune enceinte où cette confrontation d’idées pourrait avoir lieu. De ce fait, s’il 
n’est pas souhaitable d’élaborer un recueil des pratiques recommandées, il pourrait cependant être utile de 
rédiger un document présentant toute une série d’approches pour régler les problèmes inhérents à ces 
évaluations et proposant certaines méthodes simplifiées. 
Un délégué de la Roumanie partage l’avis selon lequel le Comité pourrait élaborer un manuel qui 
procurerait une aide aux autorités de la concurrence venant tout juste de commencer à réaliser de telles 
évaluations. L’examen ex-post des décisions relatives aux fusions n’est pas encore une priorité de premier 
plan en Roumanie du fait que les opérations de fusion n’y sont généralement pas très complexes. Il est en 
outre préférable à ce stade que l’autorité de la concurrence les réalise en interne et de ce fait un recueil 
compilant les meilleures pratiques, des exemples, ainsi que les méthodes existantes lui serait très utile. 
Un délégué des États-Unis fait observer qu’à certains égards, une approche universelle est possible. 
Les autorités aspirent toutes en général à pouvoir répondre aux questions suivantes : comment savoir 
qu’une méthode fonctionne ? Comment savoir si l’action menée est judicieuse ? Le manuel sur la réforme 
de la réglementation constitue un excellent exemple d’outil permettant de partager des expériences, de 
compiler des techniques et de procéder à un échange de vues sur les ouvrages économiques publiés sur 
cette question. Il serait envisageable de faire de même concernant les évaluations ex-post. 
Le Président conclut la table ronde en se déclarant favorable à l’idée d’un manuel consacré aux 
évaluations ex-post des décisions relatives aux fusions. Ce manuel n’aurait nullement pour fonction 
d’apporter une réponse universelle à toutes les questions qui se posent mais permettrait aux différents pays 
de disposer de références, d’exemples et d’idées qui pourraient leur être utiles. 
